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This dissertation has been motivated by my two broad areas of interest – the nonprofit sector and 
health care, – and in particular by the growing number of community health centers in the United 
States in the last decade. The dissertation consists of three chapters: In the first chapter, I 
estimate the causal impact of community health centers on the utilization of emergency rooms in 
California, in 2006-2010. In the second chapter, I study the San Francisco healthcare reform of 
2007-2008. And in the third chapter, I analyze California’s Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 and 
its impact on governance and revenue growth of nonprofit organizations. 
The First Chapter is titled “The Effect of Community Health Centers on Utilization of 
Emergency Care: Evidence from California.” The United States has a long list of programs that 
aim to reduce disparities in access to health care, including public health insurance, subsidies, 
and health insurance mandates on employers, insurers, and private citizens. This paper focuses 
on an alternative but complementary way of bringing medical care to medically underserved 
populations: community health centers (CHCs). CHCs provide primary health care services to 
two main groups - the uninsured and Medicaid enrollees - who face barriers to accessing primary 
health services and often turn to their local emergency departments (EDs) for non-urgent medical 
care. To examine the effect of CHCs on ED visits that do not result in an immediate hospital 
admission, I first use an event study that relies on an ED patient’s proximity to a CHC and 
exploits the variation in the number of clinics in each zip code over time. To deal with 
endogenous clinic entry, I use a second differences-in-differences strategy that uses proximity to 
a highway to model the patient’s level of access to a CHC. I find that recent expansions in the 
CHC sector have been effective in reducing the number of non-hospitalization ED visits by 
uninsured non-elderly adults and have had no impact on the number of ED visits by patients with 
private or public insurance. The results are robust to different measures of access, sample 
composition, and choices of specification. 
The Second Chapter is titled “Impact of the San Francisco Health Care Reform of 2007-
2008 on the Utilization of Emergency Departments.” In July 2007, the city and county of San 
Francisco launched the Healthy San Francisco Program (HSF) that aimed to substantially 
increase access to a broad range of medical services for uninsured residents of San Francisco. In 
March 2011, about 54,500 uninsured San Franciscans between the ages of 18 and 64 (or roughly 
two thirds of the city’s non-elderly adults without any medical coverage) were enrolled in HSF 
to take advantage of affordable and well-coordinated primary and preventive health care. In the 
first half of 2008, the city also enacted the Health Care Security Ordinance (HCSO), by which 
San Francisco-based employers must spend a certain minimum amount on employee health care 
either through the provision of employer-sponsored health insurance, or by contributing to the 
Healthy San Francisco or Health Savings Accounts.  In this paper, I analyze the impact of 
Healthy San Francisco and the Health Care Security Ordinance on the utilization of emergency 
rooms by non-elderly adults in San Francisco. My main specification is based on a differences-
in-differences strategy, in which I take zip codes in the nearby Bay Area as a comparison group. 
I also perform a within-San Francisco analysis. Both strategies produce a consistent set of results 
for uninsured patients. Overall, I find that HSF and HCSO reduced the number of non-admission 
ED visits by uninsured by an average of 30.1% between 2007 and 2009-2010. However, because 
this reduction coincides with a higher use of emergency rooms by patients with private insurance 
and by those covered by county funds, the lower number of ED visits by uninsured may be 
partially due to their “switch” to a different payor category, rather than their actual substitution 
away from EDs as a source of regular care. I discuss the validity of these results in the context of 
various control groups and data limitations. 
The Third Chapter is titled “Impact of the Nonprofit Integrity Act (2004) on Governance 
and Growth of Charities in California.” The Nonprofit Integrity Act (NIA) took effect in 
California on January 1, 2005. Its goals are to improve governance and financial transparency in 
the charitable sector, to increase its oversight, and to prevent fraudulent solicitations. NIA 
imposes certain restrictions on charity managers and boards, and explicitly requires organizations 
whose annual revenue is at or above $2 million (net of government grants) to have an 
independent audit of financial statements. In this paper, I evaluate NIA’s impact on large 
charitable organizations in California. Specifically, I use a simple differences-in-differences 
framework to examine the effect of NIA on various financial and governance outcome measures. 
I find that in the two years following the enactment of NIA, California charities with an average 
2002-2004 (pre-treatment) income “just below” the $2 million threshold grew by about 7.7-7.9% 
less than similar charities in other U.S. states, and by 15-18% less than California charities with 
the pre-treatment revenue “just above” $2 million. These differences in growth rates are not 
detectable by year 2007. The Nonprofit Integrity Act appears to have had little impact on other 
major financial measures of charities. With respect to the available set of governance measures, 
it seems that the majority of California’s charitable organizations affected by NIA had already 
used select NIA-prescribed governance and management practices before the law came into 
effect. It is also possible that the adoption of some new governance measures (e.g., audit 
committees) and their incorporation into by-laws did not happen immediately following NIA’s 
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The Effect of Community Health Centers on Utilization of Emergency Care:  
 
Evidence from California 
 
 
1.1.  Introduction 
Today, many emergency departments (EDs) in the United States have a dual function as 
providers of both acute medical care and non-emergency, primary health care. The Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) or the Patient Anti-Dumping Law of 1986 
guarantees equal access to emergency medical care for all. It requires emergency departments to 
perform a medical examination of a patient, irrespective of the severity of symptoms and before 
any payment can be collected (Zibulewsky, 2001). As an unintended consequence of EMTALA, 
the emergency room has become the only sure point of access to medical care for many people 
with insufficient medical coverage, even for non-emergency medical conditions (Siegel, 2004; 
Billings et al., 2000a, b). According to a recent report by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, uninsured adults ages 18-64 are more likely than people with private or public health 
insurance to visit the ED because they do not have access to another source of medical care 
(Gindi et al., 2012). The United States has a number of programs aimed at improving access to 
primary health care, including public health insurance, subsidies, and health insurance mandates 
on employers, insurers, and private citizens. This paper focuses on another approach to bringing 
medical care to medically underserved populations – community health centers (CHCs) – and 





uninsured non-elderly adults. Specifically, I focus on California because of the quality of 
available data. 
Community health centers (CHCs) are an important type of the health care safety net 
provider, along with public hospitals and physicians that provide free or discounted care to the 
poor. CHCs specialize in the provision of outpatient primary and preventive health care services, 
and serve patients regardless of their insurance status and ability to pay. The majority of CHCs 
are non-profit organizations, but some are public. The state of California started issuing permits 
to this type of the provider in the 1930’s (Saviano, 2009). Today, these clinics depend on patient 
revenue – which mainly comes from Medicaid1 and Medicare2 reimbursements – as well as 
government grants and contracts, foundation grants, and charitable contributions.3 In 2002, the 
CHC sector began a period of expansion due to increased levels of federal funding under Section 
330 of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act, a federal law that governs many aspects of health 
care in the United States. This initiative was authorized by the George W. Bush Administration 
with the intent of decreasing health disparities in the U.S.4 More than half of California’s CHCs 
today receive Section 330 grants, which confer them the status of federally qualified health 
centers (FQHCs). 
In this paper, I examine the effects of this recent expansion in CHCs on the use of 
emergency departments by the uninsured. Using data from California spanning 2006 to 2010, I 
employ two empirical methods that rely on changes in the number of CHCs in each zip code 
                                                          
1  Medicaid is the main public health insurance program in the U.S. for low-income non-elderly adults. It is 
organized as a federal-state partnership. In California, the program is known as Medi-Cal. 
 
2 Medicare is a public health insurance program for people ages 65 and over, and people with disabilities. 
 
3 Source: Primary Care Clinics Utilization Data, OSHPD, year 2010. See Section 1.5. 
 
4 Two other waves of CHC expansions stimulated by federal grants happened in the mid-1960’s and mid-1990’s 





over time. My first empirical specification, based on an ED patient’s proximity to a CHC, 
exploits variation in the entry, exit, and relocation choices of clinics and measures changes in 
patient volumes generated by these events. To deal with the potential endogeneity of clinics’ 
locations, I use a second differences-in-differences strategy that uses proximity to a highway as 
an exogenous proxy of patients’ level of access to community health centers. 
Both strategies show that new clinic openings reduce the use of emergency departments 
by the uninsured. I find that one additional clinic reduces the non-admission ED visits of 
uninsured non-elderly adults by 1.33% in the zip codes within a 5-mile radius of the clinic. The 
response is particularly strong among uninsured men. Furthermore, I do not detect any impact of 
CHCs on non-admission ED visits by non-elderly adults with private or public (Medicaid) 
insurance. Overall, my results support the notion that the ED use by uninsured patients for less 
urgent care is mainly a symptom of restricted access. 
This paper makes several contributions to the study of community health centers in the 
U.S. First, while previous studies (e.g., Bailey and Goodman-Bacon, 2012; Smith-Campbell, 
2000) examine expansions in CHCs that occurred in the 1960s and the 1990s, I focus on the most 
recent expansions, and analyze the short-term effect of CHCs on the utilization of emergency 
departments. Second, this paper conducts an analysis at a more disaggregated level than have 
previous studies; I use Primary Care Clinics Utilization Data from the California Office of 
Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD), which tracks annual changes in CHC 
utilization at the individual clinic level. Other authors normally observe this data at a more 
aggregated level, for a family of clinics that are jointly operated under the same name. In 
addition, I take advantage of a relatively new dataset on emergency department encounters in 





age, race, gender, type of diagnosis, and procedure. Finally, while most analyses of this topic 
have been limited to establishing correlation, I identify the causal effect of community health 
centers on the emergency department use. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 1.2 discusses various measures of non-
urgent ED visits used in the literature; provides background information on the utilization of 
emergency departments for non-urgent care; and describes the work of community health 
centers. Section 1.3 discusses previous literature on CHCs. Section 1.4 highlights the 
contributions of this paper to the general body of work on community health centers. Section 1.5 
discusses the data. I describe my two empirical strategies and results in Sections 1.6 and 1.7. 
Then I conclude with a discussion of main implications and limitations of the present study and 
suggest directions for future research.   
 
1.2.  Background 
In this section, I first describe various measures of non-emergency ED visits used in the public 
health literature. Then I discuss EMTALA, a federal law that guarantees access to emergency 
medical care to anyone who needs it regardless of the patient’s ability to pay, and one of its 
major consequences – the pervasive use of emergency departments for non-urgent medical 
conditions. Lastly, I discuss community health centers and the role they play in delivering 
primary health care to medically underserved populations.  
 
1.2.1. ED-related Measures of Non-Emergency Medical Conditions 
There is a wide variety of measures of “non-emergency,” “non-urgent,” or “less urgent” ED 
visits used in the literature on the utilization of emergency departments, all of which are 





situation. For example, ED encounters can be classified as minor, low/moderate, moderate, 
severe without threat, or severe with treat on the basis of required procedures, coded according to 
the Current Procedural Terminology, CPT (OSHPD, 2010b, p. 26). The NYU Center for Health 
and Public Services Research has developed an algorithm based on a wide set of patients’ 
characteristics by which ED visits are classified into one of four categories: non-emergent, 
emergent/primary care treatable, emergent-ED care needed-preventable/avoidable, and 
emergent-ED care needed-not preventable/avoidable (Billings et al., 2000a; NYU Wagner, 
2012). Another way to distinguish between urgent and less urgent visits is to use the time within 
which the patient needs to receive medical treatment (0-15 minutes, etc.). Many authors focus on 
ambulatory care sensitive conditions, ACSCs (AHRQ, 2012). These include diagnoses such as 
diabetes, gastroenteritis, asthma and hypertension, whose treatment can be managed on the 
outpatient basis or whose acute flare-ups can be prevented with proper and timely primary care. 
In this paper, I use emergency visits that do not result in hospital admission as a measure of less 
urgent ED visits. 5 This seems to be a sensible approach because the majority of such non-
admission visits are normally for non-emergency medical conditions: Billings et al. (2000b), for 
example, report that 75% of non-hospitalization ED visits in New York are for conditions 
categorized as non-emergent or emergent/primary care treatable.  
 
1.2.2. Emergency Departments and EMTALA (1986) 
The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), also known as COBRA6 or the 
Patient Anti-Dumping Act (Medlaw.com, 2012), is a federal law passed by Congress in 1986 
                                                          
5 I use terms “non-hospitalization” and “non-admission” inter-changeably. 
 






that guarantees nondiscriminatory access to emergency medical care for all. The original reason 
for EMTALA was to take the financial motive out of the ED decision-making, especially with 
respect to the poor and uninsured, and to stop the once-prevalent practice among hospitals of 
“dumping” unprofitable patients by either turning them away or by transferring them to public 
and other more poor-friendly hospitals even when patients were in an unstable medical condition 
(Zibulewsky, 2001). Due to EMTALA, today such patient-dumping practices are illegal.  
The key EMTALA provision requires emergency departments to perform a medical 
screening examination on any patient who requests it, with the purpose of determining whether 
an emergency medical condition (EMC) exists. If an EMC is diagnosed, the hospital must either 
stabilize the patient or transfer him/her to another, more suitable facility. Otherwise, the hospital 
has no obligation to the patient. In addition, EMTALA mandates that insurance verification, 
requests to an insurer for a treatment pre-authorization, or the patient’s inability to pay must not 
delay the patient’s medical examination and treatment (Lee, 2000; Zibulewsky, 2001). In fact, 
many legal aid websites recommend that ED staff discuss payment and insurance questions with 
patients only after the medical examination is performed. 
Any U.S. hospital that operates an emergency department and participates in the 
Medicare program is subject to EMTALA. This includes about 98% of all hospitals with an 
emergency room in the United States (Zibulewsky, 2001). EMTALA provisions apply to all ED 
patients, irrespective of their Medicare enrollment and eligibility status. To the surprise of many 
early critics of EMTALA, its enforcement has proved to be much more effective than those of 
earlier pieces of legislation with similar goals, despite EMTALA being an unfunded mandate 






The primary responsibility for complying with EMTALA provisions rests with the 
hospital. EMTALA violations can result in a malpractice case against the hospital or its 
exclusion from the Medicare program. The latter occurs rarely but seems to be a strong deterrent. 
The hospital as well as its on-call and ED physicians may face up to $50,000 (or $25,000 for 
smaller hospitals with less than 100 beds) in civil monetary penalties for each EMTALA 
violation, and possibly more for each ED patient encounter. Normally, these penalties are not 
covered by the physician’s malpractice insurance. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) are responsible for enforcing EMTALA provisions. This is a “complaint-driven 
process” characterized by swift investigations during which the complainant can remain 
anonymous; hospitals have little time to respond (about 23 consecutive, not business days) and 
may temporarily or permanently lose their right to participate in the Medicare program 
(Medscape, 2012; CMS, 2010; Zibulewsky, 2001). 
Any deviation from standard ED procedures, whether explicitly or implicitly adopted, 
creates the risk of being interpreted as an EMTALA violation, and thus can result in the onset of 
an investigation or a malpractice case against the hospital. Determining whether the patient has 
an emergency medical condition (EMC) is also a grey area where the burden of proof rests with 
the hospital. In some cases, the risk of a disagreement between the hospital and the patient, or the 
hospital and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services on the interpretation of the EMC is 
high, and can result in a formal complaint and an investigation (Zibulewsky, 2001). Given the 
high degree of the hospital’s vulnerability to an EMTALA violation claim and potentially high 
litigation costs, it is not unreasonable for hospitals to take a cautious approach in ensuring 





compliance by warranting that every medical provider conducts an impartial and timely 
examination of each incoming ED patient, and by offering more than just stabilizing treatments. 
 
1.2.3. The Use of Emergency Departments for Non-Urgent Care 
EMTALA has had an unintended consequence of encouraging widespread use of emergency 
departments for non-life-threatening, non-acute conditions. Out of a total of 11.8 million 
emergency room visits in California in 2010, only 15.6% resulted in hospitalization. 7 
Nationwide, 15.2% of all ED visits resulted in admission to the hospital in 2009. 8 This suggests 
that EDs indeed see many patients with non-emergency medical conditions. 
The lack of medical insurance often limits the person’s access to a regular source of 
primary and preventive health care services.  The inability to receive basic medical care forces 
the uninsured to utilize EDs for reasons other than unforeseen emergencies such as injuries and 
poisonings. The public health literature well documents and acknowledges the fact that the 
uninsured often use emergency rooms to receive care for non-urgent conditions such as cold and 
flu symptoms, headaches, minor sprains and infections, as well as flare-ups of chronic conditions 
such as diabetes and hypertension (Billings et al., 2000a, b; Grumbach et al., 1993; Lowe et al., 
2005; Rust et al., 2009; Young et al., 1996). 
Visiting EDs for non-urgent care is also common among patients with private and 
Medicaid coverage. Both the national U.S. and California data show that the share of non-
hospitalization ED encounters by individuals with private and public health insurance is high 
(Gindi et al., 2012). Table 1.1 includes statistics on ED utilization by three main categories of 
                                                          
7 Source: Primary Care Clinics Utilization Data, OSHPD, year 2010. See Section 1.5. 
 
8 The highest admission rate was among Medicare patients (37.54%), followed by privately insured (10.96%), 






non-admitted patients ages 18-64 in California: the uninsured, Medicaid, and privately insured.9 
The first thing to notice is that one half of all non-admission ED encounters is almost equally 
split among the uninsured (23.1%) and Medicaid patients (25.8%). Another 31.3% of all 
encounters are by privately insured. Secondly, the median share of non-injury- and non-
poisoning-related ED encounters is high for all three groups of patients: 76% for the uninsured, 
83% for Medicaid patients, and 76% for privately insured. The percentage of encounters that do 
not require “a procedure that is surgical in nature, or carries a procedural risk, or carries an 
anesthetic risk”10 – i.e., another proxy for non-urgent encounters that I use here – is actually 
higher for Medicaid (44%) and privately insured (42%) patients than for the uninsured (37%). 
The share of selected ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs) is higher for Medicaid 
patients (12.3%) than for the uninsured (9.8%) or patients with private insurance (9.3%).  
The high number of ED visits by uninsured and publicly insured patients reflects the high 
proportion of these groups in the population: 20% of Californians did not have medical insurance 
in 2011, 19% were covered by Medicaid, 45% had employer-based insurance, and 6% had 
individual coverage.11,12 Nationwide, 16% of the U.S. population was uninsured in 2010, and 
another 16% was enrolled in Medicaid (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012a). The majority of 
uninsured non-elderly adults come from working families: In California, 60% of such families 
have at least one full-time worker and 17% – part-time workers. The two most frequently 
                                                          
9 Here, “privately insured” includes patients covered by one of the following types of insurers: Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO), Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), and Blue Cross/Blue Shield. 
 
10 OSHPD’s Emergency Department Public Data Set Documentation, 2010. 
 
11 Kaiser Family Foundation (2012b) 
 
12 The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured uses the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey’s 






reported reasons why people do not have insurance are either because the employer does not 
offer the coverage,13 or it is unaffordable (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012a). In California, only 
37.9% of smaller firms (with fewer than 50 employees) offer health insurance coverage, while 
almost all larger firms do offer it (93.4%).14  Medicaid-covered non-elderly adults are more 
likely than the uninsured to come from non-working families (33% vs. 24%) and tend to be 
poorer: 69% of non-elderly adults on Medicaid have incomes at or below 138% of the federal 
poverty level (FPL), while 54% of the uninsured are in that same income category. Compared 
with people with any type of medical insurance, the uninsured are at a higher risk of developing 
chronic conditions or being hospitalized for avoidable problems. In general, uninsured people 
lack a regular source of primary care, do not receive timely preventive care, and are not able to 
afford necessary treatments (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012a).  
The lack of medical insurance is not the only reason why people with non-emergency 
medical conditions utilize EDs. Shesser et al. (1991) find that patients with lower socioeconomic 
status use the ED because they do not have a regular physician, while patients with higher 
socioeconomic status go to the ED when they cannot get a prompt appointment with their usual 
provider. Young and Sklar (1995) also cite difficulty in getting an appointment as the reason for 
going to the ED, along with the availability of ED services beyond the normal business hours 
worked by office-based physicians. Some areas suffer from a shortage of primary care 
physicians: For example, the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) uses special 
designations such as Medically Underserved Areas (MUAs) and Health Professional Shortage 
Areas (HPSAs) to identify such locations (HRSA, 2012a). Furthermore, physician shortages are 
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also partly due to the growing reluctance on the part of office-based physicians to take on 
uninsured and Medicaid patients because of high financial and administrative costs (Cunningham 
and May, 2006). EDs may also appear attractive because of high concentration of sophisticated 
diagnostic and treatment equipment. Finally, the de-facto dual role of EDs as providers of both 
acute medical care and non-urgent primary care might be an equilibrium outcome as hospitals, 
constrained by many reimbursement schemes, try to augment revenue by serving a mix of both 
non-urgent and urgent patients (Hock et al., 2005, Shesser et al., 1991).  
An over-crowded emergency room is often a sign of the hospital’s limited inpatient bed 
capacity, which gets exacerbated by hospital mergers and closures (Hock et al., 2005). 
Overcrowding makes it hard for emergency rooms to manage the flow of incoming patients, 
increases the cost of care, results in delayed care, and increases the risk of medical mistakes. For 
uninsured ED users with non-urgent conditions, the cost also comes in the form of high charges 
and possibly bad debt.  But more importantly, emergency departments cannot provide continuity 
of care to patients, who use them as a substitute for regular primary health care. ED physicians 
are best skilled at diagnosing the immediate medical problem and stabilizing the patient (Hock et 
al., 2005; Young and Sklar, 1995) and differ from office- or clinic-based physicians in the type 
of medical care they can provide.  
The lack of regular medical examinations and health education is associated with delays 
in getting proper diagnosis and treatment and, consequently, a higher risk of developing chronic 
conditions, whose management gets more expensive as the disease progresses (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2012a). Limited continuity of care makes the prevention and timely management of 





Overall, it appears that the utilization of EDs for non-urgent care by people without 
medical homes such as under- and uninsured, is fundamentally different from the ED utilization 
due to more convenient hours of operation or profit-maximizing motives of hospitals. The public 
health literature suggests that different groups of patients use emergency departments for 
different reasons. But the use of EDs by the uninsured for non-urgent care is problematic not 
only because they drive up the cost of operating the ED or crowd it, but also because these 
people have no medical homes, are in poorer health compared with people who have insurance, 
and are at a higher risk of letting a minor health condition progress to the point of a true medical 
emergency. 15 The 48.6 million of uninsured people in the United States in 2011 are not a trivial 
statistic. Before the full implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) takes place in 2014, 
many low-income non-elderly adults have to rely on a combination of Medicaid and non-federal 
public insurance programs (e.g., county programs for the poor), as well as safety net providers 
such as CHCs for primary medical care.  
 
1.2.4. Community Health Centers (CHCs) 
In this paper, I show that recent increases in the number and size of federally subsidized 
community health centers (CHCs) resulted in fewer non-hospitalization ED visits by the most 
medically marginalized group of patients – the uninsured. Community health centers are a 
growing class of health care organizations that provide primary and preventive health care 
services regardless of the patient’s ability to pay and serve many medically underserved. The 
majority of these centers are private, nonprofit organizations, and a few are public. Each 
organization, or center, usually operates several primary care clinics or sites. My data shows that 
                                                          






CHC patients represent about 15% of California’s population. A total of 11.8 million CHC 
encounters were made in California in 2010. Emergency rooms essentially had the same volume 
of encounters over the same time period, what shows the importance of CHCs in the health care 
sector. 
Why do these poor-friendly clinics exist? In contrast to economic theories of profit-
maximizing firms, the theoretical literature on objective functions of nonprofits does not give 
one convincing answer. Some theories offer to think of this type of organizations as de factor 
profit-maximizers (Lakdawala and Philipson, 2006). Other theories suggest that nonprofits seek 
to maximize the quantity or quality of services provided rather than profits (Newhouse, 1970). 
Some view nonprofits as a form of partnership between the state and the private sector in 
delivery of public goods (Salamon, 1987). To illustrate the most frequently cited motivation 
behind the clinics’ work, Appendix A includes a brief description of origins of several California 
community health centers.   
Legally, being a nonprofit in the United States means that the organization does not have 
owners; that is, there is no residual claimant. Unlike profit-maximizing firms that have 
shareholders (owners), nonprofit managers cannot claim a share of the organization’s profits and 
are accountable to the board of directors. Many universities and hospitals in the United States are 
incorporated as nonprofit organizations. The nonprofit status does not prevent these entities from 
making a handsome economic or accounting profit but restricts the use of the organization’s 
resources to the fulfillment of its mission, which could be in the area of arts, education, health 
care, charitable work, sports, and a few others. Nonprofit community health centers usually have 
a diverse set of revenue sources, including Medicaid and Medicare reimbursements, patient fees, 





private foundations, and bequests. Since most of these health centers are 501(c)(3) public 
charities under the Internal Revenue Code, they are exempt from the federal income tax and 
some other types of taxes.     
The majority of community health centers are legally bound to provide free or affordable 
medical care to low-income patients. This legal mandate is usually tied to the award of federal 
funds that helped establish or operate these centers. Some clinics adopt this mandate voluntarily, 
prior to the receipt of any government grants or contracts as a way to secure this type of funding 
in the future. 
These primary care centers were recognized as an important type of the health care safety 
net provider by the President Lyndon B. Johnson Administration in the mid-1960's, when first 
federal grants to community health centers became available as part of the War on Poverty 
welfare program (Bailey and Goodman-Bacon, 2012; Chronicles, 2012; Rosenbaum and Shin, 
2003). There were four main federal programs that funded CHCs to provide medical and social 
services to the poor: Community Health Center (CHC), Migrant Health Center (MHC), Health 
Care for the Homeless (HCH), and Public Housing Primary Care (PHPC) programs. In 1996, the 
Health Centers Consolidation Act merged the four separate programs into a single program 
under Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act. This also meant a higher level of federal 
funding for CHCs on the overall (Saviano, 2009).   
In 2001, President George W. Bush authorized the Health Center Growth Initiative, 
whose goal was to expand the capacity of then-existing community health centers and to support 
the establishment of new clinics to decrease disparities in access to health care across the United 
States. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, as a result of this 





in 2007.  By 2008, 716 federal grants were awarded to fund new clinics16 across the United 
States. Another 520 grants supported the capacity expansion of existing clinics. The Initiative 
intended to and did double the number of patients who received services from CHCs. Today, 
President Barack Obama’s commitment to CHCs stands at $11 billion over 5 years under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (GAO, 2011). 
Community health centers are staffed with physicians, physician assistants, family nurse 
practitioners, dentists, mental health specialists, and other types of providers. CHCs mainly 
specialize in the provision of outpatient primary and preventive health care services. These 
include basic medical care, management of chronic conditions such as diabetes, hypertension, 
asthma and obesity, dental services, diagnostics and testing, immunization, family planning, 
pediatrics, and others. Unlike hospitals, CHCs do not normally offer inpatient care. And unlike 
many private physicians, their mission is to almost exclusively serve low-income patients, who 
have limited or no health insurance. 
 
1.2.5. FQHCs as an Important and Sizable Category of CHCs 
At any given point in time, a community health center can either be a federally qualified health 
center (FQHC), an FQHC Look-Alike, or neither. Women’s health/pregnancy centers and family 
planning clinics such as Planned Parenthood affiliates make up the majority of CHCs that are 
neither FQHCs nor FQHC Look-Alikes. I exclude these women’s clinics from my study and 
focus only on primary care centers that offer a broad range of medical services to all population 
groups. FQHCs are distinct from other community health centers because they are subsidized by 
grants from the federal government under Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act. Other 
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types of CHCs primarily differ from FQHCs in that they do not receive Section 330 federal 
grants.  
There are three main types of Section 330 grants: to set up a new clinic, to expand the 
capacity of an existing clinic, or to offset the cost of providing medical services at low, 
affordable fees. The FQHC designation entitles clinics to receive Medicare and Medicaid 
reimbursements at enhanced, essentially cost-based rates; obtain medications at discounted 
prices (the 340B Drug Pricing Program); and obtain free malpractice coverage for their 
physicians under the Federal Tort Claims Act.  FQHC Look-Alikes are very similar to FQHCs in 
terms of many benefits they have, but they receive neither Section 330 grants nor free 
malpractice coverage. CHCs that are neither FQHCs nor FQHC Look-Alikes do not qualify for 
most of the above benefits (Saviano, 2009). Many (but not all) primary care clinics do not have 
an FQHC-related status at first, when they just start operations. They normally acquire the FQHC 
Look-Alike status eventually, and subsequently the FQHC status.  
Newly trained physicians who come to work at FQHCs are eligible to participate in 
government loan forgiveness programs. Foreign medical students who receive training in the 
U.S. and then work at FQHCs may get an exemption from J-1 visa restrictions, which would 
allow them to eventually seek permanent residence in the U.S.  
Today, FQHCs make up the majority of community health centers. In 2010, 70% of all 
CHC medical encounters in California took place in FQHCs. In particular, there were 509 
FQHCs, 64 FQHC Look-Alikes and 378 “other” CHCs in California in 2010. FQHCs served 3.1 





million encounters), and the remainder of CHCs – 1.6 million patients (or 3.3 million 
encounters).17 
Section 330 grants come with the obligation to provide affordable primary health care 
services to the medically underserved such as the uninsured and people with public coverage, 
homeless and public housing residents, migrants and seasonal workers, and members of Indian 
tribes. In particular, FQHCs must offer a sliding fee discount schedule to patients with incomes 
at or below 200% of the federal poverty guidelines (FPL), and offer the services at “no charge or 
[for] a nominal fee for individuals and families with an annual income at or below 100 percent of 
the poverty guidelines” (HRSA, 2012b). In 2010, 96.3% of all FQHC patients18 in California had 
incomes at or below 200% FPL and 78.7% – at or below 100% of the poverty level.  
FQHCs and other types of primary care CHCs are mainly located in medically 
underserved, often poor areas. Because they target low-income populations, these clinics are 
more sensitive about typical access barriers faced by the under- and uninsured, and try to more 
systematically tailor their overall operations to the needs of such populations. For example, many 
clinics offer enabling services to their patients such as translation services, transportation to and 
from the clinic, and assistance with enrollment in Medicaid and other public programs. Some 
health centers also run their own pharmacies, where medications are available at discounted 
prices. All these factors make them more user-friendly for the medically underserved and 
facilitate better access to health care.  
Although Section 330 funding comes with the obligation to provide a broad range of non-
specialized, general primary health care services to all population groups, there is a great deal of 
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heterogeneity in the type of services that FQHCs and other CHCs offer: For example, some sites 
might exclusively specialize in dental care, pediatrics, women’s health, or operate as school-
based student health centers. Some target particular ethnic groups and migrants. Clinics also 
differ in size, hours of operation,19 provision of mental health and substance abuse treatments, 
and the generosity of enabling services. Some centers operate mobile clinic vans. All clinics 
must have on-call arrangements so that patients can reach a medical professional during the 
after-hours. In this paper, I focus only on clinics that offer services to all types of patients, and 
exclude women’s and children’s clinics, mobile vans, dental and school-based sites, or clinics 
that focus on HIV/AIDS and substance abuse. 
California has the largest number of FQHCs (118 Section 330 grantees and 1,039 sites20), 
followed by New York (51 grantees and 540 sites), Illinois (36 grantees and 521 sites), Florida 
(44 grantees and 358 sites) and Texas (64 grantees and 337 sites).21 In terms of the number of 
FQHC sites per capita, California ranks as 25th with 2.8 clinics per 100,000 people, which is 
typical for the whole U.S., which averages 2.7 clinics per 100,000 people. FQHC patients alone 
represent 8% of California’s population, and nationwide they make up 6.4% of the U.S. 
population in 2010.   
Due to increased levels of funding available to FQHCs through the Bush’s Health Center 
Growth Initiative (Section 330 of the PHS Act), the number of FQHCs in California more than 
doubled from 236 sites in 2001 to 509 sites in 2010, and accounted for a large share of increases 
in the number of CHCs in the state. Between 1992 and 2001, the number of FQHC clinics 
                                                          
19 Section 330 funding requires clinics to be open for at least 32 hours a week. Most are open for at least 40 hours a 
week. UDS data shows that the median (average) number of business hours per week is 40 (47). Many clinics are 
open on Saturdays and/or have extended hours on some weekdays. 
 
20 Source: UDS Section 330 Grantee Report, year 2010.  
 





increased by about 15 annually, on average, in California. From 2002 to 2010, the number of 
FQHCs increased by about 30 each year, on average.22 The post-2001 expansion of the FQHC 
sector was due to the establishment of truly new clinics as well as conversion of FQHC Look-
Alikes and other CHCs to the FQHC status through the award of Section 330 grants. On the 
overall, the recent growth of the CHC sector in California has been primarily driven by increases 
in the number of FQHCs. These newly established and expanded primary care centers have 
improved access to medical care for people who had not previously had a regular source of care 
due to the lack of insurance or shortage of other types of (accepting) primary care providers.  
 
1.3.  Literature Review 
Community health centers have been somewhat overlooked by economists, yet they have 
become an important part of the safety net for the uninsured. The majority of academic research 
on CHCs to date is published in public health journals. This research is usually based on cross-
sectional comparisons, when no causal inferences can be made with respect to the effect of 
CHCs on various outcomes. Studies are often limited to one clinic or one emergency department 
(Smith-Campbell, 2000), a group of counties within one state or another small geographic area as 
is well acknowledged in Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2012). In addition to the case study-type 
of research, a lot of academic and non-academic publications focus on institutional details of 
federally qualified health centers (Adashi et al., 2010). Non-FQHCs, including Look-Alikes, are 
mostly mentioned only in the context of FQHCs.   
The more recent studies on whether community health centers are effective in reducing 
utilization of emergency rooms by low-income patients for non-urgent conditions include the 
following: Rust et al. (2009) compare ED utilization rates in rural counties with and without 
                                                          





CHCs in Georgia, and find that counties with a CHC presence have lower rates of ED visits by 
the uninsured. Lowe et al. (2005) analyze the use of emergency departments for primary care by 
Medicaid patients, including those who utilize FQHCs. Smith-Campbell (2000) detects a decline 
in the number of ED visits by the uninsured in one Kansas county, which she attributes to 
increases in state funding to one existing primary health center. Lo Sasso and Byck (2010) find 
that higher amounts of federal grants are associated with expansions of services provided by 
FQHCs, including care for the uninsured.   
Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2012) find that CHCs led to lower mortality rates among 
the elderly in the United States. They use historical data on first federally subsidized health 
centers established in 1965-1974 and county-level mortality rates in 1959-1988. They adopt an 
event study approach, where the definition of the county-level treatment depends on when the 
county received its first federal grant to support the establishment of a CHC. Their study is an 
important empirical contribution to the literature on community health centers along several 
dimensions: They seek to estimate the causal effect of CHCs; use data for the whole United 
States; and analyze the long-term impact of CHCs. Finally they also fill in the gap in the existing 
literature by examining the impact of CHCs on the mortality rate, a health outcome.  
One concern with the identification strategy used by Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2012) 
is that it relies only on first grants and does not capture changes in the CHC sector due to the 
subsequent establishment of new clinics, and expansions or closures of original community 
health centers. Also, it would be informative to extend their analysis to other health outcomes 
and to study the impact of CHCs on the non-elderly adult population since the elderly (ages 65+) 
do not seem to be the most significant demographic group that utilizes CHCs. According to 





is probably because the elderly are usually covered by Medicare, and they may not value access 
to CHCs as much as other population groups.  
 
1.4.  Contributions 
This paper makes several contributions to the study of community health centers in the U.S. 
First, I focus on the more recent developments in the CHC sector (2006-2010), and analyze the 
short-term effect of CHCs on the utilization of emergency departments by the uninsured for 
conditions that do not require immediate hospitalization – a proxy for non-emergency visits. My 
work supplements previous studies on FQHCs, the bulk of which relies on data before 2002, the 
year when the CHC sector received a significant boost in federal funding.  
Secondly, I propose an identification strategy to estimate the causal impact of CHCs on 
ED utilization. Apart from Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2012), there does not seem to be a great 
deal of work on causality with respect to CHCs as most studies use cross-sectional data from one 
time period, and are thus limited to establishing correlation. Lo Sasso and Byck (2010) and 
Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2012) are able to control for permanent heterogeneity across clinics 
and counties, respectively, by using panel data. 
In addition, I take advantage of a relatively new dataset on emergency department 
encounters in California. This encounter-level data allows me to analyze ED patient volumes at 
the zip code level by insurance status, age, race, gender, type of diagnosis, and procedure. 
Previous work relies on more aggregated, county-level data (Bailey and Goodman-Bacon, 2012; 
Rust et al., 2009; Smith-Campbell, 2000). Zip codes encompass smaller geographic areas than 
counties: For example, there are 1,702 zip codes in California, but only 58 counties. The use of 
zip codes allows me to better capture the local distribution of ED patients within cities and 





distance from the ED patient’s zip code rather than his/her county to the exact clinic location 
gives a more accurate, though still imperfect measure of the patient’s access to CHCs. 
Furthermore, this paper overcomes an important data limitation acknowledged in other 
studies. Here, I am able to track annual changes in individual clinics (for any type of CHCs). 
Many authors rely on the HRSA dataset on Section 330 grantees, which means that they observe 
important utilization and administrative data only at the grantee level (and only for FQHCs). 
Normally, each grantee operates several clinics but HRSA does not collect data on individual 
clinics or sites. Here, I use clinic-level data. I know when the clinic was established or shut 
down, or moved to a different location, its precise address, and the number of months it was open 
during the year. I also observe annual data on the full-time equivalent (FTE) of clinic physicians 
and other staff, number of patients and encounters, and main diagnosis categories – all at the 
clinic level. 
Finally, clinics are often smaller than emergency departments, so customarily their real 
impact on EDs has been expected to be small, if at all detectable. In this paper, I find a negative, 
statistically significant relationship between ED visits by uninsured patients and their access to 
CHCs. This supports the view that these health centers have become important providers of 
medical care to low-income populations without health insurance. 
 
1.5.  Data 
1.5.1. Data on Emergency Departments 
The Emergency Department Public Data Set is supplied by the California Office of Statewide 
Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). It includes data on ED encounters that did not 
result in hospital admission. The following information is available for each ED encounter: year 





race/ethnicity; expected source of payment; diagnoses; the external source of injury/poisoning 
(coded according to the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical 
Modification, ICD-9-CM); procedures performed (coded according to the Current Procedural 
Terminology, Fourth Edition, CPT-4); and the patient’s 5-digit zip code and county of residence. 
OSHPD started collecting this detailed, encounter-level data from California hospitals 
with licensed EDs beginning the first quarter of 2005. However, I drop the year 2005 data 
because of many reporting inconsistencies that occurred during this first year of data collection. 
For example, some hospitals categorized all their patients as self-pay (uninsured) or as “other” 
with respect to the expected source of payment in 2005. In addition, the percentage of unknown 
zip codes for uninsured patients appears to be more consistent with the percentage of unknown 
zip codes for other categories of patients in 2006-2010 than in 2005. Ultimately, I use only 
January-June data for 2006-2010 because my original dataset includes only the first two quarters 
in year 2010. Encounter records in the third and fourth quarters of 2010 were not yet available at 
the time of data acquisition.  
My main empirical results are based on non-admission ED encounters using a balanced 
panel of California zip codes and a balanced panel of 311 emergency departments that report in 
both the first and second quarters of each year between 2006 and 2010. These results turn out to 
be robust to changes in the sample composition of hospitals such as the exclusion of Kaiser 
Permanente ED encounters or inclusion of encounters to emergency rooms, which do not report 
data consistently in all quarters between 2006 and 2010.  
Based on the OSHPD’s Emergency Department Public Data, there were a total of 
2,651,798 non-admission ED visits in the first half of 2010 by non-elderly adults (ages 18-64).23 
                                                          





27.2% of adults ages 18-34 were uninsured and 30.0% covered by Medicaid. Among adults ages 
35-64, 20.2% were uninsured and 21.6% covered by Medicaid. Males (ages 18-64) were more 
likely to be uninsured than women (53.3% vs. 46.7%).  Among Medicaid patients, women 
represent the majority (70.3% of Medicaid women vs. 29.7% of Medicaid men).    
The top three diagnoses for women ages 18-34 are malnutrition in pregnancy, first 
trimester (13% uninsured and 54% Medicaid), threatened abortion (18% uninsured and 40% 
Medicaid), and urinary tract infections (21% uninsured and 40% Medicaid). The top three 
diagnoses for women ages 35-64 are headache (16% uninsured and 27% Medicaid), chest pain 
(13% uninsured and 20% Medicaid), and abdominal pain (16% uninsured and 30% Medicaid).  
The top three diagnoses for men ages 18-34 are abdominal pain (34% uninsured and 23% 
Medicaid), open wound of finger (30% uninsured and 11% Medicaid), and inflammation of the 
throat (35% uninsured and 23% Medicaid). Among the top ten ED diagnoses, the two with a 
relatively high representation of uninsured young adult males are alcohol abuse (56% uninsured 
and 11% Medicaid) and anxiety state (40% uninsured and 20% Medicaid). 
The top three diagnoses for men ages 35-64 are chest pain (18% uninsured and 14% 
Medicaid), abdominal pain (22% uninsured and 21% Medicaid), and low back pain (24% 
uninsured and 21% Medicaid). The one diagnosis with a high percentage of uninsured among the 
top ten ED diagnoses for this demographic group is again alcohol abuse (48% uninsured and 
18% Medicaid). 
The statistics above suggest that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in demand for 
emergency department care. Age and gender appear to be important predictors of the patient’s 





reproductive health and are more likely to be covered by public health insurance such as 
Medicaid. Older adults are more likely to have chest pain-related symptoms.  
In my analysis, I use the number of encounters by the patient’s expected source of 
payment: the uninsured (or self-pay), publicly insured (Medicaid, which is known as Medi-Cal in 
California), and those covered by one of the three most popular plans: Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMO), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO), or Blue Cross/Blue Shield.  
 
1.5.2. Data on Community Health Centers 
Data on community health centers in California can be obtained from two sources: (1) the 
Uniform Data System (UDS) Reports from the U.S. Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA) Health Center Program (HRSA, 2012c) and (2) the Primary Care Clinics 
Utilization Data from the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development 
(OSHPD, 2012).  
The first source, HRSA, administers federal grants to community health centers across 
the United States under Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act through its Health Center 
Program and more recently under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). 
Therefore, UDS reports include data only on health centers when they receive Section 330 
funding and thus have the FQHC designation. The major advantage of the UDS dataset is that it 
includes uniform annual data on all FQHCs nationwide (public and private) from 1996 to 2010. 
Beginning 2005, these reports also include the number of FQHC patients by zip code (which I 
use in Section 1.7): No other data source on FQHCs or CHCs contains such detailed information 
on the geographic distribution of patients who utilize this type of the provider.  
The main disadvantage of the UDS reports is that they do not cover non-FQHC 





Look-Alikes, and do not contain information on FQHCs operated by Indian tribal organizations. 
The second disadvantage of these reports is that all administrative and utilization statistics are 
collected at the grantee level, so it is not possible to track FQHC utilization and staffing at the 
clinic level because each grantee usually operates more than one clinic.  
While the UDS reports do not include clinic-level variables, they do contain a list of sites 
operated by each grantee, including the site’s name and address. The availability of this 
information is important in my research because I rely on cross-sectional and time-series 
variation in the number of clinics. These ‘sites lists’ are helpful but overly comprehensive 
because grantees would often report different programs that operate at the same address as 
different “sites.” For example, in 2007 the Alta Med Health Services Corporation included three 
separate listings for the same address in Pico Rivers – a regular clinic, a mobile clinic, and an 
HIV clinic. Thus, the UDS lists seem to count the number of programs rather than clinics and 
over-estimate the actual number of FQHC sites. I mainly use the UDS reports to double check 
information in the second data source by OSHPD, which I adopt as my main source of 
information on community health centers in California. 
OSHPD’s Primary Care Clinics Utilization Data is a rich dataset, which includes clinic-
level utilization, staffing and administrative information on all state-licensed primary care clinics 
in California (OSHPD, 2012). Most of the CHCs that operate in California are included in this 
dataset, except for a few public clinics.  
Unlike the UDS reports, the OSHPD dataset tracks individual clinics rather than multi-
clinic Section 330 grantees. It allows to observe each clinic’s entry and exit date, and year-to-
year changes in the number of patients served; encounters; basic aggregate data on patient 





performed; detailed information on the full-time equivalent of physicians, physician assistants, 
dentists, nurses, and other staff; and information on the sources of revenue and expenditure. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the UDS reports, OSHPD includes information on all primary health 
centers that operate in a given year, including non-FQHCs. A community health center would be 
listed in the OSHPD data even before the clinic acquires the FQHC status (i.e., receives its first 
Section 330 grant) and, if applicable, after it stops receiving Section 330 funding. 
 
1.6.  OLS with Annual Changes in the Number of CHCs 
To test whether growth of California’s CHC sector between 2006 and 2010 had an impact on the 
utilization of emergency departments by the uninsured, I start by estimating equation (1.1) below 
by OLS:                 𝑌𝑧𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝐶𝐻𝐶𝑧𝑡+𝜔𝑧+𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑧𝑡 (1.1) 
𝑌𝑧𝑡 is the log of non-admission ED encounters by uninsured patients from zip code Z in year t.  
For each zip code and year, I calculate the sum of all self-pay (uninsured) patients who are 
between ages of 18 and 64, irrespective of their demographic characteristics, diagnoses, 
procedures, and the visited hospital. All my specifications are based on this type of aggregation, 
which allows me to track changes in the overall pattern of ED usage by uninsured within a 
geographic unit defined by the zip code. To understand the impact of CHCs by more narrowly 
defined patient characteristics, I also estimate equation (1.1) with other outcome variables such 
as the number of uninsured women vs. men, patients with conditions unrelated to injuries and 
poisonings, uninsured by age categories, Medicaid and privately insured patients, and others. 
 Regressor 𝐶𝐻𝐶𝑧𝑡  is the number of community health centers (both FQHCs and non-





number of clinics is simply taken as a measure of supply of CHC services. Controls include zip 
code fixed effects (𝜔𝑧) and year fixed effects (𝜑𝑡).   𝜀𝑧𝑡 is a robust error term, clustered at the zip 
code level. 
The source of variation in equation (1.1) is due to both cross-sectional and time-series 
changes in the number of CHCs that operate in proximity to the ED patient’s place of residence. 
The year-to-year variation in 𝐶𝐻𝐶𝑧𝑡  is mainly due to new CHC openings, but also includes 
occasional closures and relocations to new facilities. 100 ∙ 𝛾 = 100∙(𝑑𝑌𝑧𝑡 𝑌𝑧𝑡)⁄
𝑑𝐶𝐻𝐶𝑧𝑡
 gives the within-zip code percentage change in ED visits 
associated with a new clinic opening, when zip code fixed effects are included. This is 
essentially a form of an event study, where 𝛾 estimates the change in the outcome variable on the 
impact; i.e. when a new clinic opens up or shuts down in a certain location. Conceptually, I 
expect 𝛾� < 0 because the medically underserved whose access to primary health care services 
improves are less likely to utilize EDs for non-urgent care.  
I follow the common practice in the literature and use the centroid of the patient’s zip 
code as a proxy for his/her location since the data on the patient’s exact address is not available. 
But I know each clinic’s exact location, and take the distance from the centroid of the patient’s 
zip code to the exact clinic address as an approximation for the actual distance between the 
patient and the clinic.24 Then, the number of clinics that operate in year t within the radius of 5 
miles from the centroid of the ED patient’s zip code Z, is used as a measure of supply of CHC 
services in the area or as a measure of CHC accessibility. 
I include year fixed effects 𝜑𝑡 in (1.1) to control for macroeconomic conditions and other 
year-specific events that might affect variation in the outcome and independent variables. For 
                                                          





example, the period of Great Recession, which began in 2007, was characterized by high 
unemployment rates and thus a growing number of uninsured people who lost employer-based 
coverage. Year fixed effects control for such source of across-the-board variation. 
The difficulty working with non-experimental data is due to the regressor 𝐶𝐻𝐶𝑧𝑡 being 
non-random and depending on outcome variable 𝑌𝑧𝑡 and other factors that influence both 𝐶𝐻𝐶𝑧𝑡 
and 𝑌𝑧𝑡. This means that 𝛾  in equation (1.1) does not necessarily estimate the causal impact of 
𝐶𝐻𝐶𝑧𝑡 on 𝑌𝑧𝑡. In the context of community health centers, the problem of endogeneity arises 
because CHCs locate in poor areas that are characterized by physician shortages, high mortality 
rates, and high shares of uninsured and Medicaid-covered populations. The latter implies high 
rates of ED utilization by these groups. 25  Therefore, poorer areas with lots of medically 
underserved populations are more likely to experience CHC entry and expansions. This reverse 
causality between ED encounters by the uninsured and clinic entry may result in a biased 
estimate of  𝛾.  
Another source of concern is heterogeneity across areas. For example, counties in 
California have lots of discretion in how they organize their local health care safety nets. 
According to Zuckerman et al. (1998), California counties differ a great deal in the way they 
partner with the private sector in order to deliver health care to the medically marginalized.  For 
example, Los Angeles County has built an extensive network of public hospitals and clinics and 
does not rely heavily on the provision of medical care to the poor by private, nonprofit 
community health centers. San Diego County is on the other extreme of the partnership spectrum 
                                                          
25  In fact, FQHCs must locate in the so-called Medically Underserved Areas (MUAs) or serve Medically 
Underserved Populations (MUPs) in order to fully comply with Section 330 funding requirements. In reality, 





and depends on services provided by the private sector, including CHCs (IOM, 2000). These 
institutional arrangements make the inclusion of location controls particularly important. 
Because I use a panel of zip codes from 2006 to 2010, I am able to include zip code fixed 
effects in equation (1.1), 𝜔𝑧 . This allows me to control for all observed and unobserved 
permanent characteristics across zip codes such as size, population composition, socio-economic 
and other factors, and estimate the relationship between 𝐶𝐻𝐶𝑧𝑡  and 𝑌𝑧𝑡  within the zip code 
during 2006-2010. The omission of 𝜔𝑧  from equation (1.1) means that 𝛾�  would capture the 
impact on ED utilization of both clinics and other area-specific characteristics that likely 
correlate with clinic establishments.   
OLS estimates of 𝛾� are reported in Table 1.2. In column (1) I do not control for any area 
characteristics, and the effect of CHCs is significant and positive (0.101) due to the positive bias: 
First, more populous zip codes have higher numbers of both ED visits and CHCs than less 
densely-populated areas. Second, the number of ED visits is high in the areas with a significant 
presence of community health centers presumably because their mission and grant restrictions 
force them to locate in low-income areas with a high share of the medically underserved 
population. The coefficient in column (2) is statistically significant and still positive but becomes 
smaller in magnitude (0.0231) when I include basic zip code time-invariant controls such as the 
area of the zip code and the number of hospitals that operate within 5 miles of the ED patient’s 
zip code. This significant drop in the coefficient magnitude due to the inclusion of even a small 
amount of additional information on area characteristics confirms the importance of zip code 
heterogeneity (e.g., size) behind the result in column (1). 
As expected, when I include zip code fixed effects in column (3) to control for all time-





statistically significant at the 5% level: Now I capture the within-zip code variation in ED visits, 
and observe an inverse relationship between changes in the number of CHCs and growth rates of 
ED usage by the uninsured. Specifically, a new clinic opening within 5 miles of the ED patient’s 
zip code is associated with a 1.33% decline in the number of non-hospitalization ED encounters 
by uninsured patients.  
Concerns about endogeneity are still present in the model specification used in column 
(3) if the timing of the clinic entry or exit coincides with other relevant events. That is, even after 
controlling for permanent zip code characteristics, 𝛾� may be biased due to confounding time-
varying factors that influence the demand for and supply of primary health care services in each 
area over time. These time-varying factors could include changes in local economic conditions 
and welfare programs, differing rates of population growth across zip codes, changes in the 
willingness of office-based physicians to take on new uninsured and Medicaid patients, 
cooperation between hospitals and clinics, changes in local infrastructure, community outreach 
and education, and others. For example, 𝛾�  would overestimate the impact of CHCs if the 
establishment of new clinics happened simultaneously with or as a result of community 
development efforts (Bailey and Goodman-Bacon, 2012; Campbell-Smith, 2000). 
Zip code linear time trends: One informative yet imperfect way of dealing with time-
varying confounders within the zip code is to estimate equation (1.1) with a set of additional 
time-varying variables – zip code linear time trends.  The result is reported in column (4) of 
Table 1.2: the coefficient estimate of -0.0172 is within one standard error of the estimate 
reported in column (3). It is statistically significant at the 10% level, despite the substantial loss 
in the degrees of freedom. This result suggests the robustness of the coefficient estimate in 





a fundamental issue because 2006-2010 spans a relatively short period of time, and it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the majority of zip codes followed similar time trends during this 
period, except perhaps a few areas that might have experienced trends dramatically different 
from the rest. I also estimate equation (1.1) with a set of county time trends. The result is 
reported in column (5) of Table 1.2 and is consistent with the previous estimates.    
Time-varying county-level macroeconomic variables: In columns (6) and (7) of Table 
1.2, I report estimates of  𝛾  after controlling for annual changes in select macroeconomic 
variables at the county level. This serves as one more robustness check of the result in column 
(3) where I test whether potentially confounding time-varying, county-level factors affect my 
previous results. Note that the period of 2006-2010 examined in this paper overlaps with the 
Great Recession (December 2007-June 2009), which was associated with dramatic downturns in 
the U.S. economy, especially in the labor market (NBER, 2010 & 2012). According to Elsby et 
al. (2010), the Recession was characterized by high unemployment inflows (layoffs rather than 
quits) and low unemployment outflows (prolonged unemployment spells). Males, ethnic 
minorities, and low-skilled labor were particularly vulnerable to job losses during this period. 
This implies that new unemployed, who were previously insured, also lost their employer-
sponsored health insurance, likely for an extended period of time. While some may have gained 
public medical coverage, unemployed males would be less likely to qualify for Medicaid in 
California during 2006-2010. It is likely then that the higher number of uninsured that resulted 
from the Recession increased demand for affordable health care, including primary care services 
at both EDs and CHCs, with different degrees of intensity in various areas of California. In 
addition, one might also expect the lack of health insurance to result in health declines for some, 





require regular monitoring. Annual, county-level regressions of the unemployment rate on the 
number of CHCs (not reported here) reveal a positive correlation between the two variables after 
I control for county characteristics, such as size, etc. Thus, omitting unemployment and other 
macroeconomic indicators from equation (1.1) could bias the estimate of 𝛾 upward.  
To control for the effect of job and health insurance losses during the Great Recession, I 
include annual county-level controls such as the unemployment rate, population, and per capita 
income (in constant dollars) for years 2006-2010. The data comes from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), the Regional Economic Data file.26 I calculate the unemployment rate as a 
fraction of the population without wage and salary employment. BEA does not report county-
level data on GDP so I use per capita income (results reported here) and personal income (not 
reported here) as substitute measures of local GDP.27 
Annual county-level controls in column (6) of Table 1.2 include the unemployment rate, 
log of the population, and log of per capita income. The coefficient on the number of CHCs is  
𝛾� = −0.0135 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. This estimate is very similar to 
𝛾� = −0.0133 in column (3), where I include only zip code and year fixed effects, and confirms 
the robustness of the column (3)’s result. In column (7), instead of the unemployment rate, I 
include the log of unemployed, or the number of people in the county without wage and salary 
employment. The coefficient estimate (𝛾� = −0.0148) is statistically significant at the 5% level 
and is consistent with the previous results.  
                                                          
26 The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) reports per capita income and personal income (CA1-3 series) in 
current dollars. I use the average consumer price index (CPI) reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to 
express current-dollar values in year 2006 dollars (http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm, accessed July 
17, 2013). 
  
27 BEA reports GDP at the MSA level but since there are 58 counties and only 26 MSAs in California, I choose to 
work with county-level macroeconomic time-varying controls, because they capture greater geographic variation 





To sum up, I detect a negative and statistically significant impact of CHCs on non-
admission ED visits by the uninsured. Based on the analysis of results in Table 1.2, I adopt the 
specification of column (3) as my main result of this section and perform several additional 
robustness checks. This result is robust to the use of shares vs. logs; wider radius around the 
centroid of the patient’s zip code; use of only FQHCs as the regressor; use of other types of 
regressors such as the full-time equivalent of CHC physicians, nurses, and clinic patients; 
inclusion of the log of total ED visits by all patients ages 18-64 on the right-hand side of 
equation (1.1); exclusion of zero values; changes in the set of hospitals (excluding Kaiser 
Permanente EDs or using an unbalanced set of reporting EDs); and a few others.  Details are 
described next. 
First, to rule out the possibility of the main result being driven by some other, non-CHC-
related source of variation, I examine changes in non-admission ED encounters by patients with 
private insurance (such as HMO, Blue Shield, and PPO) and Medicaid patients, as well as 
changes in the total number of all non-admission ED visits. According to row (1) of Table 1.5, 
CHCs lead to fewer ED visits by the uninsured only, and have no effect on any other type of ED 
encounters by insurance status, including the total number of visits. The results are in line with 
the expectation that better access to affordable medical care is most critical for non-elderly 
patients without health insurance. Individuals with private or public health coverage are not 
expected to value the CHC presence as much as the uninsured because they can receive care 
from other types of providers, and are thus more likely to use EDs for reasons unrelated to the 
lack of the regular source of care.  In the second row of Table 1.5, I use only FQHCs as the 
regressor, and the results closely replicate the results in row (1). The specification used in rows 





additional annual county-level controls such as the unemployment rate (row 3) or the log of 
unemployed (row 4), as well as the log of the population and per capita income in year 2006 
dollars (rows 3 and 4). The results of both rows (3) and (4) are consistent with those of row (1), 
and provide additional evidence for the robustness of estimates obtained using a simpler model 
specification with only year and zip code fixed effects.  
Furthermore, while the number of clinics is a valid measure of the availability of CHC 
services to local residents, it does not differentiate among clinics by size. To remedy this 
limitation, I estimate equation (1.1) using the full-time equivalent (FTE) of CHC physicians, 
physician assistants, family nurse practitioners, and the number of seen CHC patients – all of 
which are better measures of the size and capacity of clinics, but are also more endogenous 
(because the number of hours worked by physicians is easier to adjust than the number of clinics 
in response to changes in demand for primary care). The results are reported in Table 1.6, for all 
CHCs (row 1) and FQHCs only (row 2). On the overall, the results with the physician FTE and 
family nurse practitioner FTE are consistent with the estimates of Table 1.5, obtained with the 
number of clinics as the regressor. The addition of one full-time FQHC physician is associated 
with a 0.52% decline in the number of ED encounters by the uninsured living within 5 miles of 
the new physician, while one more CHC nurse leads to a 1.14%-1.15% decrease in uninsured ED 
visits.  
The bias in 𝛾� becomes much more apparent when I use the number of patients served by 
each clinic in year t as my regressor. Coefficients on the log of CHC and FQHC patients in rows 
1 and 2, respectively, of column (6) in Table 1.6 are positive and statistically insignificant. This 
is most likely because variation in the number of clinics and FTE of the clinics’ medical staff is 





which are more fully reflected in annual changes in the number of CHC (or FQHC) patients. In 
short, the less varying, yet relevant measures of supply of CHC services such as the count of 
clinics, full-time physicians and family nurse practitioners appears to suffer less from the 
endogeneity bias than the count of actual patients, and mainly produces estimates of the expected 
negative sign. 
Table 1.7 is similar to Table 1.5 but uses a larger radius of 10 miles around the centroid 
of the ED patient’s zip code. The top row of Table 1.7 relies on the variation in all CHCs, while 
the bottom row of Table 1.7 is based on changes in FQHCs only. Results are consistent with 
previous (Table 1.5) findings of CHCs having an inverse impact on ED visits by the uninsured, 
but no effect on ED encounters by Medicaid and privately insured patients and the total number 
of non-admission ED visits. Next, in Table 1.8, I use ratios of uninsured/Medicaid/privately 
insured patients to the total number of ED visits by all patients ages 18-64, and again find a 
statistically significant negative relationship only for ED visits by the uninsured.  
Finally, the results in Table 1.9 are consistent with the expectation that males stand to 
benefit from the new clinic entry more than females, who may receive subsidized care at family 
planning clinics (columns 1 and 2). In columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.9, I analyze non-
hospitalization ED visits for conditions not related to injuries and poisonings, which are more 
likely to be non-urgent and so would not require emergency medical care. Fewer ED encounters 
for such conditions in response to increases in CHCs support the hypothesis that CHCs offer a 
viable alternative source of care for uninsured patients with less urgent conditions. Similarly, in 
columns 5 and 6, I observer decreases in ED visits by uninsured patients when no surgical 






1.7.  Differences-in-Differences Strategy Using Proximity to a Major Highway 
1.7.1. Conceptual Framework 
The estimates of 𝛾  reported in Section 1.6 may suffer from the endogeneity bias due to 
unobserved time-varying factors that might influence the behavior of community health centers 
or the utilization of emergency departments. Thus, in this section I propose a variant of a 
differences-in-differences strategy to establish whether CHCs cause the number of ED visits by 
the uninsured to fall and the magnitude of this impact. The overall framework is based on the 
comparison of patients with different degrees of CHC access in pre- and post-treatment time 
periods. To define control and treatment groups, I use the ED patient’s proximity to a major 
highway as an instrument for his/her level of access to services provided by community health 
centers.  
The identification idea is similar to Anderson and Matsa (2011), who examine whether 
eating out contributes to obesity. They use proximity to an Interstate highway in rural areas as an 
exogenous determinant of the consumer’s propensity to eat at fast food restaurants. They exploit 
the idea that those who live close to the Interstate highway are more likely than those who live 
further away from it to dine out at restaurants established along the highway. The supply 
conditions on the restaurant side are thought to be exogenous because these highway-adjacent 
restaurants choose their location not so much on the basis of local demand conditions as to 
capture the demand of a different group of consumers: long-distance travelers. Anderson and 
Matsa’s (2011) identification strategy relies on the assumption that the control and treatment 
groups are likely to be similar in non-treatment characteristics if consumers come from closely 





towns adjacent to an Interstate highway (within 0-5 miles) with residents in towns a bit further 
away (5-10 miles away from an Interstate), and find that dining out does not cause obesity. 
One potential weakness of this approach has to do with the lack of sufficient variation in 
the first stage: That is, while people in highway-adjacent and slightly more removed areas can be 
similar along many observable characteristics, the differential distance to an Interstate may not 
generate sufficient differences in consumers’ travel costs and thus their dining-out patterns. This 
is not an issue in Anderson and Matsa (2011), who show that small differences in distance lead 
to sufficiently large differences in restaurant consumption outcomes.  
In this section, I use a similar strategy to define my control and treatment groups. 
Specifically, I compare the volume of ED visits by the uninsured before and after a clinic entry, 
and separate ED patients into treatment and control groups by using the patient’s distance-to-
highway as opposed to distance-to-CHC. Conceptually, people who live closer to the new clinic 
are more likely to utilize it than those who live further away from it, and ultimately this distance-
to-CHC (inversely) impacts the person’s propensity to use the emergency department for non-
urgent care. The endogeneity problem arises because clinics usually locate in low-income areas 
to fulfill their mission of making health care services available and affordable to the most 
medically disadvantaged populations. For example, FQHCs must locate in specially designated, 
medically underserved areas (MUAs) by the requirements of Section 330 funding (RAC, 2012). 
Therefore, if I compare ED visits by the uninsured who live close to CHCs (“treatment” group) 
to those who live far away from this type of the provider (“control” group), it is not possible to 
infer whether differences in ED utilization are due to the availability of CHC services or some 
other factors, because these two groups are likely to be fundamentally different and follow 





of people living in poverty, lower income levels, and a higher share of Hispanics. Hence, people 
who live close to clinics are more likely to be uninsured, sicker, and have more limited access to 
other health care providers. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that these differences across people who live close 
and further away from a CHC diminish, and the two groups become more comparable as one 
“zooms in” on the area around the clinic. That is, it is more reasonable to make local 
comparisons of one (poor) area with a closely positioned area than with a more remote one. 
Nonetheless, while the idea of comparing adjacent areas is appealing, it does not solve the 
problem of endogenous clinic entry. To get at causality, I need to separate ED patients into 
control and treatment groups based on an exogenous factor, which must predict how likely a 
patient is to use the CHC services but not be directly related to ED outcomes. 
One such possibility comes from an observation that clinics tend to value proximity to 
highways. Figure 1.1 suggests that there is a consistent pattern of clinics clustering close to 
interstates, highways, and other major roads in California. In 2010, for example, the median 
distance from an FQHC to a major highway was 0.27 miles. Conceptually, one might think of 
these health centers as choosing a location for a new clinic in two stages: First, they must 
identify a high-need area where clinics must locate in order to qualify for the generous Section 
330 funding (the clinic entry is endogenous). Second, clinics also care about the convenience of 
location within this high-need area. In particular, proximity to a major travel route might be an 
important consideration due to infrastructure constraints (e.g., parking) or simply because the 
clinic’s staff prefer a more convenient commuting path. Thus, if clinics usually choose a location 
closer to the highway within their targeted service area, this exogenous factor can be used for 





area). That is, then patients’ differences in proximity to a major highway can be used to model 
the patients’ degree of access to CHCs. 
Variation in highway proximity that is closely correlated with CHC access occurs around 
highway segments “populated” by community health centers. In such areas, I take the ED 
patient’s distance to the highway as an exogenous predictor of the likelihood that the patient 
utilizes the CHC. People who live in highway-adjacent areas face lower travel costs, are more 
likely to be aware of the CHC presence, and are thus more likely to take advantage of CHC 
services. This, in turn, implies that they are less likely to go to the ED for non-urgent care. In 
short, differences in the likelihood of visiting the clinic and thus in the probability of going to the 
ED are partly attributable to the person’s proximity to a highway. Table 1.11 shows that the ratio 
of FQHC patients28 to total population is about 2.7 times higher in zip codes closer to the major 
highway (within 0-5 miles) vs. zip codes 5-10 miles away from the highway (but only along 
those highway segments, which are “populated” by CHCs).   
 
1.7.2. Evidence that Clinics Value Proximity to Highways 
50% of all California’s community health centers that operated in 2010 were located within 0.29 
miles of the nearest highway. All were within 10 miles. Table 1.12 shows summary statistics for 
distance to the major highway for all three types of CHCs: FQHCs, FQHC Look-Alikes, and the 
rest. On average, FQHCs seem to locate slightly closer to highways than the rest of CHCs, with 
the median distance of 0.27 miles.   
To get an idea of how far away people’s residences are with respect to highways, I 
calculate the distance from the centroid of each census tract to the nearest highway. Census 
                                                          
28 I have zip code-level data on FQHC patients (from UDS data) only. No such data is available for patients of non-






tracts are a more refined geographical unit than zip codes and give a better approximation of the 
geographical distribution of the population. In California, the median (average) distance from the 
census tract to the nearest highway is 0.64 miles (1.02 miles), which is 2.4 times the median 
distance-to-highway for FQHCs. Hence, it appears that clinics indeed locate closer to highways, 
on average; and people’s distance-to-highway may be a valid proxy for differential access to 
these clinics.    
The last column of Table 1.12 also shows the percentage of clinics that locate in areas 
designated as MUAs 29  (medically underserved areas) or MUPs (medically underserved 
populations). Less than 50% of FQHCs and FQHC Look-Alikes are actually in the MUA/MUP 
census tracts, what suggests that the requirement of Section 330 grants to locate in these areas is 
soft. It is unlikely that clinics decide to be outside of MUAs only for the sake of location 
convenience defined in terms of proximity to a major highway: On average, FQHCs and FQHC 
Look-Alikes that are in MUAs are closer to a major highway than clinics outside of MUAs.30 
Thus, proximity to a highway does not appear to be a major factor that forces more than 50% of 
FQHCs to be outside of MUA/MUP areas.  
However, I do find evidence that being adjacent to a highway is valuable to clinics when 
I take a closer look at the CHCs that are located in MUA/MUP designated areas. MUAs/MUPs 
are normally a collection of adjacent census tracts. For each such collection of census tracts that 
has at least one CHC in 2010, I calculate the median and average distance to the nearest highway 
separately for tracts that contain a clinic and those that do not contain any clinics using data for 
2010. The ratio of the median distance for tracts with a clinic to the median distance for tracts 
                                                          
29 http://muafind.hrsa.gov (accessed September 2, 2012). 
 
30 But the picture is reversed for clinics that are neither FQHCs nor Look-Alikes: Those that locate in MUA 






without a clinic is 0.68. Since the ratio is less than 1, this implies that CHC-treated census tracts 
within the same MUA/MUP designated area are closer to highways than the rest of the census 
tracts.31 I take this as partial evidence that FQHCs value proximity to highways.  
To summarize, when clinics locate in an officially designated high-need area such as 
MUA/MUP, they tend to choose sites that are close to a major travel route. I use this exogenous 
source of variation in the location decisions of clinics to implement the differences-in-differences 
strategy that classifies ED patients in highway-adjacent areas as my treatment group and patients 
in areas a bit further away from the highway as my control group (but only along those highway 
segments that are “treated” by CHCs in 2007-2009). This way of measuring the patient’s access 
to clinics is no longer directly tied to the actual clinic location but is correlated with it.  
 
1.7.3. Implementation of the Differences-in-Differences Strategy 
The ED encounter-level data is available only for the period of 2006-2010.32 Therefore, I cannot 
use the onset of the Bush’s Health Center Growth Initiative in 2001-2002 as a one-time policy 
change that applied to all areas in California. Instead, I focus only on the areas where the 
endogenous clinic entry happened in 2007-2009.33 Specifically, for each new CHC, which was 
established any time between 2007 and 2009, I identify the nearest highway segment that is 
within 5 miles of this clinic-entrant. I define this set of highway segments as “CHC-populated” 
or “CHC-treated.”34 Similar to Anderson and Matsa (2011), I classify zip codes with centroids 
                                                          
31 The ratio is 0.66 when one uses averages rather than medians. 
 
32 I exclude the year 2005 data as described in Section 1.5. 
 
33 I do not differentiate between the areas that had clinics before 2007 and those that did not. But the impact of the 
clinic entry is expected to be stronger in the areas with no prior CHCs and limited access to other types of providers.  
 






within 5 miles of the selected highway segments as my treatment group, and zip codes whose 
centroids are 5-10 miles away from the highway segments as my control group. I then compare 
ED visits in treatment and control zip codes using 2006 as the pre-treatment year (i.e., before the 
clinic entry in 2007-2009) and 2010 as the post-treatment year.  
There were 133 new CHC openings in 2007-2009: 81 by FQHCs, 12 by FQHC Look-
Alikes, and 40 by other CHCs. 35  Like their predecessors, these new clinics also value the 
convenience of location with respect to a major travel route and generally locate close to 
highways. The median (average) distance between such new clinic-entrants and the closest 
highway is 0.30 (0.48) miles.  
To implement the differences-in-differences strategy, I estimate the following reduced 
form equation:              𝑌𝑧𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝜏𝐺𝑧 ∙ 𝑌2010 + 𝛽𝐺𝑧 + 𝛿𝑌2010 + 𝜀𝑧𝑡 (1.2) 
Variable 𝑌𝑧𝑡 is same as in Section 1.6: the log of non-admission ED encounters by uninsured 
patients from zip code Z in year t. 𝐺𝑧 is an indicator variable for the proximity of zip code Z to 
the treated highway segment: 𝐺𝑧 = 1  if 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑧 ≤ 5  miles and 𝐺𝑧 = 0  if 5 < 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑧 ≤ 10 
miles, where 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑧 is the distance from the zip code’s centroid to the geographic center of the 
highway segment.36 𝑌2010 is an indicator variable for year 2010 (the post-treatment year).  
Coefficient 𝜏 measures the average percentage change in the number of non-admission 
ED visits by the uninsured in treatment zip codes between 2006 and 2010 due to (any) clinic 
entry in 2007-2009, if the control group accounts for changes in ED utilization due to all other, 
                                                          
35 Some of these are relocations but since these clinics choose a new location I treat relocators as new clinics. 
 
36 All distance calculations are performed using Geographic Information System (GIS) software. Data on major 
highways in California is from Tele Atlas North America, Inc. 2008. “United States Major Highways.” Redlands, 





non-entry-related factors. The main identifying assumption is that in the absence of the treatment 
(no clinic entry), we would expect the treatment and control groups to have similar ED 
utilization trends between 2006 and 2010.  
Formally, 𝐸(𝑌𝑧𝑡|𝐺𝑧 = 1, 2010) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑧𝑡|𝐺𝑧 = 1, 2006) = 𝜏 + 𝛿 and 𝐸(𝑌𝑧𝑡|𝐺𝑧 = 0, 2010) 
−𝐸(𝑌𝑧𝑡|𝐺𝑧 = 0, 2006) = 𝛿. That is, we want 𝜏 = 0 in the absence of the treatment. This means 
that apart from being differently affected by CHC-treatment (i.e., being close to vs. far away 
from a new CHC), uninsured patients in treatment and control groups would utilize emergency 
rooms in a similar way between 2006 and 2010. 
Row (1) of Table 1.3a lists coefficient estimates from equation (1.2) for non-admission 
ED encounters by different types of patients, by insurance status. I detect a 13.6% decline in 
encounters by uninsured patients and a 6.8% decline in visits by Medicaid-covered adults ages 
18-64. Clinic entry does not impact any other category of patients, which is consistent with the 
results of Section 1.6 above. Results in rows (2) and (3) of Table 1.3a are based on the 
specification, which also includes county-level time-varying controls discussed in Section 1.6 
(i.e., unemployment, population, and per capita income). The main coefficients of interest – for 
uninsured and Medicaid ED visitors – change by less than one standard error and are statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  
In Table 1.13, I compare select ED outcomes and population characteristics in treatment 
and control zip codes to check the validity of the identifying assumption. The population share of 
Hispanics grew by more in the control group of zip codes than in the treatment group between 
2000 and 2010: 27.5% vs. 18.6%, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 and 2010). This might 
be inflating the true impact of the clinic entry on uninsured ED visits reported in column (1) of 





𝐸(𝑌𝑧𝑡|𝐺𝑧 = 0, 2010) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑧𝑡|𝐺𝑧 = 0, 2006) = 𝛿 + 𝜌, where 𝜌 > 0.  This would then imply the 
following bias: {𝐸(𝑌𝑧𝑡|𝐺𝑧 = 1, 2010) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑧𝑡|𝐺𝑧 = 1, 2006)} − {𝐸(𝑌𝑧𝑡|𝐺𝑧 = 0, 2010) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑧𝑡|𝐺𝑧 = 0, 2006)} = (𝜏 + 𝛿) − (𝛿 + 𝜌) = 𝜏 − 𝜌 < 𝜏 
Since 𝜏 < 0, 𝜏 − 𝜌 overestimates true 𝜏. I address this concern by including population shares of 
Hispanics in 2000 and 2010 as controls in equation (1.2). The results are reported in row (1) of 
Table 1.3b: The estimate of 𝜏 for uninsured patients in column (1) is now slightly smaller in 
magnitude (a 10.2% decline) than ?̂? = −0.136 in row (1) of Table 1.3a but otherwise appears to 
be robust to the inclusion of Hispanics population shares in equation (1.2). The estimate changes 
by less than one standard deviation and is significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the 
possible bias due to differences in the time trend between control and treatment zip codes in row 
(1) of Table 1.3a is not a significant concern (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The coefficient 
estimate on Medicaid patients becomes insignificant, what is consistent with the previous 
findings in Section 1.6. In rows (2) and (3) of Table 1.3b, I also control for unemployment, 
population, and per capita income at the county level. The results are similar to those in row (1) 
of Table 1.3b, and so I adopt the estimates in row (1) of Table 1.3b for uninsured and Medicaid 
ED visits as my main differences-in-differences results.  
As in Section 1.6, I perform several additional robustness checks here too. In Table 1.14, 
I find that the decline in the number of ED visits by the uninsured is driven by lower utilization 
of EDs by uninsured males (columns 1 and 2). In addition, encounters for conditions that are 
unrelated to traumas and poisonings also fall among uninsured patients between 2006 and 2010 
as a result of the clinic entry (columns 3 and 4). The decline is even greater for encounters not 





shares rather than logs of the outcome variable. On the overall, the differences-in-differences 
results tell a consistent story that the establishment of new community health centers leads to 
lower levels of ED utilization by the uninsured (i.e., fewer self-pay visits).  
 
1.7.4. Checking the Identifying Assumption 
I also have to check the validity of the identifying assumption, or that ED utilization would have 
evolved similarly in control and treatment groups between 2006 and 2010 in the absence of any 
clinic entry. To do this, I carry out three robustness checks below, where I compare treatment 
and control groups over a certain period of time (2006 vs. 2010; and 2005 vs. 2006) in situations 
that could be taken as rough proxies for the state when no CHC treatment takes place. Formally, 
I want to rule out the possibility that 𝜏 is statistically significant when there is no new clinic 
entry (i.e., when there is no treatment).  
First, patients with private insurance are not expected to be “treated” by new clinics 
because they have access to other providers. Statistically insignificant ?̂? = −0.004 (with standard 
error 0.0227) from column 3 of Table 1.3b implies that ED use by privately insured individuals 
evolved similarly between 2006 and 2010 in treatment and control areas. This provides partial 
support to the hypothesis that trends in the ED use by uninsured could have also been similar 
over time in the absence of the clinic entry between 2007 and 2009.  
Second, using almost the same sample as described in this section, I check for pre-trends 
using data for uninsured patients: That is, I take zip codes with good quality data in year 2005 
and re-estimate equation (1.2) for uninsured patients in treatment and control groups in 2005 vs. 
2006. Here, I obtain ?̂? = 0.0182 (standard error is 0.0256). That is, before the treatment of 2007-





2006, and this provides additional support to the validity of the identifying assumption and the 
results in columns (1) of Tables 1.3a and 1.3b. 
Finally, I also estimate equation (1.2) using zip codes in areas with no clinic entry and 
again obtain a statistically insignificant estimate ?̂? = −0.0247 (standard error is 0.107).  
 
1.7.5. Reconciling Coefficient Estimates of Sections 1.6 and 1.7 
The main result of Section 1.6 gives an estimated average drop of 1.33% in the number of 
uninsured ED visits at the zip code level (column 3 of Table 1.2), while the differences-in-
differences estimate of Section 1.7 shows a much larger decrease of 10.2% (column 1 of Table 
1.3b). This difference in the magnitude of estimated coefficients warrants further investigation.  
First, I note that estimates of Section 1.6 are based on a larger set of zip codes, which 
comprises nearly all California zip codes (n=1,608), whereas I use a more restricted set of zip 
codes in Section 1.7 (n=843). To test whether the difference in coefficient magnitudes is driven 
by the sample composition of zip codes, I re-estimate equation (1.1) using the smaller set of zip 
codes of Section 1.7 (n=843). The result is reported in column (1) of Table 1.4:  𝛾� = –0.0262, 
which is higher in absolute value than the previous estimate of –0.0133. 
Next, note that I use only two years of data (2006 and 2010) in Section 1.7, and five years 
of data (2006-2010) in Section 1.6. Hence, I re-estimate equation (1.1) using a smaller set of zip 
codes and only two years of data, 2006 and 2010. Column (2) of Table 1.4 shows a further 
decline in the coefficient estimate of 𝛾� to –0.0406.  
Finally, the results of Section 1.7 are based on a dummy variable for the entry of clinics 
in 2007-2009, while Section 1.6 exploits annual changes in the number of clinics within the zip 
code. Therefore, I re-define the regressor used in Section 1.6 to be unity when the number of 





result is listed in column (3) of Table 1.4. Estimated 𝛾� is now –0.123, which is a lot more in line 
with differences-in-differences estimates of ?̂?= –0.136 in column (1) of Table 1.3a (without the 
population share of Hispanics as a control) and ?̂?= –0.102 in column (1) of Table 1.3b (including 
the population share of Hispanics as a control).  
The above indicates that the event study approach of Section 1.6 with zip code and year 
fixed effects does a good job dealing with major sources of endogeneity. Both estimation 
approaches presented in this paper produce comparable estimates, and capture the effect of a 
clinic opening on ED utilization.  
 
1.8.  Conclusions and Future Work 
In this section, I briefly summarize my results, discuss the effect of CHCs on various groups of 
patients, and suggest directions for future research.   
This paper provides evidence that recent expansions in the CHC sector, facilitated by 
higher levels of Section 330 funding, reduce the use of emergency departments by the uninsured 
for conditions not requiring immediate hospital admission – a proxy for less urgent conditions. 
Both of my empirical strategies show a negative and statistically significant impact of CHCs on 
ED visits in California in 2006-2010. The results are robust to various measures of access. In 
regressions of Section 1.6, where I exploit the cross-sectional and time-series variation in the 
number of CHCs, I find an average decline of 1.33% in the number of non-admission ED visits 
by uninsured adults at the zip code level when one more clinic starts operating within 5 miles of 
the patients’ zip code. My differences-in-differences estimate shows a 10.2% drop in the number 
of such visits from 2006 to 2010 at the zip code level in the areas that experienced at least one 
clinic entry in 2007-2009. The difference in the magnitude of coefficients is due to differences in 





nor a negative impact of CHCs on non-admission ED visits by non-elderly adults with private or 
public (Medicaid) insurance.  
The literature on ED utilization patterns suggests that different groups of patients use 
emergency departments for different reasons, what would influence the way they value access to 
CHCs. The uninsured often lack a regular source of care, and are thus expected to take advantage 
of CHC services when these become more accessible. Medicaid patients are also often medically 
marginalized because physicians may be reluctant to accept them due to financial and 
administrative burdens of the Medicaid program (Cunningham and May, 2006). Nonetheless, 
this group tends to have better access to health care than people without insurance, and my 
estimates suggest that the impact of CHCs on this category of ED users is indeed less significant. 
This may be so because, first, the majority of Medicaid patients are women;37 and women are 
more likely to visit family planning clinics such as Planned Parenthood affiliates, where they can 
get primary care services as part of reproductive health care (Frost et al., 2012). Second, 
Medicaid patients with medical homes have little incentive to switch providers because they can 
essentially obtain health care services for free irrespective of the source of care. Thus, it is likely 
that, on average, Medicaid patients value CHC access less than patients without insurance. I also 
find no impact of CHCs on patients with private insurance, who are more likely to use office-
based physicians for primary care than patients without insurance. 
 Next, I suggest how the present study could be extended to better evaluate the degree of 
CHC effectiveness. 
The majority of uninsured are working poor (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012a) and, if 
severely constrained by work schedules, may prefer using emergency departments because of 
                                                          
37 According to Table 1.1, 70% of all non-admission ED encounters by Medicaid patients were by women, while 





their 24/7 availability. My results, based on changes in the number of clinics, suggest that the 
shortage of affordable health care providers does matter, but I do not provide an answer as to 
whether more convenient ED hours are driving the demand for non-urgent ED care among the 
uninsured. Cunningham (2011) suggests that community health centers might create more cost-
savings for EDs by diverting less urgent visits than can office-based physicians because CHCs 
are more likely to be open for more hours. Section 330 grant conditions require clinics to be open 
at least 32 hours a week. According to the year 2010 UDS report on FQHCs, the median 
(average) number of operational weekly hours is 40 (47) for sites that are open at least 32 hours a 
week (n=618). Of these, only 5.5% operate less than 40 hours, 46.0% operate exactly 40 hours, 
and 32.7% operate at least 48 hours. The more convenient hours of operation at CHCs are likely 
to be valued by the uninsured and other groups of patients but I do not test for this formally here 
due to data limitations.38  Additional data fields in the restricted-access ED utilization data from 
OSHPD could allow testing for whether the impact of CHCs on ED visits by the uninsured is 
greatest during the regular business hours (Monday–Friday, 9am–6pm) or during the after-hours. 
Declines in ED visits during the regular business hours would be particularly convincing that 
CHCs benefit the medically underserved by providing them with a medical home. 
Furthermore, while the majority of CHCs provide health care to all patients, regardless of 
ability to pay, different groups of the poor may have differential access to CHCs. As previously 
mentioned, most FQHC patients have incomes at or below 200% FPL: This group qualifies for 
clinic discounts and many other welfare programs, including Medicaid. This observation raises 
questions about the availability and affordability of health care to those patients, who are not 
                                                          
38 UDS data includes information only on FQHCs and excludes data on FQHC Look-Alikes, FQHCs associated with 
Indian tribal organizations and other types of CHCs that are available in my OSHPD dataset. In addition, data on 





very far above the 200% FPL threshold. They are relatively poor but not eligible for Medicaid 
(prior to the ACA) or discounted fees charged by FQHCs. It is possible then that the sliding fee 
structure of FQHCs, which is most accommodating to those with incomes at or below 200% 
FPL, provides fewer benefits to the poor who are just above the 200% FPL threshold and might 
lead to differences in utilization of EDs for non-emergency care and health outcomes between 
the two groups. Identifying whether these differences are significant may have important policy 
implications.  
Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2012) observe that there is not enough research on the 
health benefits created by CHCs. Data shows that the uninsured tend to have more health 
problems than people who have medical insurance (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012a). This 
contributes to differences among the two groups in employment opportunities, labor 
productivity, and the likelihood of having employer-sponsored insurance coverage. The question 
of the CHC impact on health outcomes (e.g., the incidence of chronic conditions) has probably 
received little attention to date due to data limitations and the small size of the CHC sector in the 
past but should be a productive area for further research.   
Generally, community health centers have been viewed as minor players in the health 
care system due to their small size relative to other health care providers (Summer, 2011; 
Chronicles, 2012). But the CHC sector has been growing and gaining greater importance, partly 
stimulated by federal grants. Health centers are particularly important because they provide 
continuity of care, and help prevent and mitigate the development of chronic conditions. In this 
paper, I find evidence that CHC presence in California matters, especially for people who do not 
have health insurance coverage.  Community health centers are likely to play an important role in 





2014 as scheduled. First, the Congressional Budget Office projects that about 26-27 million non-
elderly adults will continue to be uninsured post-2016 (CBO, 2012). Second, some analysts and 
policy makers predict that the anticipated dramatic increase in the number of people with 
medical insurance will create extra burden for emergency departments if the demand for primary 
health care providers substantially exceeds their supply. With higher unmet demand, CHCs are 
likely to continue being an important source of primary health care (GAO, 2011), especially for 







Table 1.1. Emergency department usage by three main categories of patients (ages 18-64), by insurance 
status. January-June 2010, California. Non-admission ED encounters only.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Uninsured Medicaid Privately Insured 
    
% Total ED visits 23.09% 25.76% 31.33% 
% Non-Injuries 75.98% 83.42% 75.57% 
% Men 52.61% 29.32% 39.81% 
% Hispanic 39.56% 39.98% 25.68% 
% Age 35-64 48.24% 47.89% 61.00% 










Most Frequent Diagnoses: 
   
1. Abdominal pain Abdominal pain Chest pain 
 2.36% 3.18% 3.16% 
2. Headache Headache Headache 
 2.21% 2.94% 2.78% 
3. Chest pain Malnutrition in pregnancy Other chest pain 
 1.92% 2.51% 2.78% 
4. Alcohol Abuse Threatened abortion Abdominal pain 
 1.70% 2.12% 2.62% 
5. Low back pain Chest pain Upper abdominal pain 
  1.60% 1.88% 1.76% 
Source: OSHPD Primary Care Clinics Utilization Data, January-June 2010. The total number of all non-
admission ED visits is 2,651,798.  
 
Notes: Privately Insured in column (3) includes patients covered by one of the following type of insurers: 
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), and Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield. 
 








Table 1.2. Section 1.6 estimates of 𝛾  from equation (1.1).  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑧𝑡  is the log of non-admission ED 
encounters in year t by uninsured patients (ages 18-64), who reside in zip code Z. Non-admission ED 

















        
𝑪𝑯𝑪𝒛𝒕:  0.101*** 0.0231** -0.0133** -0.0172* -0.0245*** -0.0135** -0.0148** 
No. of CHCs w/ 5miles (0.00904) (0.00957) (0.00668) (0.00954) (0.00727) (0.00671) (0.00687) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Invariant Controls  Yes      
Zip code Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zip code Time Trends    Yes    
County Time Trends     Yes   
Unemployment rate and 
other annual, county-
level controls 
     Yes  




       
        
Observations 8,040 8,040 8,040 8,040 8,040 8,040 8,040 
R-squared 0.240 0.294 0.969 0.983 0.974 0.970 0.970 
        
Notes: Each column includes coefficient estimates from a separate regression of equation (1.1). Types of controls 
vary by column. Time invariant controls include the log of the zip code’s area in square miles and the number of 
hospitals that operates within 5 miles of the ED patient’s zip code. Other annual, county-level controls include the 
log of the county population and the log of per capita income in 2006 dollars. Sample is a 5-year balanced panel of 
1,608 California zip codes. Number of CHCs is from OSHPD’s Primary Care Clinics Utilization Data. Data on 
hospitals and ED encounters is from OSHPD’s Emergency Department Public Data Set. Data on unemployed, 
county population and per capita income is from BEA. Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in 








Table 1.3a. Section 1.7 estimates of 𝜏 from equation (1.2) for different categories of ED patients, by 
insurance status.  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑧𝑡 is the log of non-admission ED encounters in year t by patients of the given 
category (ages 18-64), who reside in zip code Z. Non-admission ED encounters, January-June 2006 and 
2010, California.  
              Outcomes 
 
Regressor  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log(Uninsured) 
 
Log(Medicaid) Log(Private) Log(Other ED) Log(Total ED) 
      
(1)  𝑮𝒛 ∙ 𝒀𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎 -0.136*** -0.0676** -0.0148 0.0132 -0.000493 
 (0.0386) (0.0326) (0.0221) (0.0302) (0.0166) 
      
R-squared 0.074 0.073 0.023 0.049 0.054 
      
(2)  𝑮𝒛 ∙ 𝒀𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎 -0.143*** -0.0775** -0.0158 0.00867 -0.00530 
(with unemployment rate) (0.0392) (0.0324) (0.0222) (0.0307) (0.0172) 
      
R-squared 0.269 0.174 0.166 0.109 0.175 
      
(3)  𝑮𝒛 ∙ 𝒀𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎 -0.140*** -0.0731** -0.0121 0.0162 -0.00108 
(with log of unemployed) (0.0392) (0.0326) (0.0224) (0.0307) (0.0173) 
      
R-squared 0.270 0.175 0.167 0.112 0.177 
Notes: Each cell includes a coefficient estimate from a separate regression of equation (1.2). Sample is a balanced 
panel of 843 California zip codes (see Section 1.7). N = 1,686 in all regressions. I focus only on the areas, where the 
endogenous clinic entry took place in 2007-2009. For each new CHC, I identify the nearest highway segment that is 
within 5 miles of the clinic-entrant (these are my “treated highway segments”). 𝐺𝑧 is an indicator variable for the 
proximity of zip code Z to the treated highway segment: 𝐺𝑧 = 1 if 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑧 ≤ 5 and 𝐺𝑧 = 0  if 5 < 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑧 ≤ 10, 
where 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑧 is the distance from the zip code’s centroid to the geographic center of the treated highway segment. 
𝑌2010 is an dummy variable for year 2010 (post-treatment year). 2006 is the pre-treatment year. Row (1) is based on 
the model specified in equation (1.2). Rows (2) and (3) also include additional annual, county-level controls: the 
unemployment rate (row 2); the log of unemployed (row 3); and the log of county population and per capita income 
in year 2006 dollars (rows 2 and 3). Regressions with zip code fixed effects instead of indicator variable 𝐺𝑧 produce 
similar results (not reported here). Data on major highways in California is from Tele Atlas North America, Inc. 
2008. “United States Major Highways.” Redlands, California, USA: ESRI. Distance is calculated using Geographic 
Information System (GIS) software. Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses. ***, 





Table 1.3b (with population share of Hispanics). Section 1.7 robustness check estimates of 𝜏 from 
equation (1.2) for different categories of ED patients, by insurance status.  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑧𝑡  is the log of non-
admission ED encounters in year t by patients of the given category (ages 18-64), who reside in zip code 
Z. Non-admission ED encounters, January-June 2006 and 2010, California. Population shares of 
Hispanics in 2000 and 2010, and the log of the zip code area (in square miles) are included to control for 
possible differences in time trends across zip codes. 
              Outcomes 
 
Regressor  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log(Uninsured) 
 
Log(Medicaid) Log(Private) Log(Other ED) Log(Total ED) 
      
(1)  𝑮𝒛 ∙ 𝒀𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎 -0.102*** -0.0295 -0.00396 0.0330 0.0218 
 (0.0387) (0.0331) (0.0227) (0.0305) (0.0169) 
      
R-squared 0.319 0.359 0.078 0.178 0.228 
      
(2)  𝑮𝒛 ∙ 𝒀𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎 -0.112*** -0.0367 -0.00660 0.0308 0.0169 
(with unemployment rate) (0.0389) (0.0330) (0.0225) (0.0313) (0.0171) 
      
R-squared 0.427 0.382 0.286 0.230 0.320 
      
(3)  𝑮𝒛 ∙ 𝒀𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎 -0.105*** -0.0283 0.000765 0.0416 0.0245 
(with log of unemployed) (0.0390) (0.0335) (0.0229) (0.0314) (0.0174) 
      
R-squared 0.431 0.385 0.289 0.236 0.324 
      
Notes: Each cell includes a coefficient estimate from a separate regression of equation (1.2). Sample is a balanced 
panel of 843 California zip codes (see Section 1.7). N = 1,686 in all regressions. I focus only on the areas, where the 
endogenous clinic entry took place in 2007-2009. For each new CHC, I identify the nearest highway segment that is 
within 5 miles of the clinic-entrant (these are my “treated highway segments”). 𝐺𝑧 is an indicator variable for the 
proximity of zip code Z to the treated highway segment: 𝐺𝑧 = 1 if 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑧 ≤ 5 and 𝐺𝑧 = 0  if 5 < 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑧 ≤ 10, 
where 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑧 is the distance from the zip code’s centroid to the geographic center of the treated highway segment. 
𝑌2010 is an dummy variable for year 2010 (post-treatment year). 2006 is the pre-treatment year. Row (1) is based on 
the model specified in equation (1.2), and also includes population shares of Hispanics in 2000 and 2010, and the 
log of the zip code area (in square miles). Rows (2) and (3) include annual, county-level controls: the 
unemployment rate (row 2); the log of unemployed (row 3); and the log of county population and per capita income 
in year 2006 dollars (rows 2 and 3). Regressions with zip code fixed effects instead of indicator variable 𝐺𝑧 produce 
similar results (not reported here). Population shares of Hispanics are from 2000 and 2010 Census. Data on major 
highways in California is from Tele Atlas North America, Inc. 2008. “United States Major Highways.” Redlands, 
California, USA: ESRI. Distance is calculated using Geographic Information System (GIS) software. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 







Table 1.4. Reconciling estimates of Sections 1.6 and 1.7: 𝛾� of equation (1.1) reported in column (3) of 
Table 1.2 versus ?̂? from equation (1.2) reported in columns (1) in Tables 1.3a and 1.3b. 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑧𝑡 is the log 
of non-admission ED encounters in year t by uninsured patients (ages 18-64), who reside in zip code Z. 
Non-admission ED encounters, California. 
    
Regressors (1) (2) (3) 
    
No. of CHCs within 5miles -0.0262*** -0.0406***  
 (0.00642) (0.0125)  
Dummy for Clinic Entry   -0.123** 
   (0.0482) 
    
Zip code and Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Y2006-Y2010 Yes No No 
    
Y2006 and Y2010 only  No Yes Yes 
    
    
Observations 4,215 1,686 1,686 
R-squared 0.969 0.968 0.968 
Notes: Each column includes a coefficient estimate from a separate regression. Column (1): Estimate of 𝛾 using a 
balanced panel of 843 California zip codes as in Section 1.7, January–June, 2006-2010. Column (2): Estimate of 𝛾 
using a balanced panel of 843 California zip codes as in Section 1.7, January–June, 2006 and 2010 only. Column 
(3): Estimate of 𝛾 using a balanced panel of 843 California zip codes as in Section 1.7, January–June, 2006 and 
2010 only. Regressor (dummy for clinic entry) is set to unity if ∆𝐶𝐻𝐶𝑧𝑡 ≥ 1 and zero otherwise. ED encounters are 
from OSHPD’s Emergency Department Public Data Set.  Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are 






Table 1.5. Section 1.6 robustness check estimates of 𝛾 from equation (1.1) for different categories of ED 
patients, by insurance status, when distance from the zip code’s centroid is 5 miles.  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑧𝑡 is the log of 
non-admission ED encounters in year t by patients of the given category (ages 18-64), who reside in zip 
code Z. Non-admission ED encounters, January-June 2006-2010, California.  
             Outcomes 
 
Regressors  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






      
(1) No. of CHCs -0.0133** -0.00231 -0.00591 -0.00331 0.00355 
 (0.00668) (0.00663) (0.00634) (0.00591) (0.00448) 
      
(2) No. of FQHCs -0.0147** -0.00485 -0.00685 -0.00436 0.00444 
 (0.00694) (0.00714) (0.00706) (0.00608) (0.00486) 
      
(3) No. of CHCs -0.0135** -0.00387 -0.00370 -0.00432 0.00438 
(with unemployment rate) (0.00671) (0.00667) (0.00641) (0.00598) (0.00455) 
      
(4) No. of CHCs -0.0148** -0.00411 -0.00492 -0.00633 0.00334 
(with log of unemployed) (0.00687) (0.00666) (0.00652) (0.00609) (0.00460) 
      
Notes: Each cell includes a coefficient estimate from a separate regression of equation (1.1). All specifications 
include a set of zip code fixed effects and a set of year fixed effects. Sample is a 5-year balanced panel of 1,608 
California zip codes. N=8,040. Row (1): The regressor is the number of CHCs within 5 miles of the centroid of zip 
code Z. Row (2): The regressor is the number of FQHCs within 5 miles of the centroid of zip code Z (This 
specification also includes the number of non-FQHC community health centers as a control). Rows (3) and (4) 
include additional, annual county-level controls: the unemployment rate (row 3); the log of unemployed (row 4); 
and the log of county population and per capita income in year 2006 dollars (rows 3 and 4). Robust standard errors, 




Table 1.6. Section 1.6 robustness check estimates of 𝛾 from equation (1.1) using different types of 
CHC-related regressors. 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑧𝑡  is the log of non-admission ED encounters in year t by uninsured 
patients (ages 18-64), who reside in zip code Z. Non-admission ED encounters, January-June 2006-2010, 
California. FTE stands for full-time equivalent (Physician’s FTE=1 implies 1 full-time physician). 
Distance from the zip code’s centroid is 5 miles. 
                   Regressors 
 
Type of clinic 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
No. of Clinics Physician  
FTE 
Physician 





      
(1) No. of CHCs -0.0133** 0.00134 -0.00473 -0.0115*** 0.0113 
 (0.00668) (0.00130) (0.00388) (0.00431) (0.00783) 
      
(2) No. of FQHCs -0.0147** -0.00516*** -0.00789* -0.0114* 0.00128 
 (0.00694) (0.00175) (0.00457) (0.00587) (0.00484) 
Notes: Each cell includes a coefficient estimate from a separate regression of equation (1). All specifications include 
a set of zip code fixed effects and a set of year fixed effects. Sample is a 5-year balanced panel of 1,608 California 
zip codes. N=8,040. Row (1): The regressor is the number of all CHCs within 5 miles of the centroid of zip code Z. 
Row (2): The regressor is the number of FQHCs within 5 miles of the centroid of zip code Z (This specification also 
includes the number of non-FQHC community health centers as a control). Number of clinics is from OSHPD’s 
Primary Care Clinics Utilization Data. ED encounters are from OSHPD’s Emergency Department Public Data Set. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 





Table 1.7. Section 1.6 robustness check estimates of 𝛾 from equation (1.1) for different categories of ED 
patients, by insurance status, when distance from the zip code centroid is 10 miles.  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑧𝑡 is the log of 
non-admission ED encounters in year t by patients of the given category (ages 18-64), who reside in zip 
code Z. Non-admission ED encounters, January-June 2006-2010, California.  
                     Outcomes 
 
Regressors 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






      
(1) No. of CHCs  -0.00817** -0.00522 -0.00277 -0.00241 0.00152 
 (0.00401) (0.00389) (0.00346) (0.00328) (0.00248) 
      
(2) No. of FQHCs -0.00872** -0.00495 -0.00278 -0.00266 0.00147 
 (0.00405) (0.00387) (0.00345) (0.00332) (0.00247) 
Notes: Each cell includes a coefficient estimate from a separate regression of equation (1.1). All specifications 
include a set of zip code fixed effects and a set of year fixed effects. Sample is a 5-year balanced panel of 1,608 
California zip codes. N=8,040. Row (1): The regressor is the number of CHCs within 10 miles of the centroid of zip 
code Z. Row (2): The regressor is the number of FQHCs within 10 miles of the centroid of zip code Z (This 
specification also includes the number of non-FQHC community health centers as a control). Number of CHCs is 
from OSHPD’s Primary Care Clinics Utilization Data. ED encounters are from OSHPD’s Emergency Department 
Public Data Set. Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 







Table 1.8 (with ratios). Section 1.6 robustness check estimates of 𝛾 from equation (1.1) for different 
categories of ED patients, by insurance status.  𝑌𝑧𝑡 is the ratio of non-admission ED encounters in year t 
by patients of the given category (ages 18-64) to all ED encounters by patients (ages 18-64), who reside 
in zip code Z. Non-admission ED encounters, January-June 2006-2010, California. Distance from the zip 
code’s centroid is 5 miles.  
                            Outcomes 
Regressor 
(1) (2) (3) 
Share of Uninsured Share of Medicaid Share of Privately Insured 
    
No.of CHCs within 5 miles -0.00182** -0.000250 0.000633 
 (0.000850) (0.000938) (0.00139) 
    
Notes: Each cell includes a coefficient estimate from a separate regression of equation (1.1). All specifications 
include a set of zip code fixed effects and a set of year fixed effects. Sample is a 5-year balanced panel of 1,476 
California zip codes. N=7,380. Number of clinics is from OSHPD’s Primary Care Clinics Utilization Data. ED 
encounters are from OSHPD’s Emergency Department Public Data Set. Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip 
code level, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Table 1.9. Additional section 1.6 robustness check estimates of 𝛾  from equation (1.1) for different 
categories of ED patients.  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑧𝑡 is the log of non-admission ED encounters in year t by patients of the 
given category (ages 18-64), who reside in zip code Z. Non-admission ED encounters, January-June 
2006-2010, California. Distance from the zip code’s centroid is 5 miles.  
             Outcomes 
 
Regressor 













       
No. of CHCs -0.0178** -0.00895 -0.0160** -0.00131 -0.0474*** 0.00158 
 (0.00810) (0.00836) (0.00665) (0.00723) (0.0107) (0.00973) 
Notes: Each cell includes a coefficient estimate from a separate regression of equation (1.1). All specifications 
include a set of zip code fixed effects and a set of year fixed effects. Sample is a 5-year balanced panel of 1,608 
California zip codes. N=8,040. Number of CHCs is from OSHPD’s Primary Care Clinics Utilization Data. ED 
encounters are from OSHPD’s Emergency Department Public Data Set. Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip 



















Census tracts with 
CHCs 
5,891 33,833 14,528 .27 .35 .474 525 
Census tracts 
without CHCs 
5,905 47,873 20,597 .12 .19 .358 6,524 
Notes: Number of CHCs is from OSHPD’s Primary Care Clinics Utilization Data, year 2010. Census tract data is 
from 2000 Census (available through Social Explorer). I match census tracts and CHCs using Geographic 







Figure 1.1.   
 
Notes: Data on CHCs is from OSHPD’s Primary Care Clinics Utilization Data, 2010. Data on major highways in 
California is from Tele Atlas North America, Inc. 2008. “United States Major Highways.” Redlands, California, 








Table 1.11. Median FQHC penetration rate at the zip code level, by the zip code’s proximity to the major 
highway (0-5 miles vs. 5-10 miles). 
 
2006 2010   
 
0-5miles 5-10miles   0-5miles 5-10miles   
      
𝐹𝑄𝐻𝐶𝑧𝑡 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑧𝑡⁄  .025 .009 .041 .015 
     
Notes: The penetration rate is calculated as the ratio of all FQHC patients from zip code Z in year t to the total 
population of zip code Z in 2010. Data on the number of FQHC patients by zip code is from HRSA’s UDS reports 
on Section 330 grantees, 2006 and 2010. Population data is the year 2010 estimate of the zip code population from 
Tele Atlas North America, Inc. 2010 “United States Five-Digit ZIP Code Areas.” Redlands, California, USA: ESRI. 
Only zip codes, where CHC entry took place in 2007-2009, are in included. 
 
 
Table 1.12. Summary statistics for distance (in miles) from California CHCs to the nearest major 
highway, using the year 2010 data.  
 
Type of CHC Median Mean St. Dev. Min Max N 
% in  
MUA/MUP 
        
FQHCs 0.274 0.504 0.757 0.000 5.829 413 42.86% 
FQHC Look-Alikes 0.389 0.701 0.764 0.001 2.858 52 46.15% 
“Other” CHCs 0.348 0.711 1.302 0.001 9.101 113 38.05% 
All types 
 
0.292 0.563 0.893 0.000 9.101 578 42.21% 
Notes: Data on CHCs is from OSHPD’s Primary Care Clinics Utilization Data, 2010. Data on major highways in 
California is from Tele Atlas North America, Inc. 2008. “United States Major Highways.” Redlands, California, 
USA: ESRI. I calculate distance from the exact clinic location (given by longitude and latitude) to the nearest 
interstate, U.S. highway, state highway, or major road segment in California, using Geographic Information System 
(GIS) software and each segment’s geographic center. Information on MUA/MUP designations is at the census tract 
level and comes from the Human Resources and Services Administration (http://muafind.hrsa.gov, accessed October 






Table 1.13. Comparison of select variables over time in treatment zip codes (within 0-5 miles) and 
control zip codes (within 5-10 miles). Medians and median growth rates. Non-admission ED encounters 
by patients ages 18-64, January-June 2006 vs. 2010, California.  
Row  
 
Treatment: 0-5miles Control: 5-10miles 
No.  Variables 2006 2010 2006 2010 
   N=490 N=391 
(1) Share of uninsured ED visits .210 .221 .171 .200 
(2) (median % change)  (8.41%)  (13.7%) 
(3) Share of Medicaid ED visits .181 .208 .132 .174 
(4) Share ED visits by privately insured .369 .337 .452 .414 
(5) Share ED visits by Hispanics .178 .204 .103 .140 
(6) FQHCzt Total_Populationzt⁄  .025 .041 .009 .015 
 (median % change)  (43.8%)  (42.7%) 
  Census data Census data 
  2000 2010 2000 2010 
(7) Population Share of Hispanics .243 .299 .163 .224 
(8) (median % change)  (18.6%)  (27.5%) 
(9) Population Density 5,747 6,124 1,518 2,157 
(10) (median % change)  (3.4%)  (7.5%) 
(11) Vacancy Rate .035 .059 .035 .059 
      
Notes: In Section 1.7, I take 2006 as the pre-treatment year, and 2010 as the post-treatment year. I focus only on the 
areas, where the endogenous clinic entry took place in 2007-2009. For each new CHC, I identify the nearest 
highway segment, which is within 5 miles of the clinic-entrant (these are my “treated highway segments”). Then, zip 
codes that are within 5 miles of such treated highway segments are my treatment zip codes, and those that are within 
5-10 miles are my control zip codes. ED encounters are from OSHPD’s Emergency Department Public Data Set. 
Population variables are from 2000 and 2010 Census (available through Social Explorer). Data on the number of 








Table 1.14. Section 1.7 estimates of 𝜏 from equation (1.2) for different categories of ED patients.  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑧𝑡 
is the log of non-admission ED encounters in year t by patients of the given category (ages 18-64), who 
reside in zip code Z. Non-admission ED encounters, January-June 2006 and 2010, California. Controls 
for possible differences in time trends between treatment and control areas are included: Population share 
of Hispanics in 2000 and 2010, and the log of the zip code area. 
        Outcomes 
 
Regressor 













       
𝑮𝒛 ∙ 𝒀𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎 -0.136*** -0.0849* -0.109*** 0.0289* -0.260*** -0.0813* 
 (0.0524) (0.0504) (0.0384) (0.0160) (0.0576) (0.0420) 
       
Observations 1,686 1,686 1,686 1,686 1,686 1,686 
R-squared 0.310 0.336 0.348 0.225 0.220 0.157 
Notes: Each column includes a coefficient estimate from a separate regression of equation (1.2). Sample is a 
balanced panel of 843 California zip codes. I focus only on the areas, where the endogenous clinic entry took place 
in 2007-2009. For each new CHC, I identify the nearest highway segment that is within 5 miles of the clinic-entrant 
(these are my “treated highway segments”). 𝐺𝑧 is an indicator variable for the proximity of zip code Z to the treated 
highway segment: 𝐺𝑧 = 1 if 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑧 ≤ 5 and 𝐺𝑧 = 0  if 5 < 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑧 ≤ 10, where 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑧 is the distance from the zip 
code centroid to the geographic center of the treated highway segment. 𝑌2010 is an indicator variable for year 2010 
(the post-treatment year). 2006 is the pre-treatment year. ED encounters are from OSHPD’s Emergency Department 
Public Data Set. The population share of Hispanics is from 2000 and 2010 Census. Data on major highways in 
California is from Tele Atlas North America, Inc. 2008. “United States Major Highways.” Redlands, California, 
USA: ESRI. I calculate distances using the Geographic Information System (GIS) software. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
Table 1.15 (with ratios). Section 1.7 estimates of 𝜏 from equation (1.2) for different categories of ED 
patients, by insurance status. 𝑌𝑧𝑡 is the ratio of non-admission ED encounters in year t by patients of the 
given category (ages 18-64) to all ED encounters by patients (ages 18-64), who reside in zip code Z.  
Non-admission ED encounters, January-June 2006 and 2010, California.  
      Outcomes 
 
Regressor 





Share of Uninsured 
and Medicaid 
Share of Privately 
Insured 
Share of all other 
ED visits 
      
𝑮𝒛 ∙ 𝒀𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎 -0.0138*** -0.00363 -0.0175*** 0.00802 0.00944 
 (0.00470) (0.00427) (0.00619) (0.00653) (0.00739) 
      
Observations 1,774 1,774 1,774 1,774 1,774 
R-squared 0.055 0.036 0.066 0.041 0.006 
Notes: Each column includes a coefficient estimate from a separate regression of equation (1.2). Sample is a 
balanced panel of 887 California zip codes. I focus only on the areas, where the endogenous clinic entry took place 
in 2007-2009. For each new CHC, I identify the nearest highway segment that is within 5 miles of the clinic-entrant 
(these are my “treated highway segments”). 𝐺𝑧 is an indicator variable for the proximity of zip code Z to the treated 
highway segment: 𝐺𝑧 = 1 if 0 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑧 ≤ 5 and 𝐺𝑧 = 0  if 5 < 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑧 ≤ 10, where 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑧 is the distance from the zip 
code centroid to the geographic center of the treated highway segment. 𝑌2010 is an indicator variable for year 2010 
(the post-treatment year). 2006 is the pre-treatment year. ED encounters are from OSHPD’s Emergency Department 
Public Data Set.  Data on major highways in California is from Tele Atlas North America, Inc. 2008. “United States 
Major Highways.” Redlands, California, USA: ESRI. I calculate distances using the Geographic Information System 
(GIS) software. Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 








Impact of the San Francisco Health Care Reform of 2007-2008 on the 
 




2.1.  Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate whether the local health care reform carried out in the 
city and county of San Francisco in 2007-2008 reduced the use of emergency departments (EDs), 
particularly by uninsured patients. The San Francisco health care reform is a local, citywide 
reform that targets the uninsured of San Francisco and aims to increase their access to health 
care. This two-part policy innovation includes Healthy San Francisco (HSF) and the Health Care 
Security Ordinance (HCSO). As a result of HSF, uninsured residents of San Francisco are able to 
obtain a broad range of inpatient, outpatient and specialty care at participating community health 
centers (primary care clinics) at relatively low or nominal fees. 
The San Francisco health care reform of 2007-2008 presents an interesting natural 
experiment because its impact is limited geographically, and it appears to have significantly 
altered the availability of health care for a great number of vulnerable residents of San Francisco. 
The reform brought about a major change in the way community health centers and the 
Department of Public Health accept and coordinate the care of a large number of medically 
underserved. The main goal of the reform is to ensure affordable, easy and universal access to 
urgent and primary health care services for residents of San Francisco, irrespective of their 






The first policy – Healthy San Francisco (HSF) – took effect in July 2007. HSF allows 
uninsured residents of San Francisco between the ages of 18 and 64, who are not eligible to 
participate in public programs such as Medicaid or Medicare, to “buy access” to select San 
Francisco-based health care providers, or “medical homes.” Most of these providers come from 
the previously existing network of community health centers in San Francisco. Enrollment in 
HSF means that participants may purchase health care services from their chosen medical home 
at affordable and pre-specified rates (Katz, 2008). Healthy San Francisco aims to improve and 
expand access to care, and as of March 2011, about 54,500 uninsured adults were enrolled in 
HSF, which is roughly two thirds of the city’s target uninsured population (Grady, 2011; 
McLaughlin et al., 2011).  
The second policy – Health Care Security Ordinance (HCSO) – took effect in the first 
half of 2008. It imposes a minimum health spending requirement on most medium- and large-
sized San Francisco-based employers. This means that firms must either provide health insurance 
to their employees or use alternative ways of paying for their employees’ health care 
expenditures (described in more detail below).  
In this paper, I examine whether and how the ED utilization patterns changed as a result 
of this citywide health care reform. The over-utilization of emergency rooms for non-urgent 
medical conditions is a widely acknowledged problem in the United States.1 One concern with 
the over-use of EDs for non-urgent care is that the cost of emergency room care is often higher 
than the cost of care in alternative outpatient settings. And second, the over-utilization of EDs is 
associated with congestion, delays in care, medical mistakes, and worse health outcomes. The 
use of emergency rooms for non-urgent care is high among both uninsured and people with 
                                                 





health coverage, but has been particularly driven by insured patients in recent years 
(Cunningham, 2011; Garcia et al., 2010). The insured and uninsured tend to resort to EDs for 
different reasons: The ED use by uninsured patients is more likely to be due to their limited 
access to regular sources of primary care and poorer health relative to patients with health 
insurance (Gindi et al., 2012).  
This paper contributes to previous work on how mandates that aim to provide near-
universal health coverage affect the use of emergency departments. In particular, Miller (2012) 
finds that the Massachusetts health care reform – which aimed to decrease the number of 
uninsured by introducing an individual mandate to obtain health coverage – reduced the overall 
use of emergency departments in that state, primarily through the reduction in outpatient (or non-
admission) ED visits. Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) found that the Massachusetts health care 
reform decreased hospital discharges by uninsured patients, including inpatient admissions 
originating from the emergency room. In this paper, I also find a reduction in the number of non-
admission ED visits by uninsured in San Francisco; however, this effect is offset by an increase 
of similar magnitude in the number of ED visits by patients with private insurance and those 
whose care is covered by county-funded programs. Because the reform aimed to significantly 
expand the provision of employer-sponsored health insurance (via the Health Care Security 
Ordinance), it may well be that the previously uninsured who acquired employer-based health 
coverage as a result of the reform continued utilizing emergency rooms at about the same rate as 
before the reform, on average. That is, the reduction in uninsured ED encounters may simply be 
due to the uninsured’s “switch” to a different payor category rather than their actual substitution 
away from EDs as a regular source of care. Data does not allow me to track changes in insurance 





aggregate level for different encounter categories by gender, age, select diagnoses and 
procedures performed.  
Hence, it is possible that the San Francisco reform did not have a major impact on the 
overall utilization of emergency departments. This paper’s findings are also interesting because 
the results are somewhat in contrast with those in Zhanabekova (2013): There, I offer a more 
convincing empirical evidence that the establishment of new community health clinics causes 
uninsured patients to substitute away from EDs, while the San Francisco health care policy 
experiment – which targets to resolve the issue of uninsurance through a more coordinated use of 
already existing clinics and city/county resources – suggests that the decline in the use of EDs by 
uninsured might have been only nominal.  
I use a differences-in-differences approach to estimate the impact of the reform on 
various types of emergency room visits in San Francisco. As in Zhanabekova (2013), I focus on 
ED visits that do not result in hospitalization (non-admission or outpatient ED visits), and use 
them as a proxy for less urgent visits. Because the reform specifically targets the uninsured 
population, my main objective is to examine changes in the volume of ED visits by uninsured 
patients. In particular, I estimate that the number of non-admission ED visits by uninsured 
residents of San Francisco declined by about 30.1% between 2007 and 2010. I also analyze the 
use of EDs by Medicaid patients and patients with private insurance, and examine ED visits by 
patients not affected by the reform – i.e., children (ages 2-17) and elderly (ages 65+). I also 
report results for uninsured and all patients by gender and age categories. In addition, I look at 
visits (by uninsured and overall) that are not due to injuries and poisonings as another proxy for 





The outline of this paper is as follows: Section 2.2 provides background information on 
Healthy San Francisco and the Health Care Security Ordinance. Section 2.3 highlights empirical 
papers that analyze the impact of the Health Care Security Ordinance on labor outcomes; cites 
reports on the roll-out of Healthy San Francisco; and briefly reviews most relevant empirical 
papers that study the impact of the Massachusetts health care reform. I present data in Section 
2.4. I describe my estimation strategy and results with various outcome variables and control 
groups in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 includes a summary of main results, implications and 
limitations, and suggestions for future research. 
 
2.2.  Background 
2.2.1. Healthy San Francisco 
Healthy San Francisco took effect in July 2007. 2  It is administered by the San Francisco 
Department of Public Health. The focus of the program is to make primary and preventive health 
care accessible for the city’s uninsured population. Government officials emphasize that HSF is 
not health insurance since it may only be used within San Francisco at participating clinics and 
hospitals.3 Nonetheless, HSF has many features of managed care: Uninsured residents of San 
Francisco, who do not qualify for other public health programs such as Medicaid or Medicare, 
may enroll in Healthy San Francisco by paying a quarterly fee, which is determined by the 
participants’ level of income and employer subsidies, if any. For example, HSF enrollees whose 
income is between 101-200% of the federal poverty level (FPL) would have to pay a quarterly 
participation fee of $60 if not subsidized by their employers or $0 if subsidized (Katz, 2008). The 
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enrollment is not conditional on the participants’ medical needs and health status. Also, in 
contrast to the provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the Massachusetts health care 
reform of 2006, enrollment in HSF is voluntary. 
Each HSF enrollee must select a medical home from a list of participating community 
health centers. These clinics are located in San Francisco, and are either public (county-operated) 
or private, non-profit clinics (these are CHCs that I study in Zhanabekova (2013), which are an 
important type of the health care safety net provider in California). The chosen medical home 
manages the patient’s medical evaluations, referrals, and treatments unless the patient decides to 
switch to another provider. Healthy San Francisco covers a broad range of inpatient and 
outpatient services, specialist care, emergency room visits, prescriptions, lab work, and many 
other services at affordable and clearly defined rates. One advantage of the program is its up-
front information about potential point-of-service charges, which depend on the enrollee’s level 
of income. Another major benefit of the program is that eligibility does not depend on the 
enrollee’s (un)employment status (Katz, 2008). 
Healthy San Francisco is financed by various federal and county funds, employer 
contributions, patient fees, and the resources of participating San Francisco clinics and hospitals. 
During fiscal year 2009-2010, the total expenditure on HSF was about $164 million. The 
Department of Public Health contributed almost $100 million to HSF, 50% of which came from 
federal grants.  Another $40.4 million came from patient fees, employer contributions (related to 
HCSO), and other revenue sources. HSF cost an additional $24 million to participating clinics 
and hospitals. The average expenditure per person per month was about $276 in FY 2009-2010 





Total enrollment in the Healthy San Francisco program was about 7,400 people in 
December 2007; 27,400 in August 2008; and more than 53,000 in June 2010 (Colla, 2010; Katz, 
2008; HSF, 2008). In later phases, the program reached about two thirds of its target population 
of uninsured non-elderly adults in San Francisco, with a higher success rate of reaching the older 
population between the ages of 40 and 64 (McLaughlin et al., 2011).  
Healthy San Francisco was rolled-out gradually: Initially, from July to December 2007 
(1st cohort), only residents with incomes at or less than 100% of the federal poverty level were 
eligible to apply. From January 2008 on (2nd cohort), HSF enrollment was also open to uninsured 
residents with incomes between 101-300% FPL. Beginning September 2008 (3rd cohort), more 
health care providers joined Healthy San Francisco. Patients with incomes between 301-500% 
FPL could enroll in HSF beginning from February 2009 (4th cohort). There have been additional 
provider expansions in July 2009 (5th cohort) and September 2010 (6th cohort) (McLaughlin et 
al., 2011). Today, about 35 public and private, non-profit clinics participate in Healthy San 
Francisco (Grady, 2011).  
Initially enrollees were older: 39% of the 1st cohort (July-December 2007) were between 
the ages of 55 and 64; 52% were females; 38% were ethnic Chinese, 14% Whites, and 20% 
Hispanics. The composition of enrollees changed over time, resulting in a greater proportion of 
younger participants, fewer women and fewer ethnic Chinese: For example, in the 4th cohort 
(January-June 2009), 46% of HSF participants were between the ages of 25 and 44 and only 15% 
were ages 55-64; 45% women; 25% Hispanics, 22% Whites and 23% Chinese (McLaughlin et 
al., 2011).  
McLaughlin et al. (2011) also report that in the beginning (in the 1st and 2nd cohorts: July 





medical home prior to the enrollment in HSF. This is probably because logistically it was easier 
for participating community health centers to first enroll their own patients.4 And CHCs were 
likely interested in enrolling their uninsured patients, who made up about 40% of all CHC 
patients (Zhanabekova, 2013), sooner in order to receive additional county and federal funds to 
subsidize the care of such patients.  
Overall, about 85% of HSF participants remain enrolled in HSF for at least 12 months. 
Nonetheless, there has also been a significant number of exits and dis-enrollments from HSF. 
Many of these exits happen because of changes in the participants’ eligibility status due to a 
switch to public health insurance (e.g., women may qualify for Medicaid in the case of 
pregnancy); changes in income; gain of employer-sponsored private health plan; aging out; or 
relocation out of San Francisco. Only 2% of surveyed participants report lack of funds as a 
reason for their inability to participate in Healthy San Francisco (McLaughlin et al., 2011).  
Other important HSF benefits include better coordination and continuity of care, 
especially due to its common electronic system One-e-App. It contains information on the 
enrollment status of each participant, and allows providers to screen each enrollee for eligibility 
in other public programs (e.g., Medicaid). This single database is jointly shared and can be 
viewed by all participating HSF providers, and helps avoid duplication of visits, tests, and 
referrals (Grady, 2011; HSF, 2008). 
 
2.2.2. Health Care Security Ordinance 
The Health Care Security Ordinance imposes a minimum health spending mandate on San 
Francisco-based employers, and hence has some features of the Affordable Care Act and health 
                                                 






care reforms in Massachusetts and Hawaii. The mandate affects for-profit firms with at least 20 
employees (about 75% of all San Francisco workers) and non-profit organizations with at least 
50 employees. HCSO was passed into law in July 2006 but first took effect in January 2008 
(Colla et al., 2010).   
The HCSO minimum health spending requirement is at the per-hour-per-employee level. 
Initially, firms with 20-99 employees faced a minimum spending requirement of $1.17 per hour 
per employee (which amounted to about $2,415 annually), and firms with 100 and more 
employees had to spend $1.76 per hour per employee (or about $3,633 annually). These amounts 
increased to $1.23 and $1.85 per hour per employee, respectively, on January 1, 2009 (Colla et 
al. 2010). 
The minimum spending requirement covers any employee working at least 8 hours per 
week, including temporary and contract workers. This implies that switching employees from a 
full-time to a part-time status in order to avoid the minimum spending requirement is unlikely 
(Colla et al., 2010).5 The most affected industries are the restaurant and other low-skill, low-
wage industries. The minimum wage in San Francisco was $9.36 in 2008. Hence, an increase in 
the hourly health spending of $1.17 or $1.76 represents a non-trivial jump in labor costs (Colla et 
al., 2010).  
Firms may satisfy the HCSO mandate using the following four ways: (1) by spending the 
required minimum amount on health insurance for an eligible employee; (2) by contributing the 
required minimum amount into the Healthy San Francisco program on behalf of the employee (a 
subsidy of the employee’s HSF enrollment fee mentioned above); (3) by directly reimbursing an 
                                                 
5 Workers exempt from the minimum health spending requirement include certain categories of employees who earn 
more than $72,450 per year; those who are eligible for Medicare (public health insurance for the elderly ages 65+ 
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eligible employee for his/her health expenditures; and/or (4) by paying into the employee’s 
Health Reimbursement or Health Savings Account. Firms may choose different methods of 
compliance for different employees. The four options listed above make the HCSO a type of a 
“pay-or-play” health care reform, where the direct provision of health coverage is the “play” 
option, and paying into Healthy San Francisco is the “pay” option, also known as the “public 
option” or “city option” (Colla et al., 2010). 
Colla et al. (2010) examine how San Francisco employers chose to comply with the 
HSCO minimum spending mandate. They found that the majority of firms in San Francisco 
(93%) were already providing health insurance prior to the HCSO mandate, but many fell short 
of the required amount or covered only a fraction of their employees. Only 25% of affected firms 
were compliant with both the coverage requirement (who they covered) and the spending 
requirement (how much they spent on employees’ health care). About 75% of affected 
employers increased their health spending. One fifth of employers chose to comply with the 
HCSO by paying into Healthy San Francisco to subsidize the HSF enrollment fee of some 
employees. Colla et al. (2010) found no evidence of employers cutting employee health benefits 
when these exceeded the required HCSO minimum.  
Violation of the HCSO leads to the following administrative penalties: A payment of 
$100 per “non-covered” employee per quarter; $100 per person per day in case of any 
“retaliation against employees”; $500 per quarter for failing to submit proper reports and 
documentation, and a few more.6     
 
2.3.  Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
Katz (2008) gives a good overview of institutional details of the Healthy San Francisco program. 
                                                 





McLaughlin et al. (2011) analyze data on the HSF implementation, usage and enrollment 
patterns between July 2007 and March 2011. The authors describe enrollees by gender, age, 
race/ethnicity, type and frequency of care sought before and after HSF. They also examine 
reasons for enrollment, exit from HSF, and the lack of take-up. In addition, McLaughlin et al. 
(2011) present data on the utilization of emergency rooms by HSF patients with and without 
chronic conditions; and report on people’s experiences participating in Healthy San Francisco, 
most of which have been positive.  
In addition to analyzing compliance with the HCSO cited above, Colla et al. (2010) also 
discuss in some detail how the San Francisco health care reform compares with the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) and two earlier major statewide health care reforms in Massachusetts and 
Hawaii. They note that under the ACA, San Francisco employers would not be able to use 
contributions to employees’ Health Reimbursement Accounts (option 4 in the previous section) 
as a way to comply with the federal law. However, the ACA’s “employer responsibility 
requirement” applies only to firms with at least 50 full-time employees and exempts part-time 
workers, and thus would affect a smaller number of employers in San Francisco than the Health 
Care Security Ordinance.7 
In terms of methodology, I most closely follow Miller (2012), who studies how the 
Massachusetts health care reform of 2006 – which also included an individual mandate to 
purchase health insurance, – affected the use of emergency rooms. She looks at both inpatient 
and outpatient ED visits, and finds that the Massachusetts reform decreased the number of 
outpatient ED visits by about 8 to 11%.8  
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Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) evaluate the impact of the Massachusetts health care reform 
using data on hospital (inpatient) discharges, by insurance type. They find that discharges of 
uninsured patients decreased by about 36% in Massachusetts as a result of the reform. Their 
estimate is of similar magnitude to what I obtain for non-admission (outpatient) ED visits by 
uninsured patients after the San Francisco health care reform – a reduction of 30.1%.  
The HSF-driven reduction in the number of ED visits by uninsured for less urgent care 
may be due to a number of factors. On one hand, enrollment in Healthy San Francisco gives 
people better access to primary care and more certainty with respect to charges. This might result 
in direct substitution away from EDs and towards community health centers when emergency 
care is not necessary. It is also possible that access to primary care improves health of the 
previously uninsured and medically under-served population, for example, by helping them 
better manage chronic illnesses. This, in turn, could lead to a lower number of ED visits when 
emergency care is warranted.  
On the other hand, some previously uninsured patients may continue utilizing EDs 
inappropriately even post-HSF but would be reported under a different payor category. For 
example, HSF enrollees would be recorded as patients covered by county funds. 9  Some 
previously uninsured may have gained employer-sponsored health insurance as a result of the 
Health Care Security Ordinance, enacted only six months after the launch of Healthy San 
Francisco in January 2008.  
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2.4.  Data 
To study the utilization of emergency rooms before and after HSF and HCSO, I use data from 
California’s Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) on ED visits. As in 
Zhanabekova (2013), I examine only those ED visits that do not require hospitalization and 
result in discharge to home (routine discharges). I treat this type of visits, and visits that are not 
due to injuries and poisonings, as proxies for less urgent visits.  
The OSHPD data spans 22 quarters, from Q1 2005 to Q2 2010, and is at the encounter 
level. The data is reported to OSHPD by each hospital in California that operates an emergency 
room. It includes demographic characteristics of each patient (gender, age, race/ethnicity), 
diagnoses and procedures performed, the patient’s zip code of residence, and the type of health 
coverage. The data does not have a unique patient identifier, and does not contain any 
information on the patient’s actual charges and payments.  
For each quarter, I aggregate ED encounters to the zip code level, so that the unit of 
observation is zip code-quarter. The main outcome of interest is the number of ED visits by 
uninsured patients from zip code Z, in quarter t. I report specifications with both log-transformed 
number of ED visits by uninsured (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝐸𝐷𝑧𝑡) and the proportion of all ED visits by 
uninsured (𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝐸𝐷𝑧𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐸𝐷𝑧𝑡 ). I exclude all Kaiser hospitals and a small number of other emergency 
rooms10 because of various inconsistencies in the way these hospitals report ED data to OSHPD 
at different periods of time. I use data starting from the first quarter of 2006, because 2005 was 
the first year when OSHPD began collecting detailed reports on ED encounters, and many 
relevant data fields were not properly reported in 2005.  
                                                 
10 Alameda County Medical Center, St. Rose Hospital, Washington Hospital-Fremont, and California Pacific 






I look at patients between the ages of 18 to 64, because only this age group qualifies for 
the Healthy San Francisco benefits. In addition to encounters by uninsured, I also use other 
outcome variables such as visits by Medicaid and privately insured patients; injury- and non-
injury-related ED visits; and ED utilization by children and elderly. 
 
2.5.  Estimation Strategy 
I use a differences-in-differences approach to evaluate the impact of this two-part health care 
reform on the usage of emergency rooms in San Francisco. I compare the volume of ED visits by 
uninsured in San Francisco before and after the third quarter of 2007, in which HSF was 
introduced, and take ED visits in several nearby locations as a baseline for comparison.  
San Francisco is a “high income city with a strong safety net”11 and the main task in 
implementing the differences-in-differences strategy is to find a reasonable control group, whose 
changes in ED visits could be taken as a counter-factual for what would have happened in San 
Francisco in the absence of the 2007-2008 health care policy changes. Below I present two 
estimation approaches:  
In my first approach, I utilize other California counties in the San Francisco Bay Area as 
candidate control groups: For example, I use (a) the set of all zip codes in select Bay Area 
counties as in Colla et al. (2011); (b) a smaller subset of zip codes in select Bay Area cities as in 
Dube et al. (2007); and (c) I also report results separately for each county used in (a).  In the 
second approach, I perform a within-San Francisco analysis as in Miller (2012), by comparing 
ED utilization trends in two groups of San Francisco zip codes, which supposedly differ in how 
strongly they are affected by the health care reform (the intensity of treatment).   
 
                                                 





2.5.1. Approach 1. Areas Outside of San Francisco as Control Groups 
I aggregate data on uninsured ED encounters to the patient’s zip code level, and form a balanced 
panel of zip codes from Q1 2006 to Q2 2010 (18 quarters). Because the reform affected only 
residents, employers, hospitals and clinics in the city and county of San Francisco, I define all 
San Francisco zip codes as my treatment group (n=36). None of these zip codes seem to cross the 
San Francisco county boundary.12  
 
2.5.1.1. Control Groups 
Colla et al. (2010) study how different types of firms choose to comply with the Health Care 
Security Ordinance. In another paper, same Colla et al. (2011) examine the HCSO impact on 
labor market outcomes: employment and earnings. In both papers, the authors adopt a simple 
differences-in-differences framework, and use data from the 2008 Bay Area Employer Health 
Benefits Survey of for-profit and non-profit firms in San Francisco (treatment group) and Bay 
Area counties (control group). Specifically, they use four Bay Area counties as their control 
group: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, and San Mateo. San Mateo is adjacent to San Francisco 
by land, and the rest are adjacent by harbor. The authors take 2007 as the pre-HSCO year, and 
2008 as the post-implementation year. 
Katz (2008) suggests that the “HSF model is most applicable to counties with multiple 
safety-net providers.” In columns (1)-(3) of Table 2.1, I calculate three county-level, safety net-
related measures: The number of community health centers (CHCs) per 100,000 people; the 
number of CHC encounters per capita; and the number of CHC staff (full-time equivalent) per 
100,000 people. It appears that Alameda County is most comparable to San Francisco along 
                                                 






these three measures, but I also include other counties used in Colla et al. (2010) to be consistent 
with this literature.   
I also use the control group chosen by Dube et al. (2007), who analyze the effect of a 
citywide increase in the minimum wage in San Francisco in 2004 on the worker pay and 
employment in the restaurant industry. Their control group includes only the cities of Oakland, 
Hayward and Berkeley in Alameda County. San Francisco and the cities in this control group are 
a part of the San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont MSA, and are more economically linked than other 
areas outside of this MSA. My main specifications are based on this three-city control group. 
Summary statistics for San Francisco and the nearby counties of Alameda and Contra Costa 
are listed in Table 2.2. 
To identify the impact of the health care reform, I estimate equation (2.1) below. This is an 
event-study type of specification, and allows tracking changes in the ED usage on a quarterly 
basis with respect to baseline Q3 2007. The main identifying assumption is that changes in ED 
visits in the control group serve as a good approximation for how ED utilization would have 
evolved in San Francisco in the absence of the health care reform of 2007-2008. 
Equation (2.1) is a modified version of a specification used in Miller (2012), when she 
compares annual trends in ED use in Massachusetts counties with different degrees of treatment 
intensity, before and after the Massachusetts health care reform of 2006: 
𝑌𝑧𝑡 = 𝛼 + � (𝛿𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑧 ∙ 𝑄𝑠 + 𝜃𝑠𝑄𝑠)𝑠=𝑄2_2010
𝑠=𝑄1_2006 + 𝑋𝑧𝑦𝛽 + 𝜔𝑧 + 𝜀𝑧𝑡                 (2.1) 
where 𝑠 ≠ 𝑄3_2007.  𝑌𝑧𝑡  is the number of ED visits by uninsured residents of zip code Z, in 
quarter t, where t is from Q1 2006 to Q2 2010. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑧 = 1 if zip code Z is a San Francisco 





which control for all observable and unobservable time invariant differences across zip codes, 
including differences between treated and control areas (in lieu of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑧 variable).  {𝑄𝑠}  are year-quarter dummy variables (e.g., 𝑄2_2006 = 1 if s is the second quarter of 
2006, and zero otherwise). The excluded time period is the third quarter of 2007, which I use as a 
baseline period because the Healthy San Francisco program was launched in July 2007 (i.e., 
𝑠 ≠ 𝑄3_2007). These year-quarter dummies include 11 leads following the introduction of HSF 
(Q4 2007 to Q2 2010) and 6 lags, or quarters prior to HSF (Q1 2006 to Q2 2007), and capture all 
California-level quarterly changes in the utilization of emergency rooms.  
𝑋𝑧𝑦 is a time-varying control variable. In Zhanabekova (2013), I explore how community 
health centers (CHCs) affect the utilization of emergency rooms, and find that CHCs are 
associated with reductions in non-admission ED visits by uninsured. Similarly, I use several 
specifications of 𝑋𝑧𝑦 in this paper, such as the number of CHCs that operate within 5, 10, and 15 
miles of the centroid of the ED patient’s zip code Z in year 𝑦, where 𝑦 is from 2006 to 2010. 𝜀𝑧𝑡 
is an error term. In all regressions, errors are robust and clustered at the zip code level.  
The coefficients of interest in (2.1) are 𝛿𝑠′𝑠, the coefficients on 15 interaction terms 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑧 ∙ 𝑄𝑠. When 𝑌𝑧𝑡 is the zip code-level share of all ED visits by uninsured, 𝛿𝑠≠𝑄3_2007 
measures by how much the average share changes between period s and the third quarter of 2007 
in San Francisco, net of the change in the control group (a shift in the average). Similarly, when 
the outcome variable is 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝐷_𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑧𝑡),  𝛿𝑠  measures the average percentage change in 
𝐸𝐷_𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑧𝑡 between period s and the baseline period Q3 2007 in San Francisco relative to the 
control group (Bailey and Goodman-Bacon, 2012; Jacobson et al., 1993; Miller, 2012). 
Formally, when the identifying assumption holds ( 𝜃𝑠𝑆𝐹 =  𝜃𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 = 𝜃𝑠 for all 𝑠 ), 





For periods 𝑠 after Q3 2007, the sequence of 𝛿𝑠’s shows how the ED usage in San Francisco 
changed due to the reform in each quarter s relative to the period when the HSF was launched, 
on the assumption that the effects of factors other than the reform are netted out by the control 
group. These other factors could be time-varying changes in doctors’ practices, migration 
patterns, etc. 
As in Miller (2012), if the control group is valid and the San Francisco health care reform 
is effective in reducing the use of EDs by uninsured residents of San Francisco because primary 
care is more affordable and accessible, I expect to observe a statistically significant decrease in 
non-admission ED visits by uninsured in San Francisco post-reform relative to the comparison 
group ( 𝛿𝑄4_2007, … , 𝛿𝑄2_2010 < 0 ), but expect no differential ED use prior to the reform 
(𝛿𝑄1_2006, … , 𝛿𝑄2_2007 = 0). 
 
2.5.1.2. Regressions with Shares and Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley as the Control Group 
Table 2.3 lists estimates of 𝛿𝑠’s for different control groups described in the previous section, 
where the outcome variable is the share of all non-admission ED visits by uninsured patients. 
Column (1) presents results for the control group, which includes all zip codes in select Bay Area 
counties used in Colla et al. (2010, 2011): Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, and San Mateo. 
Column (2) lists estimated coefficients when the control group consists of only core cities in the 
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward MSA as in Dube et al. (2007): Oakland, Hayward, and 
Berkeley.13 Columns (3)-(6) present coefficients 𝛿𝑠’s separately for each respective county used 
in column (1).  
                                                 






I begin the discussion of results with column (2) of Table 2.3, where the control group 
includes zip codes in Oakland, Hayward, and Berkeley. These are relatively large urban 
municipalities in the Bay Area, and may be a better comparison group for San Francisco than 
individual counties containing all types of zip codes. The coefficients in column (2) of Table 2.3 
are plotted in Figure 2.1, together with 95% confidence intervals. All 𝛿𝑠’s prior to the reform are 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that the share of ED visits by uninsured evolved similarly 
over time in control and treatment zip codes before the launch of HSF.  
Following the introduction of HSF, differences in the ED usage are not immediate but 
emerge in early 2009. It appears that the reform did have an impact on encounters by uninsured 
but the effect has been gradual: Specifically, 𝛿𝑄4_2007, … , 𝛿𝑄1_2009  are all negative but 
statistically insignificant. From the second quarter of 2009, however, all coefficients 
𝛿𝑄2_2009, … , 𝛿𝑄2_2010 are negative, larger in magnitude and statistically significant at least at the 
5% level. For example, in Q2 2009 or six quarters after the introduction of HSF, the number of 
uninsured visits per every 100 ED visits of any type decreased by about 5.1 more visits in San 
Francisco relative to the control group, on average. In the second quarter of 2010 or two and half 
years after the HSF introduction, the number of ED visits by uninsured decreased by about 7.5 
more visits in San Francisco relative to Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley per every 100 ED visits.  
McLaughlin et al. (2011) also report noticeable declines in both urgent and non-urgent 
ED visits by non-elderly adults at their chosen hospital of study – the San Francisco General 
Hospital (SFGH), which serves a lot of HSF participants. But the authors are not able to 
confidently conclude whether these declines are due to HSF or other factors, because the 
downward trend began prior to the launch of HSF. They also compare SFGH to other public 





elderly and children, and find that these comparison groups do not exhibit comparable reductions 
in ED visits during the period following the introduction of HSF.  
The results in column (2) of Table 2.3 – which show that a shift in the utilization of 
emergency rooms by uninsured patients occurred in San Francisco only from the first half of 
2009 on – are consistent with the HSF enrollment patterns. First, total enrollment in Healthy San 
Francisco was about 7,400 people in December 2007 (Katz, 2008) but reached a much higher 
number of 53,058 in June 2010 (Colla, 2010). In addition, the Health Care Security Ordinance 
took effect in the first part of 2008, what also eventually increased the number of people with 
some type of health coverage, including private, employer-sponsored insurance, health accounts 
(HRSAs), and employer-subsidized enrollments in HSF.   
More importantly, initially the HSF enrollment was primarily limited to prior users of 
participating medical homes, and this might explain the lack of a statistically significant 
reduction in uninsured ED visits in the early periods of the program. Specifically, McLaughlin et 
al. (2011) note that 95% of enrollees in the first cohort (July-December 2007) were prior users of 
the chosen medical home, and 86% – in the second cohort (January-August 2008). But later 
cohorts – those that enrolled since January 2009 – were less likely to have a previously 
established relationship with the chosen medical home prior to the HSF enrollment, and appear 
to also include participants, who were not in the habit of utilizing primary care clinics: 74% of 
HSF enrollees were prior users in the 3rd cohort (September 2008-January 2009); 70% in the 4th 
cohort (February-June 2009); and 62% in 5th cohort (July 2009-August 2010). My results might 
be driven by the take-up of HSF by these later cohorts, characterized by a higher number of prior 





Taking into account the HSF enrollment patterns described above, and for a more convenient 
summary of results, I also estimate equation (2.2) below: 
𝑌𝑧𝑡 = 𝛼 + � 𝛿𝑠𝑠=𝑸𝟐_𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟕
𝑠=𝑄1_2006 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑧 ∙ 𝑄𝑠 + 𝜋𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑧 ∙ 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑡 + 𝛾𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑧 ∙ 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡
+            + � 𝜃𝑟𝑟=𝑄2_2010
𝑟=𝑄1_2006  𝑄𝑟  + 𝑋𝑧𝑦𝛽 + 𝜔𝑧 + 𝜀𝑧𝑡                                                 (2.2) 
Equation (2.2) is similar to (2.1), except that instead of including eleven post-Q3 2007 quarterly 
interaction terms 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑧 ∙ 𝑄𝑄4_2007, …, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑧 ∙ 𝑄𝑄2_2010, I group these quarters into 
two larger time periods similar to Miller (2012). This allows me to better differentiate between 
the initial period of the HSF introduction and the more mature stage in the program’s existence. 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑡=1 marks the first two cohorts of the program, when most of the HSF enrollees were prior 
users of their chosen medical home (Q4 2007 to Q3 2008), and zero otherwise. Similarly, 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡=1 includes later cohorts of HSF, when a higher share of prior non-users enrolled in the 
program (Q4 2008 to Q2 2010), and zero otherwise. Then coefficient 𝜋 estimates the average 
change in the outcome variable – logs or shares– in San Francisco during the first two cohorts of 
HSF relative to Q3 2007, net of the change in the control group, and 𝛾 during later cohorts (the 
average is over zip codes and quarters). 14 
In Table 2.4, I include the estimates of 𝜋 and 𝛾 from equation (2.2) for different outcome 
variables: the share of uninsured ED visits, the share of ED visits by Medicaid and privately 
insured patients, and the share of ED visits by patients who are covered by county funds using 
the Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley control group. Consistent with the results in column (2) of Table 
                                                 
14 I also estimate a less restrictive version of equation (2.2), where the baseline includes all quarters before HSF – 
Q1 2006 to Q3 2007. The results are mostly consistent across these two specifications, so I only report estimates for 





2.3, HSF seems to have the strongest impact on the share of uninsured ED visits in the more 
mature stage of the program: Relative to baseline Q3 2007, the number of such visits per 100 ED 
visits of any type decreases by about 5.3 more visits in San Francisco relative to the control 
group (column 1 of Table 2.4). The zip code average share of uninsured ED visits in San 
Francisco was 0.18 in Q3 2007. Then the estimate 𝛾� = −0.053  implies a reduction of 
(0.053)⋅100
0.18 = 29.4% in the average share of uninsured visits. 
By column (2) of Table 2.4, HSF does not seem to alter the proportion of Medicaid 
patients who visit emergency rooms. However, the share of visits by privately insured and 
county-funded patients increases at the 10% and 1% level of confidence, respectively, in the later 
period of the program (columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.4). I discuss these results in the context of 
regressions with logs. 
 
2.5.1.3. Regressions with Shares and Individual Bay Area Counties as Control Groups 
Column (3) of Table 2.3 includes results when all Alameda County zip codes are used (Oakland, 
Hayward, and Berkeley are a subset of Alameda County). As in column (2), the shift in the 
average share of uninsured is statistically significant from the second quarter of 2009 on, and 
shows an average decline of between 4.6 to 8.7 more uninsured visits per 100 ED visits in San 
Francisco relative to Alameda. The results in column (4) of Table 2.3 are based on zip codes in 
neighboring Contra Costa as the control group, and are mainly similar to the estimates reported 
in columns (1)-(3) of Table 2.3.  
In columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.3, control groups are comprised of zip codes in Marin 
and San Mateo counties, respectively. When I use Marin County as my control group, the 





post-reform coefficients are not statistically significant. Similarly, when San Mateo is used as a 
comparison group, the post-reform coefficients are insignificant. The results in columns (5) and 
(6) of Table 2.3 suggest that the post-2007 trends in the use of EDs in Marin and San Mateo 
counties are likely different from the post-2007 trends in Alameda and Contra Costa counties.  
The lack of differential ED use in San Francisco and San Mateo before and after the 
reform could partly be due to San Mateo’s participation in the Health Care Coverage Initiative 
described next, which was launched in September 2007, shortly after the start of HSF in July 
2007. 
 
2.5.1.4. Health Care Coverage Initiative (HCCI) 
In September 2007, just two months after the launch of Healthy San Francisco, ten counties, 
including Alameda, Contra Costa, and San Mateo, started a Section 1115 Medicaid 
Demonstration Waiver15 titled the Health Care Coverage Initiative (HCCI) to expand health care 
coverage to low-income adults not eligible to participate in existing public health programs. 
HCCI’s initial “demonstration” period lasted for three years, from September 2007 to August 
2010. The continuation of the program was approved in 2010. The goals of HCCI are similar to 
those of HSF – to provide better access to health care for the most medically underserved adults 
by building upon the existing safety net in each county and by better coordinating the work of 
providers who serve a large number of Medicaid and uninsured patients (Pourat et al., 2012). 
All counties, except Marin, participated in the Health Care Coverage Initiative Program 
(HCCI): Alameda, Contra Costa, San Francisco, and San Mateo. In the case of San Francisco, 
                                                 
15  A Medicaid Demonstration Waiver is an innovative demonstration program, approved by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services and financed by Medicaid funds, to improve health care of low-income populations 





HCCI was integrated into the Healthy San Francisco program, and provided HSF with the much 
needed federal funds. The roll-out of HCCI in other counties happened almost concurrently with 
the “treatment” of San Francisco by HSF. Therefore, interpretation of the differences-in-
differences results above should take into account that Alameda, Contra Costa, and San Mateo 
were also “treated” starting from the second part of 2007.  
However, what is important for my estimation strategy is that despite the Alameda’s, 
Contra Costa’s and San Mateo’s participation in HCCI, San Francisco still stands out from these 
counties during the period of 2007-2010 due to its broader eligibility criteria, a major re-
organization of the medical homes system, and the complementary Health Care Security 
Ordinance: i.e., we can think of San Francisco as getting a treatment of stronger intensity 
compared to other HCCI counties.  
Variation in the implementation of HCCI across counties might help identify sources of 
diverging results when different counties are used as control groups. With respect to differing 
eligibility criteria under HCCI/HSF, any uninsured San Francisco resident with income at or 
below 500% of the federal poverty level would be eligible to enroll in HSF, while other counties 
set their income thresholds at 200% FPL. San Francisco and San Mateo are also the only 
counties that allow undocumented immigrants to participate in the HCCI/HSF programs, while 
Alameda and Contra Costa do not (CHCF, 2009).  
Another way San Francisco and San Mateo differ from the other two participating 
counties over this period – Alameda and Contra Costa – is in the pattern of new enrollments. 
According to Kominski et al. (2010), San Francisco and San Mateo witnessed a more significant 
enrollment of new participants beyond the first year of the program (i.e., beyond September 





previously signed-up participants in the second year of the program (September 2008 to August 
2009).  That is, San Francisco and San Mateo continued to attract more new participants as the 
programs matured in contrast to Alameda and Contra Costa. If these new participants were the 
reason why demand for ED services concurrently decreased in San Francisco and San Mateo, but 
the same did not happen in Alameda and Contra Costa, then this might partially explain the 
differential use of EDs between San Francisco and Alameda, and between San Francisco and 
Contra Costa post-HSF, but the lack of a similar differential response between San Francisco and 
San Mateo. 
The difference in the HCCI take-up across counties may be due to a slower roll-out of the 
Initiative in Alameda and Contra Costa, or is an indicator of how pent-up the demand for the 
program services really was in each county: Alameda and Contra Costa, for example, reached 
their target enrollment levels in the first year of the program (103% and 102% of the target, 
respectively), while San Mateo seems to have experienced a more overwhelming demand for 
HCCI: The number of San Mateans who enrolled in the first year of the program constituted 
207% of the target enrollment level16 (Kominski et al., 2010). 
Hence, San Mateo and San Francisco seem to be similar to each other along some 
dimensions in the implementation of the Health Care Coverage Initiative/HSF – enrollment 
patterns and eligibility criteria,– but somewhat different from Alameda and Contra Costa. Both 
San Francisco and San Mateo seem to have experienced greater demand for these new programs 
for uninsured.  This homogeneity could be the reason why San Mateo might not be the best 
comparison group for San Francisco in this study. 
                                                 
16 The HCCI numbers for San Francisco are not comparable because of the program’s consolidation into Healthy 







2.5.1.5. What About Marin County? 
It is harder to explain the lack of the expected change in the use of EDs when Marin County is 
used as a control group. Marin did not participate in HCCI in 2007-2010, and by column (5) of 
Table 2.3 it does not seem to differ from San Francisco in the use of EDs by uninsured both prior 
to and after the HSF roll-out. There is some weak evidence of a reduction in the share of 
uninsured ED visits in San Francisco relative to Marin because coefficients on interaction terms 
during Q2 2009-Q1 2010 are negative but insignificant, and only the last coefficient 𝛿𝑄2_2010 is 
both negative and statistically significant at the 5% level of confidence.  
How is Marin different? Unlike the other four urban counties, Marin is the only sub-
urban county. While Marin does not have the smallest percentage of uninsured people in 
California (8.8% in 2009 vs. 6.7% in Alameda; 9% in Contra Costa, 8% in San Francisco; and 
7.6% in San Mateo), it has the lowest share of uninsured ED visits among the five counties 
(CHCF, 2009; OSHPD data).  
Data for Marin is based on two EDs that operate in the county, after excluding Kaiser.17 
One of the two hospitals – Marin General Hospital – shows a temporary decline in the number of 
uninsured patients in 2009 that seems to drive the results (or rather, the lack of the expected 
result). It is not clear why the number of uninsured is lower in 2009 in this hospital. The decline 
is temporary as numbers increase in 2010. The total number of ED visits also declines during the 
same time period, as does the number of Medicaid patients. So, it may be that there was some 
inconsistency in the way data was collected or reported in 2009 by Marin General Hospital, 
though OSHPD does not make any note of this. 
                                                 
17 In other counties, data is based on 6 emergency departments in San Francisco, 8 in Alameda, 6 in Contra Costa, 





It is also possible that some uninsured relocated out of Marin to one of the other Bay 
Area counties to take advantage of the HCCI or HSF benefits but I do not check for this here.  
 
To sum up, results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 suggest that there was a real decrease in the share 
of uninsured ED visits in San Francisco starting from the second quarter of 2009. The magnitude 
of post-treatment coefficients is similar when I use Alameda and Contra Costa as control groups, 
but somewhat smaller in the case of Marin County. The lack of the expected (statistically 
significant) result with Marin might be due to data inconsistencies. In the case of San Mateo, the 
lack of differential ED use post-HSF might be explained by a similar roll-out and take-up of 
HCCI in San Mateo and HSF in San Francisco. 
Next, in Table 2.5, I estimate equation (2.1) with annual controls 𝑋𝑧𝑦, using the three-city 
comparison group. The inclusion of the number of CHCs that operate within various radii of 
each zip code’s centroid (same variable used in Zhanabekova, 2013) does not significantly alter 
the benchmark results in column (2) of Table 2.3, but CHCs indeed seem to be associated with 
reductions in the share of uninsured ED visits as expected: Coefficients on these controls are 
mostly negative and statistically significant.  
While shifts in average shares are informative, changes in the ratio are driven by 
variations in both the numerator and denominator. To analyze how the actual number of ED 
visits by uninsured changed as a result of HSF, I estimate equations (2.1) and (2.2) with another 
dependent variable – the log of all non-admission ED visits by uninsured adults ages 18-64. The 
results are reported in Tables 2.6a and 2.7, respectively, where I also include the total number of 
ED visits on the right-hand side to control for changes in the overall number of visits. In Table 





reported in Table 2.6a (with the log of all non-admission ED visits on RHS) in any significant 
way. 
 
2.5.1.6. Regressions with Logs 
The results in Table 2.6a with logs are consistent with the estimates of Table 2.3 (with shares). In 
column (2) of Table 2.6a, the relative decline in uninsured ED visits in San Francisco is observed 
from the second quarter of 2009. These coefficients are plotted in Figure 2.2. The pre-reform 
estimates are mostly insignificant, or positive and significant at the 10% level. All coefficients 
after the first quarter of 2009 are negative and statistically significant, and show an average 
reduction of 26.7% to 40.1% in uninsured ED visits in San Francisco during Q2 2009-Q2 2010 
relative to the baseline Q3 2007, relative to the three-city control group. Similar results are 
obtained when the control group consists of all Alameda zip codes (column 3) and Contra Costa 
zip codes (column 4). Using Marin county as the control group shows a statistically significant 
reduction of 28.8% and 33.8% only in 2010 relative to Q3 2007 (column 5). But again no 
statistically significant differential is detected post-reform between San Francisco and San Mateo 
County (column 6), though the estimated coefficients are primarily negative during the post-
reform period.  
Table 2.6b includes a specification of equation (2.1) with zip code-specific linear time 
trends, using the Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley control group. Figure 2.3 displays the plot of 
coefficients from Figure 2.2 (without time trends) and coefficients from column (2) of Table 2.6b 
(with time trends). The inclusion of zip code linear time trends seems to amplify the effect of the 
San Francisco health care reform even more than the specification without time trends: The 
coefficients are larger in magnitude, and statistically significant declines in uninsured ED visits 





Results in Table 2.7 include coefficient estimates of equation (2.2), and are based on the 
three-city control group. Consistent with the estimates of equation (2.1) in Table 2.6a, there is no 
statistically significant percentage change in ED visits during the early (implementation) period 
of HSF, but the average number of San Francisco uninsured ED visits declines by 30.1% 
between the more advanced stage of the reform (Q4 2008-Q2 2010) and Q3 2007, relative to the 
control group. Given that the zip code average number of uninsured ED visits in San Francisco 
was 103.9 in Q3 2007, this translates into a reduction of (103.9)(.301) = 31.3 such visits during 
the HSF’s later period (per zip code, per quarter). 
 
2.5.1.7. Privately Insured 
Interestingly, there has also been a significant increase in the number of ED visits by patients 
with private insurance (column 3 of Table 2.7). Specifically, the number of such visits increased 
by an average of 13.5% in the later period of the reform in San Francisco relative to Q3 2007, 
relative to the control group. The average number of privately insured ED visits in San Francisco 
was 227.4 per zip code in Q3 2007, which implies an average increase of about (227.4)(.135) = 
30.7 such ED visits during Q4 2008-Q2 2010. This closely matches the estimated reduction of 
31.3 ED visits by uninsured.   
Both results – reductions in uninsured ED visits and increases in visits by privately 
insured – are consistent with the goals of the reform: (1) to make alternative sources of primary 
care available and affordable to uninsured residents of San Francisco (Healthy San Francisco); 
and (2) to encourage the provision of employer-sponsored health coverage by imposing a 
minimum spending requirement on employers (the Health Care Security Ordinance, which was 





benefits under HSF). The total number of ED visits that do not require hospital admission, 
irrespective of coverage, does not change (column 5 in Table 2.7) as a result of this two-part 
reform. Hence, it might well be that the reform did not help decrease the load of EDs in San 
Francisco and did not change the mix of patients, but instead nominally led to fewer encounters 
by uninsured and more encounters by privately insured. If uninsured patients and patients with 
private coverage visit EDs for same reasons and similar non-urgent conditions, which do not 
depend on the type and availability of coverage, then the reform may have only shifted the cost 
of care from uninsured patients and hospitals that provide charity care onto the county and 
community health centers as well as employers, who provide employer-sponsored health 
insurance as a result of the HCSO. Some of the HCSO cost appears to be passed onto consumers 
in the form of new surcharges (Colla et al., 2010). However, previous studies show that there is a 
great deal of heterogeneity among patients that depends on the (un)insurance status (Gindi et al., 
2012). So it is unlikely that HSF did not change the mix of ED patients, but overall I find little 
evidence here to support this hypothesis using the OSHPD data.  
One more piece of evidence that might suggest that the decrease in uninsured ED visits is 
not merely offset by the increase in encounters by newly insured patients, and that the two trends 
are driven by different factors, is the observation that the number of ED visits by individuals 
with private insurance also increased significantly in the period immediately after Q3 2007: By 
column (3) of Table 2.7 the number of such visits increased in San Francisco, on average, by 
12.7% relative to the baseline period, relative to the three-city control group. The decrease in 
uninsured ED visits began only later (in early 2009) and is consistent with a higher number of 





Ideally, longitudinal data with unique patient identifiers could help figure out how much 
of the increase in visits by patients with private insurance was due to gaining employer-
sponsored insurance by previously uninsured ED users. Because of limitations in my dataset, I 
can only analyze changes in uninsured ED visits by gender, age, diagnosis, procedure performed, 
and whether visits are related to injuries and poisonings (see next). I then make similar 
comparisons for privately insured and the aggregate of all patients. 
By Table 2.9, it appears that the reduced usage of EDs in the mature stage of the HSF 
program was more prominent among the uninsured ages 35-64 and somewhat weaker among 
ages 18-34. In particular, the number of visits by uninsured ages 35-64 decreased by an average 
of 34.8% in San Francisco during Q4 2008-Q2 2010 relative to Q3 2007, which amounts to a 
decrease of (56.1)(.348)=19.5 such visits (per zip code, per quarter). My results in Table 2.10, 
where I estimate equation (2.1) and track changes in all post-HSF quarters individually, show 
that the statistically significant decline in uninsured ED visits by the older population began in 
Q1 2009 and persisted until the end of the sample period in Q2 2010, while the decline in visits 
by younger uninsured was more sporadic and mostly insignificant (columns 3 and 4 of Table 
2.10).  
In the Background section, I mention that there was a noticeable shift over time in the age 
distribution of HSF enrollees. McLaughlin et al. (2011) find that HSF has been much more 
successful in reaching and enrolling sooner the uninsured ages 40-64, and subsequently ages 25-
39, than the younger population of uninsured between the ages of 18 and 24. My estimates in 
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 are consistent with these enrollment patterns – the utilization of emergency 
rooms by the younger category of uninsured adults does not seem to change as much as it does in 





ED usage by uninsured women seems to have declined slightly more in percentage terms than by 
men but the overall trend seems similar (32.3% decline or 12 fewer visits by uninsured women, 
on average, vs. 24.6% decline or 16 fewer visits by uninsured men, on average). Column (1) of 
Table 2.9 shows a 29.2% decline in uninsured ED visits that exclude all injuries and poisonings 
(or about 20.4 fewer visits per zip code, per quarter) during 2009-2010, and little change post-
HSF in uninsured ED visits due to injuries and poisonings (column 2). These findings are 
consistent with the expectation that HSF should have primarily reduced the use of EDs for less 
urgent conditions. 
With respect to changes in visits by privately insured, the number of such visits by the 
older group (ages 35-64) seems to increase in both the early and more mature stages of HSF by 
an average of 22 and 24 visits per zip code per quarter, respectively (column 4 of Table 2.11). 
There is no detectable change in the use of EDs by younger patients with private insurance 
(column 3 of Table 2.11), and increases in the number of non-injury and non-poisoning visits 
happen in the early stage of the HSF roll-out (column 1 of Table 2.11). Separate regressions for 
privately insured men and women show little or no change in the utilization of EDs in the post-
HSF periods (columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.11). To summarize, when one compares the magnitude 
of changes in ED visits across these different categories of uninsured and privately insured 
patients, there is some evidence suggesting that HSF had little impact on the overall utilization of 
EDs and simply resulted in the change of how people pay for emergency room care (e.g., 
opposite trends for ages 35-64). But because significant increases in ED visits by privately 
insured individuals occur in the early stage of the HSF implementation, when no comparable 
declines yet occurred among the uninsured, I cannot eliminate the possibility that these changes 






2.5.1.8. Other Types of ED Visits 
The OSHPD data allows me to examine ED visits by patients, who are covered by county funds. 
HSF enrollees would be listed under this category of payors when hospitals report data to 
OSHPD. By column (4) of Table 2.7, the number of such visits increases in San Francisco by 
42.6% or (33.7)(.426) = 14.6 visits, on average, per zip code per quarter during the more 
advanced stage of HSF. This is a smaller change than the reduction of 31.3 ED visits by 
uninsured over the same time period, and is a more convincing evidence of continued use of EDs 
by some previously uninsured patients, but just under a different payor category (“county 
funds”). This result, however, should be taken with caution because: (1) hospitals often do not 
report any patients under this category, especially in earlier periods of data collection by 
OSHPD; and (2) in addition to HSF enrollees, this category of payors also includes patients 
covered by other county programs, and the OSHPD data does not allow me to distinguish among 
these different county programs.  
Unlike with this last category, the quality of reporting Medicaid patients by hospitals 
appears to be very robust and reliable throughout the data collection period of 2005-2010. By 
column (2) of Table 2.4 (with shares) and Table 2.7 (with logs), it appears that the utilization of 
EDs by Medicaid patients was not affected by HSF: The pre- and post-reform coefficients are 
not statistically significant in both tables.  
Finally, in Table 2.12, I also examine the utilization of EDs by children (ages 2-17) and 





patients and uninsured children18 as was the case of uninsured non-elderly adults, but the number 
of ED visits by all children increased significantly in 2009-2010.  
 
2.5.1.9. How do Differences-in-Differences Estimates Compare to the Healthy San 
Francisco Enrollment Rates? 
To understand how my estimates of changes in uninsured ED visits compare to the number of 
HSF participants, I perform the following back-of-the-envelope calculations.  
1) A total of 3,742 non-admission ED visits were made by uninsured adults in Q3 2007 in 
San Francisco (or an average of 104 visits per zip code). Using the coefficient estimate 
𝛿𝑡=𝑄3_2009 = −0.384 from column (2) of Table 2.6a, the number of uninsured ED visits declined 
by 38.4%, or a total of 1,437 uninsured visits (or an average of 40 visits per zip code) in Q3 2009 
relative to Q3 2007 due to HSF, on the assumption that the control group accounts for all non-
HSF changes.19  
2) In 2009, about 54,000 people ages 18-64 were enrolled in HSF. By statehealthfacts.org 
data, I extrapolate that Californians make about 293 ED visits per 1,000 population, 201 of 
which do not require hospitalization (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010). If this proportion of 
0.201 is roughly representative of how many non-admission ED visits uninsured San Franciscans 
make, then the maximum decrease in demand for ED services due to the newly HSF-covered 
patients could approximately translate into 54,000(.201) = 10,854 fewer uninsured ED visits 
annually or about 2,714 fewer visits quarterly in San Francisco in 2009. That is, if the 54,000 
HSF enrollees would not have left the ranks of uninsured, then about 20.1% of them would have 
                                                 
18 About 9% of children-ED users ages 2-17 are uninsured. 
 
19 The actual average number of uninsured ED visits in San Francisco was 77 per zip code in Q3 2009. This means a 






visited the ED when hospitalization was not necessary. This calculation is based on the 
unrealistic assumption that HSF eliminates all demand for ED services. Thus, 2,714 fewer visits 
quarterly is a very crude estimate by how much the number of uninsured ED visits could decline 
in San Francisco in 2009-2010 (relative to Q3 2007) based on the HSF enrollment rates, and 
grossly exceeds the differences-in-differences estimate of 1,437 fewer visits in total in San 
Francisco per quarter obtained from equation (2.1).20  
3) I also obtain a more conservative estimate of the decrease in ED demand due to HSF by 
taking into account the program’s enrollment patterns. According to McLaughlin et al. (2011) 
and HSF (2010), most of the early HSF enrollees were prior users of the chosen medical home. 
Given their past usage of community health centers, I assume that these early enrollees were 
more likely to have used EDs more appropriately, for more urgent conditions even prior to their 
HSF enrollment. In later HSF cohorts (from September 2008 on), with a higher share of 
enrollees without previous connections to their chosen medical home, about 5% reported using 
the ED as a usual source of care, 11% did not have a usual source, and 25% did not respond.21  If 
roughly 6,190 people were enrolled in HSF during Q3 2009,22 and 5% of these used to rely on 
EDs because they could not get primary care elsewhere, then (6,190)(0.05)=310 could be used as 
a more conservative estimate of the expected quarterly decrease in uninsured ED users in the city 
of San Francisco (the estimate of encounters would be higher if the number of visits per patient 
is greater than one, on average). 
                                                 
20  Subtracting 7,400 HSF enrollees as of December 2007, the calculated number in (2) declines to (54,000-
7,400)(.201) = 9,367 annually or 2,342 quarterly. 
 
21 I use numbers for the 4th cohort. Numbers for the 5th cohort are similar. Source: McLaughlin et al. (2011). 
 
22 Adjusted from McLaughlin et al. (2011): The total number of enrollees in the 5th cohort over the period of 14 
months between July 2009 to August 2010 was 28,888. Then the average monthly enrollment over this period is 
28,888
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2.5.1.10. Additional Set of Regressions with Total Number of ED Visits 
I also run an additional set of event-study regressions as in equation (2.1) to check the impact of 
the San Francisco reform on the overall utilization of emergency rooms (non-admission visits 
only).23 The control group is comprised of Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley zip codes. Column (1) of 
Table 2.13 is same as column (2) of Table 2.6a, with the log of ED visits by uninsured patients as 
the outcome, and is replicated here for convenience. The outcome variable in column (2) is the 
log of all ED visits that did not result in admission to the hospital. The statistically insignificant 
coefficients of column (2) suggest that the reform did not alter the overall usage of EDs. This set 
of coefficients is consistent with those in column (5) of Table 2.7 that shows no impact of the 
reform on the total number of non-admission ED visits using a less restrictive specification of 
equation (2.2).  
By the estimates reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.13, there is no detectable 
impact on the overall number of ED visits whether they are related to injuries and poisonings, or 
not. The number of encounters that do not require “a procedure that is surgical in nature, or 
carries a procedural risk, or carries an anesthetic risk”24 (column 5) increases, especially in the 
later period of the reform (Q4 2009-Q2 2010 relative to Q3 2007), while there is weak evidence 
that visits that do require such procedures decline post-reform (column 6). The former (column 
5) can be thought of as a possible proxy for less urgent visits and suggests that the ED loads – in 
terms of having to perform fewer procedures – might have been eased as a result of the reform. 
The lack of impact on the later (column 6), or visits that necessitate some type of invasive 
                                                 
23 The results reported in Table 2.13 do not include annual zip code-level controls, 𝑋𝑧𝑦 , such as the number of 
CHCs, because the estimates are not sensitive to their inclusion.  
 





procedures, is in line with the expectation that the reform should have had little impact on more 
urgent encounters. These patterns of a higher number of post-reform ED visits when invasive 
procedures are not performed, and little impact on ED visits when such procedures are carried 
out, hold for both injury-related and non-injury-related encounters (these results are not reported 
here). 
Finally, by columns (7)-(10) of Table 2.13, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude 
that the San Francisco health care reform changed the overall ED usage across gender and age 
dimensions. In column (11) of Table 2.13, the outcome variable is the log of all ED visits for 
ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs), which are considered to be primary care 
preventable and treatable. Here, these include ear and nose infections, pulmonary conditions, 
pneumonia, asthma, diabetes, hypertension, and urinary tract infections (using the ICD-9-CM 
codes). The estimates are not statistically significant in any of the quarters prior to or after Q3 
2007, and indicate the lack of the reform’s impact on the utilization of EDs for these ACSCs. 
This is contrary to the expectation that access to affordable primary and other types of medical 
care would have decreased the number of such ED visits, which could be treated in a primary 
care setting.25  
 
2.5.2. Approach 2. Within-San Francisco Analysis 
In my second approach, I again follow one of Miller’s (2012) specifications. She studies the use 
of emergency rooms in Massachusetts before and after its major health care reform of 2006 and 
in her main specification she analyzes ED trends within Massachusetts. Specifically, she assumes 
                                                 
25 Regressions in Table 2.13 do include zip code linear time trends. Estimates are essentially robust to the inclusion 
of these zip code time trends for all outcome variables in Table 2.13, except for columns (7)-(10). Estimation results 
with time trends show a decline in the total number of ED visits by males, but an increase in encounters by females 
in 2009-2010 quarters relative to Q3 2007. Similarly, there is a reduction in the number of visits by older adults 





that the ED utilization would be more impacted in counties with a higher pre-reform percentage 
of uninsured residents “… because the reform instituted near-universal coverage, [and] counties 
with high rates of insurance coverage prior to the reform experienced a smaller change in 
insurance coverage than counties with fewer insured residents” (p. 896). Similarly, instead of 
using other counties or cities as control groups, here I perform a within-San Francisco analysis, 
and define San Francisco zip codes with a higher (smaller) pre-HSF share of ED visits by 
uninsured as my treatment (control) group. The idea is that if the reform is successful in making 
health care available and affordable, then zip codes where uninsured constitute a higher 
proportion of all non-admission ED visits would be more affected by Healthy San Francisco than 
zip codes with a smaller fraction of uninsured patients: i.e., San Francisco treatment zip codes 
would experience larger declines in uninsured ED visits than San Francisco control zip codes. 
Miller (2012) uses the number of ED visits per capita in Massachusetts counties, while I use ED 
visits by uninsured as a fraction of all non-admission ED visits in San Francisco zip codes. 
Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of the ratio of uninsured ED visits to all ED visits (at 
the zip code level) in 2006, the year before the Healthy San Francisco program was introduced, 
𝑟𝑧,2006 = 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑧,2006𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐸𝐷𝑧,2006 . The percentage of uninsured ED visits varies between 10% and 25% in 
the majority of San Francisco zip codes, with two outliers of 48% and 57%. The 25th percentile 
of the fraction of uninsured ED visits is 12.7%, the median is 16.2%, and the 75th percentile is 
20.5% in 2006. I form four groups of zip codes based on these percentile cutoffs and plot their 
respective median shares of uninsured ED visits from the first half of 2005 to the first half of 
2010 in Figure 2.5.  
 Table 2.14 lists the actual median shares used to plot Figure 2.5. The median share of 





pre-HSF share of uninsured ED visits such that 𝑟𝑧,2006 ≤ 25th percentile (12.7%) and 25th 
percentile<𝑟𝑧,2006≤50th percentile (16.2%), respectively. In zip codes with the 2006 shares such 
that 50th percentile <𝑟𝑧,2006≤ 75th percentile and 𝑟𝑧,2006>75th percentile (20.5%), the median share 
of such visits declined by 44.4% and 30.4%, respectively, between 2005 and 2010. This is 
consistent with the expectation, as in Miller (2012), that zip codes with a higher pre-reform share 
of uninsured ED visits would experience larger declines in ED visits when “treated” by HSF and 
HCSO than zip codes with relatively smaller pre-reform shares. 
Next, to implement the within-San Francisco differences-in-differences strategy, I 
estimate a version of equation (2.1) using semi-annual data for Q1 and Q2 of 2005-2010. 
Excluded year is 2007, in which HSF was introduced. I define zip codes with the year 2006 share 
of uninsured ED visits above (below) the pre-HSF median (or 25th or 75th percentile) as my 
treatment (control) group, so that treatment zip codes are the ones that are affected the most by 
Healthy San Francisco and HCSO.26 The results are listed in Table 2.15 (with logs) and Table 
2.16 (with shares). Here, I show three different specifications: In columns (1) of Tables 2.15 and 
2.16, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑧=1 for zip codes such that 𝑟𝑧,2006 = 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑧,2006𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐸𝐷𝑧,2006 >25th percentile. In columns 
(2), 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑧=1 for all zip codes with 𝑟𝑧,2006>median, and in columns (3) 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑧=1 
for zip codes with  𝑟𝑧,2006>75th percentile. 
Table 2.15 shows no differential ED use prior to the reform but statistically significant 
declines in uninsured ED visits in columns (2) and (3) post-reform. By column (2) of Table 2.15, 
the average number of uninsured ED visits declined by 35.3% between January-June 2007 and 
January-June 2010 in the treatment group of zip codes relative to the control group. Similarly, by 
column (2) of Table 2.16, the zip code average share of uninsured ED visits fell by 7.2% 
                                                 





between January-June 2007 and January-June 2010 in the treatment group relative to the control 
group. These within-San Francisco estimates are similar in magnitude to the estimates I obtain in 
my main specifications above, when zip codes in other Bay Area counties are used as control 
groups.   
 
2.6.  Conclusion  
My main results in Tables 2.3-2.4, 2.6a and 2.7 show that San Francisco has experienced 
significant reductions in non-admission ED encounters by uninsured adults starting from the 
early 2009. The differences-in-differences estimates with shares and logs produce similar results: 
a 29.4% decline in the average share of uninsured ED visits per zip code, per quarter and a 
30.1% decline in the average number of uninsured ED visits by non-elderly adults per zip code, 
per quarter in 2009-2010 relative to Q3 2007. 
The reduction in uninsured ED visits is primarily due to the lower number of ED 
encounters by uninsured ages 35-64. On one hand, the timing of these reductions and the age of 
the most impacted group among the uninsured (older adults) mirror the enrollment patterns in 
Healthy San Francisco, and support the hypothesis that HSF indeed had an impact on the way 
EDs are utilized. In particular, the number of visits by uninsured that are not due to injuries and 
poisonings also decreased significantly, what suggests that HSF might have been effective in re-
directing the flow of less urgent visits away from emergency rooms and towards the primary care 
safety net.  
On the other hand, increases of similar magnitude among ED users with private insurance 
and of smaller magnitude among patients covered by county funds for the indigent suggest that 
emergency rooms might not have experienced real reductions in the volume of non-emergency 





of the San Francisco health care reform. It is possible then that patients continue utilizing and 
perceiving EDs as an important source of care, whether insured or not, in both urgent and less 
medically urgent situations. Data does not allow me to track changes in insurance status at the 
individual level, and I do not detect changes in the utilization of EDs at the aggregate level for 
different encounter categories. Hence, it is possible that the reduction in uninsured ED 
encounters may simply be due to the uninsured’s “switch” to a different payor category rather 
than their actual substitution away from EDs as a regular source of care.  
However, it is also likely that increases in visits by insured individuals in late 2007 and 
2008 are not entirely due to the reform-induced decreases in the number of San Franciscans 
without any health coverage, because these increases of 2007-2008 precede the prominent 
declines in visits by uninsured in 2009-2010. Public health literature acknowledges that there has 
been a persistent and significant growth in the use of emergency rooms by patients with private 
coverage, especially for non-urgent, primary care treatable conditions (Cunningham, 2011). 
Another possible explanation for the higher number of ED visitors with private insurance could 
be the migration of new workers into the city of San Francisco, who could have been attracted by 
the HSCO benefits. I do not test for this in this paper.  
If there was a great number of the sick in San Francisco before 2007, who were over-
using emergency rooms and desperate to receive access to affordable primary and specialty care, 
we would expect to observe a sharp drop in ED visits relatively quickly and a rapid take-up of 
HSF benefits by prior non-users of medical homes. I do not observe this here, at least with 
respect to non-admission (outpatient) ED visits. The change is relatively slow and does not seem 





among the uninsured. It might be worthwhile to also examine trends in inpatient visits, and 
compare the results with those in Kolstad and Kowalski (2010). 
My data does not contain information on the timing of each visit, but Miller (2012) finds 
that “the reduction in emergency room visits is most pronounced during regular office hours 
when physician’s offices are likely to be open.” A similar exercise in the context of San 
Francisco could provide additional evidence on the direction of the impact this citywide health 
care reform had with respect to emergency rooms.  
Moreover, I do not account for the strategic behavior of hospitals in this paper, and do not 
analyze changes in hospital charges and reimbursements. A study of strategic responses by 
emergency rooms to policies such as Healthy San Francisco and the Health Care Security 
Ordinance could help evaluate their impact more thoroughly. In particular, an analysis of ED 
costs and revenues – overall and for different types of patients – could reveal the real impact of 
the reform on emergency departments. By the same token, a study of the costs of community 
health centers pre- and post-reform could help answer the question of whether the reform 
increased the financial burden on these clinics.  
Finally, another potentially fruitful direction for research could be a study of whether the 
San Francisco health care reform improved health outcomes, especially among the previously 
uninsured. While this paper shows that major changes in the insurance status of San Francisco 
residents did occur as expected, it does not provide convincing evidence of the real effect of the 
reform with respect to emergency departments. Its impact on basic health indicators and chronic 
conditions could help evaluate the overall effectiveness of Healthy San Francisco and the Health 





Table 2.1. Safety Net-related Measures for California counties. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
County 


















 poverty level 
 







Contra Costa 1.72 0.19 5.70 0.83 9% 8.1% 
Alameda 4.17 0.62 30.91 6.76 6.7% 11.8% 
San 
Francisco 5.34 0.77 36.86 
12.89 8% 12.2% 
Marin 5.94 0.57 17.48 5.56 8.8% 6.5% 
       
       
CA median 4.10 0.64 20.27    
CA average 
(st.dev.) 5.98 (8.29) 0.73 (0.53) 25.37 (19.61) 
   
Sources: Columns (1)-(3): http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/hid/Products/Hospitals/Utilization/PC_SC_Utilization.html 
(accessed July 20, 2013), http://www.census.gov/popest/data/counties/asrh/2011/CC-EST2011-agesex.html 




Table 2.2. Descriptive Summary Statistics. ED encounters by uninsured patients, ages 18-64. San 
Francisco vs. Oakland- Hayward-Berkeley (three cities in Alameda County) vs. all zip codes in Alameda 
County vs. all zip codes in Contra Costa County. Q1 and Q2 2006-2010. 
  
Zip code Median Number of  
Uninsured ED visits 
 
 
Total Number of  
Uninsured ED visits 
 
Zip code Median Share of 


































 N=34 N=27 N=56 N=43 N=34 N=27 N=56 N=43 N=34 N=27 N=56 N=43 
             
2006 81 82.5 58 75 8,851 5,658 9,921 14,425 0.201 0.200 0.193 0.182 
2007 71 77 56 74.5 7,965 5,685 9,782 14,824 0.168 0.194 0.191 0.189 
2008 61.5 94 69.5 71 7,283 6,367 10,843 14,037 0.155 0.211 0.209 0.182 
2009 46 71 64 70 5,995 6,198 10,462 14,278 0.125 0.211 0.198 0.169 


































Table 2.3. Estimated coefficients 𝛿𝑡 ’s from equation (2.1) for different control groups. Dependent 
variable is the share of non-admission ED visits by uninsured patients in zip code Z, quarter t. Ages 
18-64. Excluded time period is Q3 2007. 
Control groups→ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
↓ Interaction 
terms 
Bay Area Oakland, 
Hayward, 
Berkeley 
Alameda Contra Costa Marin San Mateo 
       
Q1 2006 0.00934 0.00741 0.00430 0.0101 0.0407* -0.0147 
 (0.0189) (0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0221) (0.0234) (0.0291) 
Q2 2006 0.0173 0.0194 0.0107 0.0160 0.0245 0.0238 
 (0.0239) (0.0314) (0.0278) (0.0242) (0.0340) (0.0304) 
Q3 2006 0.0253 0.0192 0.0199 0.0172 0.0529 0.0185 
 (0.0253) (0.0292) (0.0277) (0.0259) (0.0375) (0.0288) 
Q4 2006 0.0265 0.0133 0.0285 0.0140 0.0141 0.0537** 
 (0.0194) (0.0231) (0.0209) (0.0222) (0.0309) (0.0231) 
Q1 2007 -0.00542 -0.0124 -0.00709 -0.00671 -0.0259 0.0207 
 (0.0179) (0.0192) (0.0210) (0.0191) (0.0290) (0.0278) 
Q2 2007 0.0197 0.0129 0.00793 0.0155 -0.00481 0.0730*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0155) (0.0141) (0.0158) (0.0301) (0.0244) 
Q4 2007 -0.00265 -0.00348 -0.0115 0.00428 -0.0130 0.0147 
 (0.0209) (0.0237) (0.0266) (0.0238) (0.0247) (0.0237) 
Q1 2008 0.0172 -0.0118 -0.00405 0.0190 0.0401* 0.0308 
 (0.0210) (0.0303) (0.0245) (0.0242) (0.0229) (0.0272) 
Q2 2008 -0.0266 -0.0171 -0.0440* -0.0410 -0.0108 0.0105 
 (0.0232) (0.0233) (0.0258) (0.0255) (0.0318) (0.0321) 
Q3 2008 -0.00960 -0.0207 -0.0282 -0.00951 0.00581 0.00901 
 (0.0187) (0.0205) (0.0263) (0.0212) (0.0229) (0.0248) 
Q4 2008 -0.0220 -0.0208 -0.0393 -0.0110 -0.0114 -0.0163 
 (0.0262) (0.0264) (0.0286) (0.0261) (0.0435) (0.0331) 
Q1 2009 0.00630 -0.0235 -0.0236 -0.000630 0.0233 0.0545** 
 (0.0176) (0.0205) (0.0183) (0.0195) (0.0347) (0.0254) 
Q2 2009 -0.0305* -0.0507*** -0.0463** -0.0376** -0.0178 -0.00414 
 (0.0162) (0.0176) (0.0183) (0.0189) (0.0226) (0.0232) 
Q3 2009 -0.0453** -0.0663*** -0.0663*** -0.0661** -0.0149 -0.00784 
 (0.0182) (0.0239) (0.0211) (0.0257) (0.0255) (0.0205) 
Q4 2009 -0.0452** -0.0582*** -0.0825*** -0.0483** -0.0238 0.00690 
 (0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0237) (0.0227) (0.0229) (0.0311) 
Q1 2010 -0.0365** -0.0423** -0.0610*** -0.0339* -0.0519 0.0212 
 (0.0175) (0.0171) (0.0193) (0.0190) (0.0314) (0.0288) 
Q2 2010 -0.0639*** -0.0750*** -0.0869*** -0.0772*** -0.0545** -0.0118 
 (0.0192) (0.0197) (0.0214) (0.0206) (0.0252) (0.0309) 
       
Zip FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CHCs No No No No No No 
       
Observations 3,528 1,134 1,656 1,422 1,206 1,188 
R-squared 0.463 0.635 0.484 0.614 0.492 0.601 
The average zip code share of uninsured ED visits (ages 18-64) in San Francisco in Q3 2007 is 0.180. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 






Figure 2.1. Plot of coefficients 𝛿𝑡’s from equation (2.1) using the Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley control 
group. Dependent variable is the share of non-admission ED visits by uninsured patients. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Plot of coefficients 𝛿𝑡’s from equation (2.1) using the Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley control 
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Source: Table 2.3, column (2).
Dependent variable is Share of Uninsured ED visits.
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Source: Table 2.6a, column (2). Log(total ED visits) is included on RHS.
Dependent variable is log(uninsured ED visits)






Figure 2.3. Plot of coefficients 𝛿𝑡’s from equation (2.1) using the Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley control 
group, with and without zip code-specific linear time trends. Dependent variable is the log of non-
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Source: Table 2.6b, columns (1) and (2). Log(total ED visits) included on RHS.
Dependent variable is log(uninsured ED visits)







Table 2.4. Estimated coefficients 𝜋  and 𝛾  from equation (2.2), using the Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley 
control group. Dependent variable is the share of non-admission ED visits by the payor category in zip 
code Z, quarter t. Ages 18-64. Excluded time period is Q3 2007. 
Outcomes→ (1) (2) (3) (4) 
↓ Interaction terms Uninsured Medicaid Private Insurance County funds 
     
𝜋: Q4 2007-Q3 2008 -0.0148 -0.00258 0.0459 0.0156** 
 (0.0213) (0.0222) (0.0315) (0.00590) 
𝛾: Q4 2008-Q2 2010 -0.0527*** 0.00156 0.0441* 0.0457*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0209) (0.0236) (0.00850) 
     
Zip FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝛿𝑡’s prior to Q3 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 
R-squared 0.632 0.694 0.847 0.582 
Mean of Dependent     
Variable in Q3 2007 
in San Francisco  
0.180 0.187 0.397 0.046 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 






Table 2.5.  Estimated coefficients 𝛿𝑡’s from equation (2.1), using the Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley control 
group, with CHC controls. Dependent variable is the share of non-admission ED visits by uninsured 
patients in zip code Z, quarter t. Ages 18-64. Excluded time period is Q3 2007. 
Control groups→ (1) (2) (3) (4) 
↓ Interaction terms Without CHCs CHCs within  
5 miles 
CHCs within  
10 miles 
CHCs within  
15 miles 
     
Q1 2006 0.00741 0.00344 0.000674 0.00729 
 (0.0214) (0.0218) (0.0215) (0.0215) 
Q2 2006 0.0194 0.0155 0.0127 0.0193 
 (0.0314) (0.0319) (0.0311) (0.0314) 
Q3 2006 0.0192 0.0152 0.0125 0.0191 
 (0.0292) (0.0295) (0.0288) (0.0292) 
Q4 2006 0.0133 0.00937 0.00660 0.0132 
 (0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0227) (0.0231) 
Q1 2007 -0.0124 -0.0124 -0.0124 -0.0124 
 (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0192) 
Q2 2007 0.0129 0.0129 0.0129 0.0129 
 (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
Q4 2007 -0.00348 -0.00348 -0.00348 -0.00348 
 (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0237) 
Q1 2008 -0.0118 -0.0136 -0.0132 -0.00959 
 (0.0303) (0.0306) (0.0304) (0.0306) 
Q2 2008 -0.0171 -0.0189 -0.0185 -0.0149 
 (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0235) 
Q3 2008 -0.0207 -0.0226 -0.0221 -0.0185 
 (0.0205) (0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0207) 
Q4 2008 -0.0208 -0.0226 -0.0222 -0.0186 
 (0.0264) (0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0269) 
Q1 2009 -0.0235 -0.0297 -0.0216 -0.0169 
 (0.0205) (0.0215) (0.0212) (0.0215) 
Q2 2009 -0.0507*** -0.0569*** -0.0488*** -0.0441** 
 (0.0176) (0.0192) (0.0178) (0.0184) 
Q3 2009 -0.0663*** -0.0725*** -0.0643*** -0.0597** 
 (0.0239) (0.0256) (0.0241) (0.0240) 
Q4 2009 -0.0582*** -0.0645*** -0.0563*** -0.0517** 
 (0.0199) (0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0209) 
Q1 2010 -0.0423** -0.0423** -0.0250 -0.0352* 
 (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0190) (0.0178) 
Q2 2010 -0.0750*** -0.0750*** -0.0577** -0.0679*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0199) (0.0217) (0.0214) 
 (0.0229) (0.0239) (0.0234) (0.0229) 
CHCs within 5 mi  -0.00255   
  (0.00243)   
CHCs within 10 mi   -0.00686***  
   (0.00183)  
CHCs within 15 mi    -0.00415** 
    (0.00177) 
     
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 
R-squared 0.635 0.635 0.639 0.636 
CHC controls are included on the RHS. All specifications include zip code fixed effects and year-quarter fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 





Table 2.6a. Estimated coefficients 𝛿𝑡 ’s from equation (2.1) for different control groups. Dependent 
variable is the log of ED visits by uninsured patients in zip code Z, quarter t. Ages 18-64. Log of all ED 
visits is included on the RHS. Excluded time period is Q3 2007. 
Control groups→ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
↓ Interaction 
terms 
Bay Area Oakland, 
Hayward, 
Berkeley 
Alameda Contra Costa Marin San Mateo 
       
Q1 2006 0.0420 0.104 0.104 0.0151 0.125 -0.0964 
 (0.0918) (0.107) (0.105) (0.103) (0.136) (0.135) 
Q2 2006 0.110 0.255** 0.190** 0.0137 0.187 0.0248 
 (0.0800) (0.107) (0.0933) (0.0848) (0.139) (0.116) 
Q3 2006 0.177** 0.171* 0.190** 0.0833 0.338*** 0.113 
 (0.0750) (0.101) (0.0845) (0.0839) (0.118) (0.0970) 
Q4 2006 0.121 0.191* 0.157 0.0698 0.102 0.154 
 (0.0961) (0.0977) (0.0953) (0.0998) (0.174) (0.119) 
Q1 2007 0.0432 0.0791 0.114 -0.0276 0.0639 0.00289 
 (0.0729) (0.0769) (0.0827) (0.0711) (0.124) (0.117) 
Q2 2007 0.0768 0.0818 0.0502 -0.0336 0.112 0.282*** 
 (0.0639) (0.0707) (0.0686) (0.0670) (0.0987) (0.0940) 
Q4 2007 0.000728 0.0553 0.00906 -0.0104 0.0271 -0.0116 
 (0.0808) (0.102) (0.0889) (0.0978) (0.118) (0.102) 
Q1 2008 -0.0488 -0.0842 -0.0770 -0.0145 0.0517 -0.109 
 (0.0536) (0.0651) (0.0630) (0.0696) (0.0841) (0.0907) 
Q2 2008 -0.109 -0.0350 -0.123 -0.239** 0.000832 -0.0136 
 (0.0751) (0.0993) (0.0819) (0.0924) (0.121) (0.115) 
Q3 2008 -0.0919 -0.0928 -0.108 -0.177** 0.0684 -0.0866 
 (0.0691) (0.0956) (0.0816) (0.0872) (0.124) (0.111) 
Q4 2008 -0.155* -0.128 -0.200* -0.0900 -0.0973 -0.197 
 (0.0905) (0.115) (0.101) (0.0968) (0.150) (0.127) 
Q1 2009 -0.0568 -0.137 -0.159** -0.110 0.0628 0.113 
 (0.0657) (0.0840) (0.0746) (0.0789) (0.101) (0.130) 
Q2 2009 -0.256*** -0.267** -0.270*** -0.349*** -0.158 -0.172 
 (0.0860) (0.105) (0.0941) (0.0934) (0.119) (0.125) 
Q3 2009 -0.305*** -0.384*** -0.363*** -0.370*** -0.183 -0.224* 
 (0.110) (0.121) (0.116) (0.129) (0.150) (0.122) 
Q4 2009 -0.220** -0.278** -0.313*** -0.289** -0.106 -0.0863 
 (0.0991) (0.111) (0.103) (0.112) (0.146) (0.160) 
Q1 2010 -0.317*** -0.332*** -0.370*** -0.356*** -0.338** -0.120 
 (0.0676) (0.0799) (0.0725) (0.0789) (0.140) (0.116) 
Q2 2010 -0.354*** -0.410*** -0.418*** -0.454*** -0.288** -0.162 
 (0.0945) (0.107) (0.101) (0.104) (0.130) (0.138) 
       
Zip FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log(all ED visits) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 3,528 1,134 1,656 1,422 1,206 1,188 
R-squared 0.974 0.977 0.975 0.978 0.969 0.975 
The average zip code number of uninsured ED visits (ages 18-64) in San Francisco in Q3 2007 is 103.9. 
No CHC controls are included. Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses.  





Table 2.6b. Estimated coefficients 𝛿𝑡 ’s from equation (2.1), using the Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley 
control group, with zip code-specific linear time trends. Dependent variable is the log of ED visits by 
uninsured patients in zip code Z, quarter t. Ages 18-64. Column (1) is same as column (2) in Table 2.6a. 
Columns (2) and (3) are with zip code-specific linear time trends.  Excluded time period is Q3 2007. 
Specification→ (1) (2) (3) 
↓ Interaction terms Same as (2) in Table 2.6a With linear time trends With linear time trends  
    
Q1 2006 0.104 0.313** 0.288** 
 (0.107) (0.123) (0.123) 
Q2 2006 0.255** 0.438*** 0.492*** 
 (0.107) (0.123) (0.134) 
Q3 2006 0.171* 0.315*** 0.340*** 
 (0.101) (0.107) (0.109) 
Q4 2006 0.191* 0.302*** 0.347*** 
 (0.0977) (0.105) (0.105) 
Q1 2007 0.0791 0.154* 0.191** 
 (0.0769) (0.0859) (0.0948) 
Q2 2007 0.0818 0.123 0.166** 
 (0.0707) (0.0753) (0.0824) 
Q4 2007 0.0553 0.0152 -0.0270 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.120) 
Q1 2008 -0.0842 -0.156** -0.172** 
 (0.0651) (0.0642) (0.0780) 
Q2 2008 -0.0350 -0.139 -0.123 
 (0.0993) (0.0919) (0.0893) 
Q3 2008 -0.0928 -0.235*** -0.247** 
 (0.0956) (0.0877) (0.0967) 
Q4 2008 -0.128 -0.308*** -0.346*** 
 (0.115) (0.102) (0.0973) 
Q1 2009 -0.137 -0.349*** -0.350*** 
 (0.0840) (0.0751) (0.0787) 
Q2 2009 -0.267** -0.513*** -0.514*** 
 (0.105) (0.0920) (0.0900) 
Q3 2009 -0.384*** -0.667*** -0.679*** 
 (0.121) (0.101) (0.0934) 
Q4 2009 -0.278** -0.595*** -0.588*** 
 (0.111) (0.0936) (0.0880) 
Q1 2010 -0.332*** -0.683*** -0.680*** 
 (0.0799) (0.0762) (0.0819) 
Q2 2010 -0.410*** -0.795*** -0.777*** 
 (0.107) (0.0683) (0.0638) 
    
Zip FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes 
Log(all ED visits) Yes Yes No 
Zip code time trends No Yes Yes 
    
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,134 
R-squared 0.977 0.981 0.978 
The average zip code number of uninsured ED visits (ages 18-64) in San Francisco in Q3 2007 is 103.9. 
No CHC controls are included. Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses.  







Table 2.7. Estimated coefficients 𝜋  and 𝛾  from equation (2.2), using the Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley 
control group. Dependent variable is the log of ED visits by the payor category in zip code Z, quarter t. 
Ages 18-64. Excluded time period is Q3 2007. 
Outcomes→ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
↓ Interaction terms Uninsured Medicaid Private 
Insurance 
County funds  All ED visits 
      
𝜋: Q4 2007-Q3 2008 -0.0570 0.0767 0.127** 0.0901 -0.0148 
 (0.0801) (0.112) (0.0586) (0.114) (0.0680) 
𝛾: Q4 2008-Q2 2010 -0.301*** 0.110 0.135** 0.426*** 0.0185 
 (0.0841) (0.105) (0.0636) (0.133) (0.0745) 
      
Zip FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝛿𝑡’s prior to Q3 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log(all ED visits) Yes Yes Yes Yes  
      
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 
R-squared 0.977 0.974 0.985 0.948 0.981 
Mean of Dependent       
Variable in Q3 2007 in San 103.9 120.3 227.4 33.7 575.6 
Francisco      
Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 






Table 2.8. Estimated coefficients 𝛿𝑡’s from equation (2.1) for different control groups (excluding the log 
of all ED visits as a control). Dependent variable is the log of ED visits by uninsured patients in zip 
code Z, quarter t. Ages 18-64. Excluded time period is Q3 2007. 
Control groups→ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
↓ Interaction 
terms 
Bay Area Oakland, 
Hayward, 
Berkeley 
Alameda Contra Costa Marin San Mateo 
       
Q1 2006 0.0203 0.0708 0.0828 0.00736 0.0918 -0.135 
 (0.0904) (0.104) (0.106) (0.0994) (0.153) (0.137) 
Q2 2006 0.107 0.312*** 0.202** 0.00558 0.179 0.00455 
 (0.0804) (0.117) (0.0950) (0.0823) (0.144) (0.120) 
Q3 2006 0.199*** 0.196* 0.216** 0.132 0.331*** 0.132 
 (0.0729) (0.100) (0.0870) (0.0801) (0.122) (0.103) 
Q4 2006 0.156* 0.239** 0.182* 0.126 0.133 0.176 
 (0.0928) (0.0963) (0.0938) (0.0976) (0.178) (0.122) 
Q1 2007 0.0941 0.119 0.151* 0.0342 0.123 0.0492 
 (0.0798) (0.0855) (0.0891) (0.0784) (0.136) (0.132) 
Q2 2007 0.132* 0.129 0.0950 -0.000689 0.193* 0.338*** 
 (0.0703) (0.0773) (0.0744) (0.0759) (0.115) (0.101) 
Q4 2007 0.0114 0.00847 0.00653 0.0153 0.0520 -0.0211 
 (0.0974) (0.119) (0.103) (0.114) (0.133) (0.118) 
Q1 2008 -0.0396 -0.102 -0.0777 0.00451 0.0785 -0.136 
 (0.0702) (0.0789) (0.0765) (0.0802) (0.101) (0.107) 
Q2 2008 -0.0693 -0.0144 -0.102 -0.185* 0.0376 0.0488 
 (0.0850) (0.100) (0.0918) (0.107) (0.136) (0.120) 
Q3 2008 -0.0705 -0.104 -0.116 -0.104 0.0966 -0.0990 
 (0.0807) (0.108) (0.0912) (0.0953) (0.141) (0.115) 
Q4 2008 -0.140 -0.168 -0.226** -0.0677 -0.0261 -0.185 
 (0.0955) (0.115) (0.104) (0.108) (0.151) (0.127) 
Q1 2009 -0.0395 -0.134 -0.156* -0.101 0.0897 0.147 
 (0.0809) (0.0947) (0.0908) (0.0913) (0.121) (0.150) 
Q2 2009 -0.246*** -0.263** -0.263** -0.345*** -0.118 -0.191 
 (0.0928) (0.110) (0.102) (0.103) (0.125) (0.134) 
Q3 2009 -0.285** -0.390*** -0.380*** -0.330** -0.114 -0.210 
 (0.115) (0.127) (0.120) (0.134) (0.162) (0.134) 
Q4 2009 -0.161 -0.261** -0.271** -0.216* -0.0473 0.00386 
 (0.110) (0.117) (0.113) (0.125) (0.151) (0.175) 
Q1 2010 -0.280*** -0.321*** -0.353*** -0.319*** -0.270* -0.0888 
 (0.0839) (0.0967) (0.0862) (0.101) (0.156) (0.124) 
Q2 2010 -0.324*** -0.381*** -0.395*** -0.440*** -0.240* -0.111 
 (0.102) (0.115) (0.106) (0.120) (0.134) (0.148) 
       
Zip FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log(all ED visits) No No No No No No 
       
Observations 3,528 1,134 1,656 1,422 1,206 1,188 
R-squared 0.970 0.972 0.971 0.973 0.964 0.971 
The average zip code number of uninsured ED visits (ages 18-64) in San Francisco in Q3 2007 is 103.9. No CHC 
controls are included. Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses.  







Table 2.9. Estimated coefficients 𝜋  and 𝛾  from equation (2.2), using the Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley 
control group. Dependent variable is the log of uninsured ED visits of various categories in zip code Z, 
quarter t. Ages 18-64. Excluded time period is Q3 2007. 
Outcomes→ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





Ages 18-34 Ages 35-64 Women Men 
       
𝜋: Q4 2007-Q3 2008 -0.0777 0.0157 -0.0122 -0.0622 -0.0787 -0.0858 
 (0.0811) (0.0687) (0.0758) (0.0971) (0.105) (0.0797) 
𝛾: Q4 2008-Q2 2010 -0.292*** -0.165* -0.169** -0.348*** -0.323*** -0.246*** 
 (0.0834) (0.0916) (0.0764) (0.0985) (0.0899) (0.0903) 
       
Zip FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝛿𝑡’s prior to Q3 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log(all ED visits) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 
R-squared 0.973 0.958 0.968 0.965 0.965 0.969 
Mean of Dependent       
Variable in Q3 2007 
in San Francisco 
69.9 34.1 47.9 56.1 36.8 64.6 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 






Table 2.10.  Estimated coefficients 𝛿𝑡 ’s from equation (2.1), using the Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley 
control group. Dependent variable is the log of uninsured ED visits of various categories in zip code Z, 
quarter t. Ages 18-64. Excluded time period is Q3 2007. 







Ages 18-34 Ages 35-64 Women Men 
       
Q1 2006 0.0235 0.424*** 0.280*** 0.0737 0.115 0.203* 
 (0.115) (0.114) (0.0826) (0.155) (0.136) (0.109) 
Q2 2006 0.218* 0.400*** 0.397*** 0.219* 0.240** 0.281*** 
 (0.113) (0.101) (0.0968) (0.127) (0.118) (0.0990) 
Q3 2006 0.193 0.248** 0.224*** 0.257* 0.200 0.209* 
 (0.130) (0.109) (0.0811) (0.142) (0.134) (0.106) 
Q4 2006 0.152 0.390*** 0.378*** 0.145 0.158 0.227** 
 (0.0929) (0.101) (0.110) (0.119) (0.111) (0.102) 
Q1 2007 0.0754 0.368*** 0.382*** -0.0506 -0.0610 0.258** 
 (0.0843) (0.112) (0.108) (0.101) (0.106) (0.0983) 
Q2 2007 0.0887 0.178* 0.108 0.0527 0.0511 0.139 
 (0.0902) (0.106) (0.0903) (0.0898) (0.117) (0.0999) 
Q4 2007 -0.0145 0.222** 0.141 0.0813 0.0273 0.0528 
 (0.102) (0.109) (0.0894) (0.121) (0.122) (0.127) 
Q1 2008 -0.0625 -0.0367 0.0192 -0.133 -0.0482 -0.106 
 (0.0778) (0.0842) (0.124) (0.0885) (0.141) (0.0833) 
Q2 2008 -0.0295 -0.0745 -0.0238 -0.0198 -0.0407 -0.123 
 (0.105) (0.0850) (0.108) (0.106) (0.135) (0.106) 
Q3 2008 -0.0982 0.0220 -0.120 -0.0153 -0.190 -0.0754 
 (0.107) (0.119) (0.0954) (0.132) (0.133) (0.106) 
Q4 2008 -0.184* -0.0541 -0.0772 -0.223 -0.142 -0.177* 
 (0.108) (0.101) (0.0873) (0.135) (0.111) (0.0998) 
Q1 2009 -0.155 -0.0722 -0.109 -0.244** -0.323*** -0.155* 
 (0.0947) (0.103) (0.0885) (0.0995) (0.121) (0.0907) 
Q2 2009 -0.208** -0.262** -0.200* -0.244* -0.200* -0.285*** 
 (0.0936) (0.116) (0.101) (0.129) (0.100) (0.100) 
Q3 2009 -0.334*** -0.266** -0.310*** -0.355*** -0.338*** -0.346*** 
 (0.111) (0.124) (0.114) (0.108) (0.114) (0.121) 
Q4 2009 -0.294*** 0.0232 -0.0648 -0.355*** -0.424*** -0.0580 
 (0.103) (0.118) (0.0969) (0.108) (0.115) (0.103) 
Q1 2010 -0.378*** -0.119 -0.133 -0.363*** -0.328*** -0.284** 
 (0.0978) (0.122) (0.116) (0.113) (0.113) (0.142) 
Q2 2010 -0.384*** -0.296** -0.200* -0.527*** -0.328*** -0.347*** 
 (0.123) (0.125) (0.111) (0.136) (0.120) (0.119) 
       
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 
R-squared 0.973 0.959 0.969 0.965 0.965 0.970 
Mean of depen-
dent variable in  
      
Q3 2007 in San 69.9 34.1 47.9 56.1 36.8 64.6 
Francisco       
All specifications include zip code fixed effects, year-quarter fixed effects, and the log of all ED visits as a control. 
No CHC controls are included. Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses.  







Table 2.11. Estimated coefficients 𝜋 and 𝛾 from equation (2.2), using the Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley 
control group. Dependent variable is the log of privately insured ED visits of various categories in zip 
code Z, quarter t. Ages 18-64. Excluded time period is Q3 2007. 
Outcomes→ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




Ages 18-34 Ages 35-64 Women Men 
       
𝜋: Q4 2007-Q3 2008 0.129** 0.0626 0.0216 0.179*** 0.0710 0.118* 
 (0.0557) (0.0872) (0.0585) (0.0581) (0.0530) (0.0689) 
𝛾: Q4 2008-Q2 2010 0.127* 0.0774 0.00581 0.198*** 0.0332 0.127* 
 (0.0727) (0.0799) (0.0760) (0.0623) (0.0650) (0.0672) 
       
𝛿𝑡’s prior to Q3 2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log(all ED visits) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 
R-squared 0.982 0.977 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.981 
Mean of Dependent       
Variable in Q3 2007 155.7 71.7 105.4 122.0 110.5 111.3 
in San Francisco       
All specifications include zip code fixed effects and year-quarter fixed effects. No CHC controls are included. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 




Table 2.12. Estimated coefficients 𝜋 and 𝛾 from equation (2.2), using the Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley 
control group. Dependent variable is the log of ED visits by children or elderly in zip code Z, quarter t. 
Excluded time period is Q3 2007. 
Outcomes→ (1) (2) (3) 
↓ Interaction terms Children Uninsured Children Elderly 
    
𝜋: Q4 2007-Q3 2008 0.0626 0.116 0.00882 
 (0.0418) (0.113) (0.0510) 
𝛾: Q4 2008-Q2 2010 0.227*** -0.119 -0.0342 
 (0.0653) (0.135) (0.0581) 
    
Zip FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes 
𝛿𝑡’s prior to Q3 2007 Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,134 
R-squared 0.990 0.927 0.989 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 







Table 2.13. Estimated coefficients 𝛿𝑡’s from equation (2.1) using the Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley control 
group. Dependent variable is the log of total ED visits by various types of patients in zip code Z, 
quarter t. Ages 18-64. Log of all ED visits is included on the RHS (except in column 2).  Excluded time 
period is Q3 2007. (Continued on the next page). 
Outcomes→ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
↓ Interaction 
terms 




No Procedures Procedures 
       
Q1 2006 0.104 -0.0477 -0.0678 0.163** -1.492*** 0.341*** 
 (0.107) (0.0678) (0.0467) (0.0813) (0.206) (0.0746) 
Q2 2006 0.255** 0.0921 -0.0546 0.0423 -0.281** -0.0308 
 (0.107) (0.0635) (0.0481) (0.0764) (0.121) (0.0714) 
Q3 2006 0.171* 0.0386 -0.00906 0.103 0.137 -0.0438 
 (0.101) (0.0979) (0.0255) (0.0626) (0.113) (0.0690) 
Q4 2006 0.191* 0.0768 0.0108 -0.0263 0.183 -0.0273 
 (0.0977) (0.0813) (0.0274) (0.0551) (0.139) (0.0486) 
Q1 2007 0.0791 0.0631 0.0384 -0.0263 0.282** -0.0694 
 (0.0769) (0.0837) (0.0273) (0.0705) (0.110) (0.0418) 
Q2 2007 0.0818 0.101 -0.00628 0.00261 0.0146 -0.0501 
 (0.0707) (0.0672) (0.0322) (0.0683) (0.109) (0.0603) 
Q4 2007 0.0553 -0.0709 -0.0267 0.0399 0.231*** -0.0837 
 (0.102) (0.0893) (0.0360) (0.0719) (0.0814) (0.0583) 
Q1 2008 -0.0842 0.00424 -0.0230 0.0157 0.228** -0.0965 
 (0.0651) (0.0855) (0.0354) (0.0777) (0.112) (0.0592) 
Q2 2008 -0.0350 0.0306 0.0328 -0.0663 0.106 0.00442 
 (0.0993) (0.0774) (0.0312) (0.0646) (0.150) (0.0626) 
Q3 2008 -0.0928 0.00243 -0.0141 -0.0178 0.160* -0.0154 
 (0.0956) (0.0734) (0.0423) (0.0747) (0.0939) (0.0608) 
Q4 2008 -0.128 -0.0405 0.0339 -0.0339 0.276** -0.0901 
 (0.115) (0.0812) (0.0376) (0.0654) (0.127) (0.0612) 
Q1 2009 -0.137 0.0147 -0.000438 -0.00401 0.323*** -0.0431 
 (0.0840) (0.0717) (0.0281) (0.0570) (0.116) (0.0604) 
Q2 2009 -0.267** 0.0159 0.0309 -0.0360 0.0244 -0.0122 
 (0.105) (0.0940) (0.0349) (0.0673) (0.0939) (0.0713) 
Q3 2009 -0.384*** -0.0152 0.0445 -0.0980* 0.124 -0.111 
 (0.121) (0.0827) (0.0277) (0.0586) (0.0966) (0.0871) 
Q4 2009 -0.278** 0.00190 -0.0200 0.0146 0.212** -0.136** 
 (0.111) (0.0989) (0.0325) (0.0680) (0.104) (0.0553) 
Q1 2010 -0.332*** 0.0439 -0.0188 0.0181 0.495*** -0.114* 
 (0.0799) (0.0693) (0.0359) (0.0684) (0.118) (0.0671) 
Q2 2010 -0.410*** 0.0496 0.00809 0.0501 0.499*** -0.0361 
 (0.107) (0.0981) (0.0322) (0.0731) (0.136) (0.0694) 
       
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 
R-squared 0.977 0.981 0.997 0.985 0.973 0.988 
All specifications include zip code fixed effects and year-quarter fixed effects. Neither CHC controls nor zip code 
linear time trends are included. Estimates are robust to the inclusion of these controls and the exclusion of the log of 
all ED visits on the RHS. For more information, see Section 2.5.1.10. Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip 







Table 2.13 (cont’d). Estimated coefficients 𝛿𝑡 ’s from equation (2.1) using the Oakland-Hayward-
Berkeley control group. Dependent variable is the log of total ED visits by various types of patients in 
zip code Z, quarter t. Ages 18-64. Log of all ED visits is included on the RHS.  Excluded time period is 
Q3 2007. 
Outcomes→ (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
↓ Interaction 
terms 
Ages 18-34 Ages 35-64 Women Men ACSCs 
      
Q1 2006 -0.0656 0.0228 0.0285 0.102* 0.155 
 (0.0566) (0.0395) (0.0529) (0.0590) (0.102) 
Q2 2006 0.0953 -0.0502 0.0786 0.0862 0.0689 
 (0.0687) (0.0530) (0.0641) (0.0618) (0.0957) 
Q3 2006 0.0387 0.0408 0.0179 0.108 0.0860 
 (0.0722) (0.0375) (0.0695) (0.0693) (0.120) 
Q4 2006 0.0150 0.0455 -0.0277 0.126** 0.0488 
 (0.0762) (0.0608) (0.0563) (0.0583) (0.113) 
Q1 2007 0.0774 0.0852 -0.00161 0.167** 0.229** 
 (0.0598) (0.0821) (0.0762) (0.0659) (0.0960) 
Q2 2007 0.0785 0.0176 -0.0561 0.151** 0.163 
 (0.0631) (0.0611) (0.0656) (0.0750) (0.0979) 
Q4 2007 -0.0125 0.0759 -0.0198 0.0498 0.0443 
 (0.0531) (0.0576) (0.0575) (0.0549) (0.0911) 
Q1 2008 0.0371 0.0593 -0.0264 0.0745 -0.0159 
 (0.0678) (0.0641) (0.0937) (0.0628) (0.113) 
Q2 2008 -0.0319 0.111 0.0795 0.0266 0.134 
 (0.0578) (0.0758) (0.0797) (0.0531) (0.114) 
Q3 2008 -0.0578 0.0555 0.0149 0.0342 0.0981 
 (0.0527) (0.0578) (0.0701) (0.0636) (0.112) 
Q4 2008 -0.0396 0.114 0.00348 0.0409 0.204* 
 (0.0549) (0.0791) (0.0705) (0.0607) (0.106) 
Q1 2009 -0.0545 0.0548 -0.0568 0.0133 0.0148 
 (0.0531) (0.0651) (0.0548) (0.0741) (0.112) 
Q2 2009 -0.0650 0.0872 -0.00983 0.0539 0.251* 
 (0.0724) (0.0843) (0.0867) (0.0674) (0.127) 
Q3 2009 -0.162** 0.153** 0.00563 0.00988 0.139 
 (0.0679) (0.0670) (0.0581) (0.0674) (0.120) 
Q4 2009 -0.0786 0.106 -0.0818 0.0908 0.00681 
 (0.0768) (0.0701) (0.0819) (0.0715) (0.122) 
Q1 2010 -0.0637 0.0738 0.000700 0.0660 0.119 
 (0.0733) (0.0629) (0.0692) (0.0606) (0.131) 
Q2 2010 0.0108 0.0519 0.0271 0.0738 0.181 
 (0.0639) (0.0490) (0.0785) (0.0614) (0.118) 
      
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 
R-squared 0.989 0.993 0.989 0.988 0.971 
All specifications include zip code fixed effects and year-quarter fixed effects. Neither CHC controls nor zip code 
linear time trends are included. Estimates in columns (7)-(10) are not robust to the inclusion of zip code linear time 
trends, but all are robust to the exclusion of the log of all ED visits on the RHS. For more information, see Section 
2.5.1.10. Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip code level, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 











Figure 2.4. Histogram of the Share of Uninsured ED Visits in 2006, the year prior to Healthy San 
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Source: OSHPD, 2006. 
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Figure 2.5. Changes in the median share of uninsured ED visits across 4 groups, defined by the 25th, 50th, 




Table 2.14. Median ratio of uninsured ED visits to all ED visits over time, in 4 groups of zip codes. 















2005 to 2010 
% change in 
the median 
Share<.25 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 -10.0% 
.25<Share<.5 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 -14.3% 
.5<Share<.75 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.10 -44.4% 
.75<Share 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.16 -30.4% 



















Data: OSHPD, 2005-2010. Based on 33 San Fran zips. 
Groups are based on the quantiles of 2006, the year before the reform year. 
H1 2005-H1 2010. 





Table 2.15. Within-San Francisco Analysis. Estimated coefficients 𝛿𝑡’s from a version of equation (2.1) 
for various pairs of treatment-control groups (see Section 2.5.2). Dependent variable is the log of ED 
visits by uninsured patients in zip code Z, year t. Semi-annual data, January-June 2005-2010. Excluded 
period is year 2007.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Groups → 
↓ Year 
𝑟𝑧,2006 > 25th percentile 
 
𝑟𝑧,2006 > 50th percentile 
 
𝑟𝑧,2006 > 75th percentile 
 
    
Year 2005 -0.303 -0.177 -0.239 
 (0.265) (0.170) (0.176) 
Year 2006 -0.220 -0.157 -0.0670 
 (0.203) (0.188) (0.179) 
Year 2008 -0.288 -0.344** -0.258* 
 (0.187) (0.132) (0.145) 
Year 2009 -0.188 -0.281 -0.253** 
 (0.282) (0.169) (0.122) 
Year 2010 -0.131 -0.353** -0.165 
 (0.159) (0.155) (0.132) 
    
Observations 204 204 204 
R-squared 0.975 0.976 0.975 
All specifications include zip code fixed effects and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip 
code level, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2.16. Within-San Francisco Analysis. Estimated coefficients 𝛿𝑡’s from a version of equation (2.1) 
for various pairs of treatment-control groups (see Section 2.5.2). Dependent variable is the share of non-
admission ED visits by uninsured patients in zip code Z, year t. Semi-annual data, January-June 2005-
2010. Excluded period is year 2007.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Groups → 
↓ Year 
𝑟𝑧,2006 > 25th percentile 
 
𝑟𝑧,2006 > 50th percentile 𝑟𝑧,2006 > 75th percentile 
 
    
Year 2005 -0.0410 -0.0210 -0.0544 
 (0.0367) (0.0282) (0.0376) 
Year 2006 -0.0224 -0.0195 -0.0326 
 (0.0201) (0.0227) (0.0360) 
Year 2008 -0.0661* -0.0630** -0.0640 
 (0.0336) (0.0265) (0.0420) 
Year 2009 -0.0489* -0.0548*** -0.0610** 
 (0.0248) (0.0198) (0.0296) 
Year 2010 -0.0476*** -0.0717*** -0.0762** 
 (0.0165) (0.0179) (0.0310) 
    
Observations 204 204 204 
R-squared 0.869 0.877 0.871 
All specifications include zip code fixed effects and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the zip 











Impact of the Nonprofit Integrity Act (2004) on 
 




On January 1, 2005, California’s new law titled the Nonprofit Integrity Act (NIA) came into 
effect. The main goal of the Act is to deter fraud and mismanagement of funds among public 
charities by instituting greater financial transparency and stronger governance infrastructure. 
NIA intends to hold managers of charities more accountable to their stakeholders by requiring 
independent audits, disclosure of financial statements, and the establishment of audit committees.  
This paper examines whether these new audit and disclosure mandates affected the 
growth and governance of public charities in California. Starting from 2005, California charities 
with annual incomes at or above $2 million have to undergo independent audits of their financial 
statements and make them available for inspection by the public and Attorney General. I focus 
on two broad sets of variables: One set that describes the organization’s governance 
infrastructure, and a second set that includes basic financial data. I find that new NIA provisions 
may have delayed revenue growth among charities that were below the $2-million threshold 
before NIA, but only temporarily. Analysis of a small set of governance measures reveals little 
change following the enactment of NIA. 
 
3.1.1. Public Charities 
Today, the nonprofit sector represents a large part of the U.S. economy. There were about 1.6 





and churches (National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2010a). Public charities, or charitable 
organizations, are the largest category (64%) of nonprofit organizations in the United States, 
which also include private foundations and a few other types of establishments. Hospitals, 
educational institutions, arts and human services organizations form the bulk of the charitable 
sector. There were over 112,000 charities in California in 2009, which reported over $125 billion 
in total revenue (about 6.7% of California’s GDP) and over $230 billion in assets1 (National 
Center for Charitable Statistics, 2010b, c; U.S. Census Bureau, 2012a). 
The objectives and efficiency of charitable organizations continue to be open questions 
for researchers and policy makers (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001; Hansmann, 1980; Weisbrod, 
1998). From the legal perspective, a public charity is an organization created for the public 
benefit, to enhance the welfare of communities. Each charity has a specific mission: for example, 
to provide education or health care services, etc. (Internal Revenue Service, 2008c). Contrary to 
the popular belief, nonprofit organizations, including charities, are allowed to earn profits. What 
distinguishes them from for-profit firms is the absence of owners and the non-distributional 
constraint (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001). This means that any excess profits of a charitable 
organization cannot be solely distributed to any individual stakeholder (e.g., an executive) or 
used for private benefit, though in practice, much of this is a grey area. Any profits have to be 
reinvested back into the organization to increase the scope or scale of its operations, support its 
endowment, or pay reasonable compensation.2 Upon charity dissolution, its assets can be 
appropriated by the organization’s creditors, if any, or must be donated to another charity, but 
not to any private individual. 
                                                          
1 One third of these registered charities are large enough so that they have to file annual returns with the IRS. 
Charities with gross annual receipts of less than $25,000 do not have to report their finances to the IRS. (National 
Center for Charitable Statistics, 2010a). 
 






Exemption from the federal income tax is the main benefit associated with the public 
charity status. Many charities are also often exempt from state income taxes and local real estate 
taxes. Overall, they enjoy significant tax savings and some smaller benefits such as lower 
postage rates, etc.  
In addition, donations to charities are tax deductible for donors, what encourages giving 
to these organizations. Unlike for-profit firms, many nonprofits are not able to raise capital by 
issuing stock or by borrowing (with some exceptions). That is why grants and donations from 
individuals, corporations, foundations, and the government are an important source of revenue 
for them.  
In general, the day-to-day operations of charities are carried out by managers, while their 
strategic direction and financial health are supervised by board members, who bear the ultimate 
legal responsibility for the proper management of charities. Board members, or trustees, of 
charitable organizations are usually not compensated, and have to act in the best interests of the 
charity, and promote its mission. The board is essentially the decision-making body of the 
organization that has the authority to make decisions about the way the charity implements its 
mission, and holds the management accountable. One other important function of the board is 
fundraising.  
It is generally believed that boards in the nonprofit sector are self-perpetuating: that is, 
new board members are usually appointed by their predecessors, come from the same social 
circles and share similar beliefs (Goldschmid and Swords, 2009). The exemption from the 
federal income tax coupled with the lack of well-defined legal restrictions on charities and 
self-perpetuating boards raise questions about the misuse of nonprofit resources, including the 
use of the charitable status as an anti-competitive strategy in industries where both for-profit and 





and Weisbrod, 2003).  
According to the IRS, it “continues to observe the misuse of tax-exempt organizations. 
Misuse includes arrangements to improperly shield income or assets from taxation, attempts by 
donors to maintain control over donated assets…,” etc. (Internal Revenue Service, 2008b). Weak 
internal controls and lack of oversight create opportunities for intentional and unintentional 
abuse of organizational resources and promote motivation other than the pursuit of a charitable 
mission (Wells, 2005). Fishman and Schwarz (2006) note that “because nonprofit outcomes may 
be harder to measure than for-profit counterparts, organizations may go on for years unobserved, 
undistinguished, unaccomplished, and largely unregulated” (p. 242). The lack of accountability 
and monitoring of charities by the public have been associated with abuse of the charitable status 
and the principal-agent problem similar to that in the corporate sector, when managers and/or 
board members act in their own interests rather than the interests of the charity. Fraud, stealing, 
and mismanagement of resources are not uncommon in the nonprofit sector, though large-scale 
violations are rare.  
Until recently, nonprofit organizations were exposed to little monitoring and scrutiny. In 
addition, they do not normally face the threat of a hostile takeover what serves as a disciplining 
mechanism in the corporate sector. Litigation exposure is almost non-existent in the charitable 
sector. This is because historically legal actions against charities were strongly discouraged so 
that donors’ resources would not be diverted away from charitable activities. Moreover, the 
nonprofit sector has traditionally relied on volunteers and board members, often unpaid. In order 
to incentivize their participation in charitable organizations, these agents’ liability had to be 
limited (Fishman and Schwarz, 2006).  
Overall, the IRS is not well-equipped to monitor charities. The IRS’s primary function is 





charities for abuse of the tax-exempt status or other violations. For example, only 845 IRS 
employees monitored charities in 2000 and 837 in 2008, while 819,008 charities reported to the 
IRS in 2000 and 1,186,915 in 2008 (The Chronicle of Philanthropy, 2009). Up until about a 
decade ago, competition for donations and the threat of media exposure were the only two 
external disciplining mechanisms for charities. 
In many states, the Office of the Attorney General is responsible for monitoring the work 
of public charities. The Attorney General has the authority to investigate charities, initiate 
lawsuits, dissolve organizations, remove board members, and more. But the primary function of 
the Attorney General is to promote accountability, to oversee charities and to ensure compliance 
with the charitable mission and tax-exempt status. However, the lack of staff and finances imply 
that monitoring of charities is limited, and they often come under the Attorney General’s scrutiny 
only when large-scale scandals erupt (Fishman and Schwarz, 2006; Independent Sector, 2005). 
Nonetheless, the public and policy makers have been increasingly zooming in on the 
charitable sector in the U.S. over the past decade or so, demanding greater transparency and 
accountability. Each charity with annual gross receipts of $25,000 must file an annual return with 
the IRS using Form 990 or 990-EZ. The Form includes balance sheet items, sources of revenue 
and expenses, compensation, and a brief description of the organization’s activities. Although 
Form 990 is open for public inspection, it has become widely accessible only with the emergence 
of charity watchdogs such as Guidestar and Charity Navigator, which collect, process and 
digitize Forms 990 and 990-EZ, post them online, and rate charities to help potential donors 
make informed decisions about charitable contributions (Internal Revenue Service, 2009a).  
Moreover, the IRS has been periodically revising Form 990 and Form 1023 (whose data 
is used to determine the nonprofit’s eligibility for the 501(c)(3) tax-exempt public charity status 





to set higher disclosure standards. For example, now charities have to submit information on 
their board members; CEO performance; any conflicts of interest and policies in place to address 
them; family ties; any loans to key personnel; and other governance-related matters. By requiring 
more information on governance practices of charities, the IRS seeks to encourage them to think 
through these issues and adopt proper organizational policies (e.g., how to handle a conflict of 
interest). Revisions of Form 990 (in 2008) and Form 1023 (in 2004) were meant to raise 
awareness among charities on governance issues and to signal greater attention on the part of the 
IRS to these matters3 (Blazek, 2005; Internal Revenue Service, 2009a; Independent Sector, 
2005).  
In this paper, I focus the Nonprofit Integrity Act (NIA) that aimed to increase the 
oversight of large public charities in California by introducing additional reporting requirements. 
Specifically, I use a simple differences-in-differences framework to examine the effect of NIA 
on various financial and governance outcome measures of charities. I find that in the two years 
following the enactment of NIA, California charities with an average 2002-2004 (pre-treatment) 
income just below the $2 million threshold grew by about 7.7-7.9% less than similar charities in 
other states, and by 15-18% less than California charities with the pre-treatment revenue just 
above $2 million. These differences in growth rates are not detectable by year 2007. The 
Nonprofit Integrity Act appears to have had little impact on other major financial measures of 
charities. With respect to the available set of governance measures, it appears that the majority of 
California charities affected by NIA had already used select NIA-prescribed governance and 
management practices before the law came into effect. It is possible that the adoption of some 
new governance measures (e.g., audit committees) and their incorporation into by-laws did not 
happen immediately following NIA’s enactment because of natural organizational rigidities. 
                                                          
3 Some nonprofit experts have criticized the IRS, a revenue collection agency, for interfering with the governance 





3.1.2. Definition of Governance 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as “the ways in which the suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.” Tirole (2001) 
describes it as “the design of institutions that induce or force management to internalize the 
welfare of stakeholders.” In general, corporate governance can be thought of as a set of rules and 
procedures that shape the every-day transactions, relations and decision-making within the 
organization. For example, how are decisions made? Who participates in voting at board 
meetings? Is the organization’s executive director a voting member of the board? How often 
does the board meet, and how are records of board meetings kept? Is the person who collects 
checks also the one who deposits them into the organization’s bank account? Do payments to 
various service-providers have to be approved by more than one person? 
The IRS also offers its own view on nonprofit governance, which is a set of 
organizational and operating principles and a system of internal controls to minimize the risk of 
non-compliance with the Internal Revenue Code’s requirements for tax-exemption (Internal 
Revenue Service (2009b). With respect to the nonprofit sector, the IRS is primarily concerned 
with issues such as excessive compensation, political intervention, and private benefit (i.e., 
violation of the non-distributional constraint), and recommends that organizations adopt the 
“good governance principles” listed below in order minimize the risk of misuse of resources and 
other fraudulent activity: 
1. Adopt a clearly formulated and communicated mission; 
2. Have an engaged, informed and independent board that implements the rules against 
inurement and self-dealing; 
3. Adopt policies and practices that address executive compensation, protect against conflicts of 





4. Transparency (accurate and complete record-keeping). 
The outline of this paper is as follows: Section 3.2 describes California’s Nonprofit 
Integrity Act and its predecessor in the corporate world, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Section 3.3 
includes literature review. Section 3.4 describes existing measures of corporate governance. 
Section 3.5 discusses data. Estimation strategy and results with governance-related measures 
(financial variables) are described in Section 3.6 (Section 3.7).  
 
3.2. Background 
3.2.1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 
In many respects, the Nonprofit Integrity Act (NIA) is a nonprofit version of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, or the American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability Act of 2002, which 
primarily applies to for-profit public corporations in the United States.  
Several high-profile accounting scandals took place in corporate America in the early 
2000’s, when the public found out about falsification of financial statements by executives of 
Enron and Telecom and a few others, and self-dealing transactions. Shareholders were 
intentionally misled on the true net worth of these companies. The scandals prompted heated 
debates on effective mechanisms to minimize the risk of this kind of fraud among corporations. 
Subsequently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was quickly passed and enacted in July 2002, in 
order to mitigate the principal-agent problem (i.e., fraud by corporate managers, auditors and 
accountants) by improving corporate governance. SOX imposes more stringent requirements 
with respect to the accuracy and transparency of accounting practices among for-profit public 
corporations, regulates their relationship with auditors, and requires disclosure of certain 
essential financial information to the public.  
The opponents of SOX argue that its provisions regarding the financial management of 





would do little to minimize the risk of fraud but would instead impose high cost of compliance 
on all public corporations. Romano (2005) suggests that SOX was poorly developed because it 
was passed in a rush, under high pressure from the media and discontented public. In addition, 
she notes the redundancy of many SOX provisions, which are present in other laws.  
The proponents of SOX argue that increased oversight and regulation of corporations’ 
financial management practices would help to both detect and deter fraud. Prentice and Spence 
(2006) review the existing empirical literature and conclude that there is sufficient empirical 
evidence to support the view that higher levels of regulation of accounting practices and other 
corporate governance-related areas benefit the society. For example, investors are more willing 
to invest in companies with better corporate governance, and this has a positive impact on the 
overall economy.  
Why would public corporations care about their compliance with SOX? In practical terms, 
non-compliance with SOX may negatively impact their ratings by Fitch, Standard and Poor’s, 
and other similar agencies. This, in turn, could affect the value of their stock and access to capital 
(Rodgers et al., 2005).  
 
3.2.2. SOX and the Nonprofit Sector 
SOX primarily regulates the behavior of for-profit public corporations. Most of the SOX 
provisions do not apply to public charities, except for the protection of whistle blowers and 
document destruction (Rodgers et al., 2005). 
Nonetheless, the passage of SOX has impacted nonprofit organizations throughout the 
U.S. Poor governance and the lack of accountability by managers of public charities are not 
uncommon. Increased oversight in the corporate sector has drawn the attention of nonprofits as 
well. Following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Guidestar (a nonprofit watchdog) and 





governance practices on a voluntary basis (Guidestar, 2003, 2009; Ostrower and Bobowick, 
2006). For example, they advise public charities to have independent audits of their financial 
statements and to establish independent audit committees, which would oversee the relationship 
between the charity and its auditors. Rodgers et al. (2005) note that nonprofit hospitals seem to 
have taken the lead in voluntarily adopting SOX provisions, but only primarily those that are 
least costly to comply with. Some states responded by introducing or re-enforcing SOX-like 
accounting and governance legal requirements for nonprofits (Hymowitz, 2005; Wells, 2005). 
 
3.2.3. California’s Nonprofit Integrity Act (NIA) of 2004 
California is the first state that introduced the SOX-like legislation for public charities following 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. NIA, or Senate Bill 1262, was adopted by the 
state of California in September 2004 and took effect on January 1, 2005 with a six-month 
phase-in or grace period (Silk and Fei, 2005). It includes three major types of provisions that 
affect charitable organizations that are either based in California or solicit funds in California 
(California Registry of Charitably Trusts, 2004):4 
1. Mandatory annual audits and audit committees: Charities whose annual income (net of 
government grants) is at least $2 million must have their financial statements audited by an 
independent CPA. The CPA has to ensure that the statements are prepared in accordance 
with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The three most recent audited 
statements must be available for inspection to the public and Attorney General. 
Charities at or above the 2-million threshold must also establish audit committees, which 
would oversee the relationship between the organization and its auditors. These audit-related 
                                                          
4 Prior to SOX (2002), many states had already adopted some SOX-like provisions (e.g., the audit of financial 
statements or oversight of commercial fundraisers). But California’s Nonprofit Integrity Act seems to include the 
most coherent and all-encompassing set of provisions that aim to improve nonprofit governance compared with any 






requirements do not apply to organizations below the threshold, as well as to hospitals, 
educational institutions, cemeteries, and religious organizations.   
2. Periodic review of CEO and CFO compensation: Board members must establish a formal 
mechanism by which to review the compensation of CEOs and CFOs on a regular basis. The 
compensation must be “just and reasonable,” but NIA does not specify what “just and 
reasonable” is. This requirement applies to all charities, both below and above the $2-million 
threshold (except hospitals, educational institutions, and others). 
3. Commercial fundraisers: The third set of NIA provisions regulates the work of commercial 
fundraisers, who are required to notify the Attorney General’s office of any planned 
fundraising campaigns in a timely manner. In addition, all fundraisers must be registered 
with the Attorney General’s office; otherwise, charities may void contracts with unregistered 
fundraisers (California Registry of Charitably Trusts, 2004).  
NIA also requires all charities to officially register with the Attorney General’s office and 
renew their registration annually.  
In this paper, I primarily focus on the first set of NIA provisions because they are based on a 
clearly defined income threshold that differentiates charities (often imperfectly) into two groups, 
by the audit requirement. I use this threshold in my identification strategy. I do not focus on the 
third set of provisions, targeted at commercial fundraisers, mainly because “… most of the 
93,000 charities registered with the Attorney General do not use commercial fundraisers to raise 
funds” (California Department of Justice, 2005).   
 
3.3. Literature Review 
Research on the impact of NIA on California nonprofits has been limited. Gilkeson (2007) 
provides a well-organized review of nonprofit governance issues, regulation and monitoring of 





specifically analyzes California’s Nonprofit Integrity Act. She suggests that NIA’s audit 
requirements may be not be the most effective set of new requirements imposed on California 
charities. First, the introduction of mandatory audits was borrowed from the corporate sector, and 
may not be the best way to discipline public charities. Second, audits also place a higher 
financial burden of compliance on charitable organizations than on public corporations. She 
contrasts the scale of the manager’s material gain from fraud in the nonprofit and for-profit 
sectors, and suggests that the emphasis should not be on the careful scrutiny of charity’s finances 
for fraud, but on identifying more effective and productive charities. Gilkeson (2007) is not 
against audits of charities per se, but merely suggests that their cost may exceed their potential 
benefits.  
Ostrower and Bobowick (2006) describe findings of the National Survey of Nonprofit 
Governance conducted by the Urban Institute in 2005. The goal of the survey is to analyze the 
impact the adoption of some SOX-like provisions would have on charitable organizations. They 
review issues such as independent audit committees, auditor responsibilities, certification of 
financial statements, disclosure of audits and Forms 990, insider transactions and conflicts of 
interest, and a few others. The survey responses suggest that some SOX-like provisions would 
require at least some level of effort on the part of many nonprofits (e.g., establishing an 
independent and well-functioning audit committee), but some provisions would hardly affect 
most organizations (e.g., restrictions on loans to key personnel). 
Wells (2005) also goes over the most relevant provisions of SOX that are recommended 
to be adopted by nonprofit hospitals. He presents the views of Fitch Ratings on the importance of 
financial transparency and accountability among non-profit hospitals that tend to have more 
stakeholders than nonprofits outside of the educational and health care sectors.  





nonprofit sector is limited. Callen and Falk (1993) analyze whether the composition of the 
charity’s board affects its efficiency, using charities in the Canadian health care sector. They find 
that organizations with a higher share of insider trustees (those that receive compensation from 
the charity) are not more wasteful or less efficient than charities with a higher share of volunteer 
board members.  
Segal and Weisbrod (1998) offer a discussion on nonprofits’ engagement in 
mission-related vs. commercial activities. The latter may be associated with violations of the 
tax-exempt status, and the risk of being detected by the IRS and other stakeholders (such as 
donors) deters charities from pursuing non-mission related activities.  
Marx (2012) offers an innovative dynamic bunching design approach to estimate the 
effect of an IRS threshold on public charities. 
Overall, most empirical papers on charitable organizations use various governance and 
management measures to test, in particular, the objective function of nonprofit organizations. In 
addition, much research is limited to nonprofit hospitals or institutions of higher education in the 
United States, which are not covered by NIA.  
Brickley and van Horn (2002) carry out an empirical exercise to evaluate whether 
nonprofit boards incentivize their CEOs to meet the organization’s financial targets or to fulfill 
the organization’s altruistic objectives. They find that CEOs’ turnover and compensation depend 
on their financial performance, but do not depend on whether they successfully achieve other 
non-financial or altruistic objectives. Since they exclusively focus on nonprofit hospitals, it is not 
surprising that their research is mostly consistent with other authors’ findings that little 
difference exists between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals.  
Duggan (2000) analyzes how nonprofit, for-profit and public hospitals spend “windfall” 





experienced by California hospitals as a result of the DSH program resulted in an increase of 
financial assets among both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, rather than an increase in services 
provided, what could be interpreted as another evidence of the lack of altruism in nonprofit 
hospitals.   
The question about the objective function of the nonprofit firm continues to be a 
fundamental question. To date, there is no comprehensive theory of the nonprofit firm (Glaeser 
and Shleifer, 2001). Authors do not seem to agree on the single theory that would capture well 
the behavior of all nonprofits. Basic questions include: Do nonprofits mimic for-profit firms, or 
do they act as altruists? Why do nonprofits exist? Although the nonprofit objectives should be an 
important part in the study of nonprofit governance and the principal-agent problem in the 
charitable sector,5 I do not discuss theories of the nonprofit firm here, but refer readers to the 
following important papers on the topic: Anheier and Ben-Ner (1997), Glaeser and Shleifer 
(2001), Hansmann (1980), Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006), Newhouse (1970), Pauly and 
Redisch (1973), Rose-Ackerman (1996), Salamon (1999), Steinberg and Gray (1993), and 
Weisbrod (1998).  
Finally, Lampkin and Boris (2002) describe existing IRS data on different types of 
nonprofits in the U.S., its limitations, and how the Urban Institute processes these raw IRS data. 
They acknowledge the availability of many financial variables that characterize nonprofits, 
which include broad revenue and expense categories; marked improvements in the quality of 
reporting on Form 990 over the past few years; classification of organizations by industry; and 
digitization of data, which can be easily checked against the original paper format that is usually 
available online. Other strengths of the IRS nonprofit data include the availability of data for the 
                                                          
5 Weisbrod (1998), for example, suggests that nonprofits can be modeled as individuals with a utility 






same organization over time, for a number of years, and the public nature of the data, especially 
starting from year 1999. Froelich et al. (2000) also analyze the quality of the IRS data and find 
that “the IRS Form 990 return is a reliable source of information for basic income and balance 
sheet entries.”  
Fremont-Smith (2004) discusses differences in information available on Form 990 and 
audited financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP. Form 990, for example, 
includes information on officers and directors and their compensation, but does not disclose any 
problems that could be identified during the audit. Financial statements do not list information on 
the compensation of key staff, but would note whether any major material weaknesses exist. 
However, auditor’s reports usually use a very general language, omitting any specific details, and 
normally reveal only gross violations. 
 
3.4. Outcome Variables: Measuring the Impact of NIA 
In this section, I present outcome variables that could be used to evaluate the impact of NIA on 
California charities, and discuss my choice of outcomes. This choice is often constrained by the 
quality of available data. I rely on measures of governance improvement used by ratings 
agencies such as Fitch Ratings and Standard and Poor’s to evaluate public corporations: in 
particular, I take some SOX provisions as guidelines in evaluating California charities (adopted 
from Mann et al., 2005; Standard and Poor’s, 2008; Wells, 2005). I also use certain nonprofit 
sector-specific variables, which provide insight into the magnitude of the principal-agent 
problem in different nonprofits.   
Below is a list of outcome variables, which are targeted by SOX and which could be applied 
to nonprofits as well. However, due to data limitations I am not able to utilize most of these 
variables. Nonetheless, I list them in this paper for the sake of a more systematized presentation 





– Fraud, an illegal appropriation and use of the organization’s resources for personal benefit, 
would be one of key variables to look at because the incidence of fraud is one of the major 
outcomes that both SOX and NIA aim to minimize. For example, the number of corporate fraud 
filings dropped significantly post-SOX: by 64% between 2006 and 2007, and by 77% between 
2004 and 2007 (Standard and Poor’s, 2008). Deterrence and better ability to detect fraud are 
cited as the main reasons for the above decline in the corporate sector. However, fraud is hard to 
detect in both for-profit and non-profit sectors (Standard and Poor’s, 2008), and is believed to be 
less prevalent in the nonprofit sector (Gilkeson, 2007). Large-scale fraud that attracts a lot of 
media attention is relatively rare. Smaller-scale fraud cases often neither reach the courtroom nor 
become public but are instead resolved within the organization (e.g., dismissal). Hence, I do not 
examine any fraud-related outcomes in this paper. 
– Independent auditors (i.e., auditors who strictly provide only audit-related services). Part 
XII of Form 990 revised in 2008 contains two related questions: (2a) “Were the organization’s 
financial statements compiled or reviewed by an independent accountant?” and (2b) “Were the 
organization’s financial statements audited by an independent accountant?” Answers to these 
questions could be valuable given the proper understanding and use of word “independent” by 
charities; however, the IRS began collecting this information only starting from 2008-2009.  
– Rotation of auditors every 3-5 years is viewed as another mechanism to minimize the 
incidence of fraud.  
– Establishment of an audit committee within the organization that would be responsible for 
retaining independent auditors, coordinating their relationship with the management, and 
ensuring the objectivity of auditors. This centralizes the audit function in the organization and 
could lower the risk of document falsification (Internal Revenue Service, 2008a). NIA does not 





Attorney General, 2013). Table 3.0 compares SOX, NIA, and IRS requirements with respect to 
audit committees. 
– Certification of financial statements by CEOs and CFOs (SOX Sections 302 and 906) as a 
way to assert that the responsibility for verifying the accuracy of financial documents rests with 
the top management. 
– Restatement of financial statements by a publicly traded corporation occurs when it 
corrects its previously issued financials due to an error or after a discovery of a significant 
material problem. The market is usual very sensitive to such events. By Standard & Poor’s (2008), 
the number of restatements increased right after the SOX enactment but eventually leveled off. 
Public charities may update or correct their old Forms 990; however, such changes happen 
infrequently and usually do not create significant agitation as in the for-profit sector. 
– Disclosure of “material weaknesses”: Section 404 of SOX mandates publicly traded 
corporations to identify material internal control weaknesses. The management is expected to 
report on how it plans to deal with these weaknesses and on any progress made (Mann et al., 
2005). NIA does not have a comparable provision. 
– CEO and CFO turnover and compensation, and the board: Despite the expectation that 
more independent boards are more likely to dismiss underperforming CEOs and CFOs and set 
more moderate executive levels of compensation, empirical findings do not support this 
hypothesis in the corporate sector. NIA does not include any direct provisions about increasing 
the board’s independence except for the requirement to establish an audit committee. NIA also 
requires the executive pay to be “just and reasonable” but does not define the term.  
Other variables that could measure whether NIA had any impact on California charities include 
the following:  





in audit and accounting fees incurred by organizations with weaker financial management 
practices and which did not normally have financial statements audited prior to NIA. Data on 
audit expenditures is hard to come by. But according to an informal report by the United Way of 
America on the audit costs incurred by its agencies, the average audit cost is $15,795 for United 
Way affiliates with annual revenue of $4-$9 million (or 0.26% of the annual revenue); $10,440 
for agencies with annual revenue of $2-$3.8 million (or 0.37% of the annual revenue); and 
$3,475 for agencies with annual revenue below $500,000 (or 0.93% of the annual revenues) 
(Independent Sector, 2005). A major data limitation in Form 990 is that audit-related expenses 
are lumped together with accounting expenses, and it is not possible to distinguish between 
“internal” accounting expenses and fees paid to professional CPAs and auditors.  
– Changes in the accounting firm that prepares the charity’s Form 990: Most charities that 
have to file Form 990 hire either an outside CPA or an accounting firm to prepare the Form, and 
its name is listed on the first page of Form 990. In certain cases, a switch to a different 
accounting firm post-NIA could signal the charity’s desire to improve its financial management. 
It is not clear, however, whether the outside preparer of Form 990 is the same person who audits 
the organization. Incidentally, whether Form 990 is self-prepared or prepared by an outside 
accountant is also a potential measure of the degree of sophistication of the organization’s 
financial practices. 
– Changes in the method of accounting: cash-based vs. accrual method. Here, I collect data 
on the method of accounting used by the charity and discuss it in Section 3.6. Overall, smaller 
and less mature organizations tend to use the cash-based method of accounting. Hence, a switch 
to the accrual method could be viewed as an improvement in the financial management of the 
organization. 





does not want to reveal all required information to the public. Froelich et al. (2000) find that 
about 30% of organizations do not report CEO’s compensation on Form 990. Recent 
improvements in the quality of reported data are more likely to be due to higher levels of 
scrutiny by the public, IRS, and charity watchdogs rather than due to new NIA provisions. 
– Extensions to file Form 990 with the IRS are not uncommon among charities (see Section 
3.6). Charities that require extensions could be more poorly managed than charities that file on 
time. 
– Increase in donations to the charity could be a signal of confidence among donors about 
the organization’s commitment to its mission and appropriate use of resources.  
– Changes in the management following NIA would be hard to track and are unlikely to be 
the result of NIA, which is a relatively “soft” law. Following SOX, charities are advised to have 
some board members with extensive accounting and finance expertise as another way to ensure 
that smaller charities have access to this kind of expertise and establish robust financial practices.  
– How a charity makes its Forms 990 available to the public – upon request, posts it on its 
own website or with Guidestar, or has no established mechanism – could also signal a great deal 
about the organization’s willingness to disclose information. 
– Form 990 also asks questions about family relationships among key employees; conflicts of 
interests; loans to the charity’s officers, etc. 
– Whether the number of audits and audited financial statements increased post-NIA would 
ideally be one of key variables to be examined in this paper. However, there are data constraints: 
Beginning 2008, Form 990 asks “Did the organization receive an audited financial statement for 
the year for which it is completing this return that was prepared in accordance with GAAP?” 
(Part IV, line 12). No comparable data is available on whether a nonprofit organization had 





Prior to 2008, I tried using information from Form 990, Parts IV-A and IV-B, as a proxy for 
whether the organization’s financials were audited: “Reconciliation of Revenue per Audited 
Financial Statements with Revenue and Expenses per Return.” Cross-reference with other 
sources mentioned in the next section (e.g., Form RRF-1) revealed that despite the title, this 
information on Form 990 did not necessarily mean that the organization’s financials were 
audited by an independent CPA or firm.  
 
3.5. Data 
3.5.1. IRS Form 990 
As mentioned above, most charities are exempt from the federal income tax and the majority of 
state taxes, but depending on the level of assets and annual income, have to report to the IRS by 
submitting an annual return, or Form 990. It includes basic information about the charity’s 
sources of income; main expense categories; balance sheet items; information on the top 
management, board of directors/trustees and contractors and their compensation; a brief 
description of the charity’s mission and activities; and more. While researchers of nonprofits 
agree that Form 990 often lacks in precision and accuracy, and does not provide a uniform set of 
variables, to date it is the only source of a rich set of variables that describe the activities of 
nonprofits in the United States (Froelich et al., 2000). 
The IRS is continuously revising Form 990 to better monitor and understand the work of 
nonprofits. The Form was significantly modified in 2008, primarily through the addition of new 
variables to be reported by nonprofits, and offers a lot more information on governance, 
management, and disclosure practices of organizations than its previous editions. For the purpose 
of this paper, however, I cannot use these newly introduced governance-related variables to 
evaluate the impact of the Nonprofit Integrity Act, because such information is not available for 





Identifying and obtaining data on nonprofit non-financial measures is a major challenge 
in empirical work on nonprofit governance. First, it is hard to measure the quality of these things. 
And second, the data often either does not exist, or is reported inconsistently and only by a few 
nonprofit organizations. In addition, non-financial measures of performance can be quite distinct 
in different nonprofit industries.  
All governance measures that I use in this paper had to be digitized from pdf files of the 
public Form 990, which can be obtained from the IRS, Guidestar, the Foundation Center, or 
directly from organizations. First, I assembled pdf files, and then converted select data fields into 
electronic format as follows: I drew a random sample of 3,086 California charities from the IRS 
Exempt Organizations Business Master File Extract6 for fiscal year ending between January 1 
and June 30, 2004. The Business Master File contains limited information on each charity that 
has to file Form 990 or Form 990-EZ with the IRS but represents the whole universe of reporting 
charities. Then I collected pdfs of Form 990 for each charity in the sample for two fiscal years – 
2004 and 2005 – to form a balanced panel. The Nonprofit Integrity Act took effect on January 1, 
2005 and offered charities a 6-month grace period to comply with its provisions. Any charity 
whose fiscal year ended any time between January 1 and June 30, 2005, had to be already 
compliant with NIA but had time to do so (Office of the Attorney General, 2013). Hence, I 
define the fiscal year ended January-June 2004 as the pre-treatment time period and the fiscal 
year ending in 2005 as the post-treatment period (the year of NIA’s enactment). Subsequently, I 
digitized data on the amount of government grants, changes in the charity’s governing 
documents (bylaws), requests for extensions to file Form 990, and the method of accounting. 
For financial measures I use Core Financial Files from the Urban Institute’s National 
                                                          





Center for Charitable Statistics7 for years 2002-2007. The Core Financial Files contain a great 
deal of financial information from Form 990 and allow me to form a larger panel of charities 
over six years and include charities located in other states too.  
In both samples, I exclude all educational organizations, hospitals, cemeteries and 
religious organizations using the charity’s NTEE code, which classifies organizations by industry 
(e.g., hospitals, colleges, soup kitchens, etc.).8  
 
3.5.2. Form RRF-1 of the California Registry of Charitable Trusts 
California Registry of Charitable Trusts is another source of some basic information on charities 
in California. As mentioned above, all charities that are based in California or solicit funds in 
California, must register with the Office of Attorney General and submit annual renewal 
documents (Form RRF-1, “Annual Registration Renewal Fee Report”). All these documents are 
available in the pdf format on http://ag.ca.gov/charities. The Form includes questions on the 
incidence of any conflicts of interest, theft or misuse of the organizational resources, use of 
professional fundraisers, receipt of government funding, whether the audited financial statements 
are prepared in accordance with GAAP, and a few others. I occasionally use the information on 
these RRF-1’s to confirm the validity of data listed in the charity’s Form 990.  
 
3.5.3. Audited Financial Statements 
During data collection, I came across several publicly available audited financial statements. The 
following is a quote from the auditor’s letter to one California charity for the fiscal year (FY) 
ended June 30, 2009: 
…I conducted my audit in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the 
United States of America. Those standards require that I plan and perform the audit to 
                                                          
7 National Center for Charitable Statistics (2013a) 
 





obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the 
amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the 
accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as 
evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. I believe that my audit provides a 
reasonable basis for my opinion. 
 
In my opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all material 
respects, the financial position of [name of the charity] as of June 30, 2009, and the 
changes in its net assets and its cash flows for the year then ended in conformity with 
accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America.9 
 
Audited financial statements give a much more detailed presentation of the organization’s 
balance sheet items than Form 990 does and a commentary on its procedures, activities, and 
accounting policies. However, information such that the president’s wife and daughter are also 
employed by the charity is only revealed in Form 990. The above example is consistent with 
discussions in Fremont-Smith (2004) and Gilkeson (2007) on strengths and limitations of audit 
information vs. Form 990, and consequently the costs and benefits of audits in the nonprofit 
sector. 
Next, I discuss my estimation strategy. I use a simple differences-in-differences approach. 
First, I estimate equation (3.1) with governance-related variables, and then equation (3.2) with 
financial variables. 
 
3.6. Estimation Strategy: Equation (3.1) with Governance-Related Outcomes 
3.6.1. Set-up of Equation (3.1) 
To estimate the causal effect of the audit mandate on governance, I use an exogenous change in 
the reporting requirements that NIA imposed on large California charities. Any organization 
whose annual income (net of government grants)10 is at or exceeds $2 million is subject to the 
independent audit requirement, except hospitals, educational institutions, cemeteries, and 
                                                          
9 The charity is located in Sylmar, California.  
 






I collect data on governance measures only for a sample of charities in California (as 
described in section 3.5.1), so I am not able to use charities in other states as my control group in 
this section. I want to use a simple differences-in-differences framework, so the main challenge 
is to properly define the treatment and control groups using only California charities. I want to be 
able to use the $2 million threshold defined in NIA, but the validity of such strategy is 
questionable because charities can manipulate whether their revenue is above or below the $2 
million threshold. The differences-in-differences strategy defined below may still be valid for as 
long as charities do not manipulate their revenue precisely, for example, because some sources of 
future revenue may be unpredictable (Lee and Lemieux, 2009). I try to circumvent this problem 
by using charities’ pre-NIA revenue as a determinant of how likely a charity is to be affected 
(treated) once NIA is enacted. 
For each California charity, I calculate my running variable defined as total revenue net 
of government grants, using data reported by charities for FY ended January-June 2004, a few 
months before NIA was signed into law on September 29, 2004 (Adler & Colvin, 2006). In this 
section, in regressions with governance variables, I define charities for which the running 
variable is at or above the $2 million threshold in 2004 as my treatment group, and charities 
below the threshold as my control group. By taking the year 2004 data to define treatment, I 
want to mitigate the problem that charities may misreport their total revenue in 2005, when NIA 
was already enacted. That is, I take data for the year before NIA as a more exogenous predictor 
of whether the charity would be subject to NIA in 2005. Even if charities tried to manipulate 
their revenue down in 2005 to stay under the $2 million threshold, organizations whose total 
revenue (net of government grants) exceeded $2 million in 2004 are more likely to be above the 





Another difficulty with the use of this policy change in estimating the causal impact of 
new requirements is that nonprofits below the threshold (and in other states used in the next 
section) may adopt some NIA provisions on a voluntary basis. This would further complicate the 
identification of the NIA’s effect. Data could clarify whether the take-up of treatment by the 
control group is a problem. (Later, my data reveals a much bigger problem, which essentially 
makes the estimation exercise with governance outcomes impractical). 
Keeping the above issues in mind, I propose to estimate equation (3.1) below:   
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑖 ∙ 𝐹𝑌2005 + 𝜆𝐹𝑌2005 + 𝜓𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (3.1) 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 is an outcome variable for charity i, defined by the charity’s employer identification number 
(EIN), in fiscal year t. 𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑖 = 1 for charity i whose 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,2004 − 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,2004 ≥$2 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 (treatment group) and zero otherwise (control group). 𝐹𝑌2005=1 if year t is 2005 
(post-NIA), and zero if year t is 2004 (pre-NIA). 𝜓𝑖 is a set of charity fixed effects to control 
for all permanent or relatively stable characteristics of organizations such as size, location, 
managerial talent, industry, overall quality of reporting on Form 990, etc. In all regressions, 
errors are robust and clustered at the charity level. 
The “governance sample” includes 3,086 charities, described in section 3.5.1. The 
treatment group includes 402 charities (13.03% of all organizations), and the control group has 
2,684 charities (86.97%). All outcome variables that I use in this section are binary. Despite the 
binary nature of outcomes, I use the linear model specified in (3.1) and forego any non-linear 
specifications. Then the coefficient of interest 𝛿 estimates the impact of NIA on the average 
frequency of the outcome (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), or the average change in the outcome 
variable in the treatment group post-NIA, relative to the change in the control group over the 
same period of time (here, 2004 to 2005).  





of concerns that charities may manipulate their revenue, but also because I have very few 
observations in close proximity to the $2 million threshold on both sides. The limitation of the 
“governance sample” is that the Business Master File does not contain data on the amount of 
government grants, which is an important determinant in whether the organization is above or 
below the $2 million threshold. When I drew the sample, I had to rely only on total revenue, 
without data on government grants, and focused on organizations with total revenue between $1 
and $3 million. I then digitized government grant data from pdf files of Form 990 in 2004. After 
data clean-up, it turned out that there were few observations in 2004 around the $2 million 
threshold.   
Next, I describe how a select number of governance-related measures changed between 
2004 and 2005 among California charities. It turned out that there was very little variation in my 
chosen governance outcomes, what makes estimation of equation (3.1) impractical. Nonetheless, 
I supplement the qualitative description of these outcomes with results of estimating equation 
(3.1) in Tables 3.1-3.3. Table 3.1 includes results with the whole “governance sample.” Tables 
3.2 and 3.3 zoom in closer on the $2 million threshold, and include charities with the year 2004 
running variable between $1.5-$2.5 million (n=165) and $1.6-$2.4 million (n=134), respectively. 
 
3.6.2. Estimation Results from Equation (3.1) 
3.6.2.1. Method of Accounting: Cash-based vs. Accrual 
There are two main methods of accounting: cash-based and accrual. The use of the cash-based 
method could be one indicator of weak financial management, but it is also used by many small 
and new nonprofits. The two approaches differ in the timing of when financial transactions are 
recorded. Under the cash-based method, income is recorded only when it is actually received by 
the organization and does not have any liquidity constraints (e.g., cash). Under the accrual 





the cash-based method provides a clear state of the organization’s cash flows, the overall 
financial health of the organization is better captured by the accrual method of accounting 
(Internal Revenue Service, 2013). GAAP principles mandated by the Nonprofit Integrity Act are 
based on accrual principles, and their adoption is viewed as a more dependable method of 
financial management. 
If a charity is classified as treated in my sample and uses the cash method of accounting 
in FY ended January-June 2004 (i.e., in the pre-treatment period), then by having to comply with 
the NIA’s audit requirement in 2005, it would have to switch to the accrual method in the 
post-treatment period. This change should be reflected in the data reported on Form 990 for FY 
ended 2005. Observing changes in the accounting method could give me a rough idea of how 
many organizations had to switch to the accrual method post-NIA. In addition, this kind of a 
change could be used to identify organizations, which had weaker financial management 
pre-NIA, and which were prompted to improve their financial practices under the new law.  
In my limited dataset for 2004-2005, information on the method of accounting is 
available on the first page of Form 990 both pre- and post-NIA. Hence, I use it as one of the 
indicators of the charity’s internal controls and the quality of the organization’s financial 
management.  
I have data on 3,086 charities with fiscal year ending between January and June 2004, of 
which 920 or 29.8% use the cash method of accounting. So almost a third of all organizations in 
my sample use the cash method of accounting in 2004. However, the cash method is used 
primarily by small charities, whose revenue is below the $2-million threshold: In the control 
group, 903 organizations (or 33.6% of 2,684) use the cash method in 2004. In the treatment 





the cash method.11 That is, almost all treated charities in my sample already use the required 
accrual method of accounting the year before the enactment of the Nonprofit Integrity Act, and 
two-thirds of under-the-threshold organizations use the accrual method in the pre-NIA period. In 
2005, 6 (or 1.5%) of a total of 402 treated charities switch from the cash to accrual method, 
while 31 organizations (or 1.2%) in the control group make the same switch. All switchers in the 
treatment group were above the $2 million threshold in both 2004 and 2005, but none of the 31 
switchers in the control group were above the $2 million threshold in either 2004 or 2005.  
Eleven organizations in the treatment group (or 2.7%) use the cash-based method of 
accounting in both 2004 and 2005. 10 of these are above the $2 million threshold in both years, 
and only one charity’s income in 2005 is reported to be under the threshold.12 Overall, it appears 
that most charities were already using the accrual method of accounting, especially the larger 
ones, and NIA impacted only a very small percentage of charities.  
Though not very informative (or sensible) given the descriptive statistics above, columns 
(1) in Tables 3.1-3.3 list differences-in-differences estimates with outcome variable 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1 if 
charity i used the accrual method of accounting in fiscal year t, and zero otherwise. The 
expectation is that 𝛿 � > 0 since the use of the accrual method is expected to increase following 
NIA. The estimated coefficients are not statistically significant in all Tables.  
 
3.6.2.2. Extensions 
Another outcome that I examine here is a request for an extension to file Form 990 with the IRS. 
The Form must be filed within four and a half months after the end of the charity's fiscal year. 
When more time is necessary to complete the return, for example, because the organization does 
                                                          
11 The remaining seven observations were coded as “unknown.” 
 
12 It appears, however, that this charity was established in 2003-2004 and being above the $2 million threshold in 





not have all necessary documentation, it can request an “automatic” three-month extension by 
filing Form 8868 with the IRS. This first request would be automatically granted if Form 8868 is 
properly filled out, filed on time, and if any estimated tax owed is paid. After that, the 
organization may request an additional extension, for another three months, which must be 
approved by the IRS.   
In the corporate sector, delays in producing timely reports raise questions about the firm’s 
ability to “effectively budget for future cash flow requirements” (Mann et al, 2005), and thus can 
adversely impact the company’s ratings. It seems reasonable to assume that taking more time to 
complete Form 990 by charities could be a signal of poor organizational structure and financial 
management, lack of proper procedures, etc. Less efficiently managed charities may have 
required more time to file Form 990 in order to comply with the new NIA provisions and to 
prepare audited financial statements. Hence, I use information on extensions to file Form 990 as 
a proxy for the quality of charities’ financial management. 
 While Form 990 is due four and a half months after the end of the charity’s fiscal year, 
the Nonprofit Integrity Act requires audited financial statements to be prepared within 9 months 
after the end of the fiscal year. If the above-the-threshold charity decides not to send out Form 
990 to the IRS before the audit of its financial statements is complete to ensure consistency and 
accuracy of both documents, then it might be reasonable to use “the time to completion” of Form 
990 or any delays as a rough measure of how long it took the NIA-impacted charity to complete 
the audit, and thus the quality of the charity’s financial management (taking into account the 
charity’s size). As with the audit of public corporations, to avoid the issuance of a negative 
assessment of the charity’s finances even when there are deficiencies, the auditor might take 
extra time to carry out a more thorough examination of the charity’s accounting procedures and 





accounting fees and delays in preparing Form 990.   
One advantage of using data on extensions is that it is available in both pre-NIA (2004) 
and post-NIA (2005) years. Form 8868 is usually attached at the end of the corresponding Form 
990. So for each charity in my sample in 2004 and 2005, I collect information on whether the 
charity requested an extension, and if yes, whether it needed a second, additional extension.  
Extensions in FY 2004 (pre-treatment year): 790 organizations out of 3,086 (25.6%) 
requested an automatic extension to file a return for FY ended January-June 2004. Of these, 45.6% 
of organizations (n=360) requested an additional three-month extension.   
Extensions in FY 2005 (treatment year): Out of 3,086 organizations in my panel data, 
29.3% of charities (n=904) requested at least one three-month automatic extension; i.e., an 
increase of 14.4% from 2004, the year prior to NIA’s enactment. Of these charities with 
automatic extensions for FY 2005, 44.8% (n=405) filed for an additional extension to submit 
Form 990 to the IRS. The number of these additional extensions grew from 360 in 2004 to 405 in 
2005, a 12.5% increase.   
Columns (2) and (3) in Tables 3.1-3.3 list regression results where outcome variable 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1 if charity i requested an initial automatic and then an additional extension in fiscal year t, 
respectively, and zero otherwise. I expect an increase in extensions due to NIA (𝛿 � > 0). 
However, estimated coefficients are not statistically significant and suggest that the new law had 
little impact on the number of extensions to file Form 990.  
 
3.6.2.3. Change in bylaws, the governing documents 
Form 990 also requires organizations to report changes in their governing documents, or bylaws, 
defined as a set of written rules that establish the mission, procedures, and the overall way the 
organization should be managed. For example, a charity would update its bylaws by including 





which is mandated by NIA of charities at or above the $2-million threshold. Thus, I examine 
changes in organizations’ governing documents, some of which are expected to be due to NIA. 
 Part VI, “Other information,” of the year 2004 version of Form 990 has the following 
question (line 77): “Were any changes made in the organizing or governing documents but not 
reported to the IRS? If 'Yes,' attach a conformed copy of the changes.” 46 organizations, or 1.5% 
of 3,086, report a change in their governing documents during FY 2004 (pre-NIA). During 2005, 
44 organizations (or 1.43%) report a change in their governing documents. 40 out of 44 year 
2005 modifiers were “new,” and only 4 were made by organizations, which also made changes 
in bylaws in 2004.   
Columns (4) in Tables 3.1-3.3 list regression results where outcome variable 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1 if 
charity i had a change in bylaws in fiscal year t, and zero otherwise. As a result of the NIA’s 
requirement to have an audit committee, an increase in the number of organizations modifying 
their bylaws is expected (𝛿 � > 0). The estimated coefficients are not statistically significant. 
Overall, it appears that few organizations report any changes in bylaws by the end of FY 2005. 
Perhaps it was too early for NIA-related changes to take place in 2005, just as the law took effect. 
Modifications of bylaws might be occurring slowly, with delays rather than instantly, because 
the staff need to develop new procedures, agree on them, and then start implementing them. Thus, 
changes in bylaws should also be checked in later years, not only in 2005 presented here.   
 
3. 7. Estimation Strategy: Equation (3.2) with Financial Variables 
3.7.1. Set-up of Equation (3.2) 
I compile another dataset using the Urban Institute’s NCCS Core Files with financial outcomes 
for years 2002-2008. This allows me to take other states as a control group, and to analyze a 





requirements. I start by comparing growth in revenue of charities “just below” the $2 million 
threshold in 2004 in California and other states. If California charities wanted to stay under the 
threshold in order to avoid higher scrutiny and the disclosure of audited financial statements, 
they would have grown slower than similar charities in other states. 
Specifically, I focus on organizations whose three-year average income in 2002-2004 was 
“just below” the $2 million threshold, and compare the before- and after-NIA changes in 
financial outcomes of California charities to those in other states by estimating equation (3.2) 
below. First, I form a balanced panel of charities located in and outside of California, using data 
for 2002-2007. Then I calculate the three-year average revenue (line 12 on Form 990) for 
pre-NIA years (2002-2004) and keep only those charities whose average revenue lies in 
[$1million; $2 million). Within this set of charities, I keep only those with average revenue less 
than $2 million but at or above the third quartile of $1,636,556 (i.e., I take 25% of charities, 
which are closer to the $2 million threshold from the left). This is my “just below the $2 million 
threshold” group that I use in estimating equation (3.2). Note that I calculate the three-year, 
pre-NIA average because revenue fluctuates widely from year to year. So, to better capture the 
charities that were below the threshold not only in 2004, but in other years prior to NIA, I take 
the three-year average over 2002-2004.  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + � (𝜇𝑘𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑘 ∙ 𝐶𝐴𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑘)
𝑘≠2004
 + 𝜓𝑖 + 𝑡 ∙ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡      (3.2) 
𝑘 = 2002, …, 2007. 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the log of total revenue (or another financial variable) of charity i in 
year t, where t is from 2002 to 2007. 𝐶𝐴𝑖=1 if charity i is based in California (treatment group), 
and zero if it is based in any other state or the District of Columbia (control group). 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑘 = 1 if 
𝑘 = 𝑡, and zero otherwise. {𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑘} is a set of year fixed effect that captures variation common 





(3.1), 𝜓𝑖 is a set of charity fixed effects. 𝑡 ∙ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 is a shorthand for state-specific linear time 
trends to account for possible differences across states over time in factors such as population 
growth, etc. 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is a robust error term, clustered at the charity level.  
The coefficients of interest in (3.2) are 𝜇2002, 𝜇2003, and 𝜇2005–𝜇2007. These coefficients 
measure the average percentage change in charity’s annual revenue (or another financial 
outcome) between the baseline year 2004 and year 𝑘 ≠ 2004 in California relative to other 
states. If NIA had an effect on the charities’ income or other financial variables that I use here, 
then the pre-treatment 𝜇2002  and 𝜇2003 would not be statistically different from zero, while 
𝜇2005–𝜇2007  would reveal a statistically significant difference between public charities in 
California and other states post-NIA. 
 
3.7.2. Estimation Results from Equation (3.2) 
Column (1) of Table 3.4 shows that NIA might have slowed revenue growth in 2005 and 2006 
among California charities that tended to be under the $2 million threshold in years before NIA. 
In particular, the statistically significant  ?̂?2005 = −0.0758 implies that California charities with 
the average 2002-2004 (pre-treatment) income just below $2 million grew by 7.6% less, on 
average, than similar charities in other states between 2005 and 2004. ?̂?2006 is also significant 
and of similar magnitude, -0.0788. The differential growth effect dissipates in 2007. Since 𝜇2002 
and  𝜇2003 are not statistically significant, this provides extra support to the hypothesis that 
slower growth in the treatment group in 2005 and 2006 was due to NIA. Results in column (1) of 
Table 3.4 were obtained without any state-level linear time trends, while results in column (2) of 
Table 3.4 are based on the specification with state-specific linear time trends. Estimates in 





Next, I discuss results in columns (3)-(4) of Table 3.4, where I use different pairs of 
control and treatment groups within California. As in Section 3.6, I take pre-NIA data to define 
treatment and control groups in order to mitigate possible endogenous responses by charities. In 
column (3), I report results of estimating equation (3.2) using the same treatment group as in 
column (1) but a different control group. Specifically, I compare treated California charities 
(“under the threshold”) to a set of California charities whose 2002-2004 average revenue was 
greater than $2 million prior to NIA. The control group includes only those California charities 
whose three-year average revenue in 2002-2004 is below the first quartile of $2,210,436 but 
above $2 million (i.e., 25% of all California charities whose average lies in [$2million; $3 
million] interval). The idea is to examine California charities with pre-NIA average income close 
to $2 million on both sides. Supposedly, control charities (“above the threshold”) are more likely 
to have revenue that is above $2 million in post-NIA years, even if revenue manipulation is 
possible. They might be less able (or willing) to stay below the threshold by constraining their 
growth than treated charities (“below the threshold”). Similar to the results in columns (1) and (2) 
of Table 3.4, I find that in the two years following the enactment of NIA (2005 and 2006), 
California charities with the average pre-treatment income less than $2 million grew by 15% and 
18% less, respectively, than California charities with the pre-treatment revenue “just above” $2 
million. 
Column (4) of Table 3.4 presents another robustness check using the same treatment 
group and “smaller” California charities as a control group. These “smaller” charities include 
organizations with the 2002-2004 average revenue between $1 million and $1,636,556, which 
was used above to define the treatment group. That is, here I consider charities with the pre-NIA 
average income between $1 million and $2 million. I expect that if NIA impacted whether 





treatment group) may be more likely to manipulate the revenue in order to stay under the 
threshold post-NIA than organizations further away from the threshold from the left. In column 
(4) of Table 3.4, I find weaker evidence of slower differential growth between the treated and 
control groups than in the two previous examples.  
Finally, in column (5) of Table 3.4, I compare California charities to charities in other 
states, all of which were “just above” the $2 million benchmark before NIA (but below 
$2,210,436 as defined above). Not surprisingly, based on their pre-NIA revenue, these larger 
California charities were most likely affected by NIA, and were either already compliant with 
NIA or had little incentive to be under the threshold in order to avoid the audit mandate. None of 
the coefficients are statistically significant, and this suggests that these treated charities did not 
grow any differently from comparable charities in other states as a result of NIA. In contrast, by 
the results in column (1) of Table 3.4, it appears that just-below-the-threshold charities had a 
stronger interest in keeping revenue under $2 million in the two years following the enactment of 
NIA.  
Next, I talk about Table 3.5 but first comment on data. The problem with NCCS files 
from which the data was drawn is that it contains no data on government grants (line 1c on Form 
990). Rather, only data from line 1d is available, where government grants are reported together 
with private contributions from individuals and grants from foundations. So in this section, I 
have so far used total revenue from line 12, instead of the preferred measure of total revenue net 
of government grants (line 12-line 1c), to define whether the charity is above or below the $2 
million threshold. In Table 3.5, however, I include only those charities that reported zero 
contributions in line 1d in all three years prior to NIA (2002-2004). This makes total revenue in 
line 12 an appropriate measure to be used in determining whether the NIA audit mandate applies. 





of Tables 3.4 and 3.5, respectively). The overall results of Table 3.5 are much weaker than those 
reported in Table 3.4.  
Tables 3.6-3.8 report regression results using other financial variables from Form 990 for 
the three pairs of treatment-control groups used in columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 3.4 above, 
respectively. Outcomes include two main types of revenue: donations from individuals and 
grants from foundations (line 1c of the old Form 990, which may also include government 
grants), and fee-based revenue from services that charities provide to their beneficiaries (line 2); 
total annual expenses (line 17), fundraising-related expenses (line 15), wages (lines 25 and 26); 
total assets (line 59b) and total liabilities (line 66b).  
In Table 3.6, I compare just-below-the-threshold charities in California vs. other states. It 
appears that much of the slowdown in total revenue growth in the treatment group in 2005 and 
2006 happened due to slower growth in revenue from contributions, grants, and donations 
(column 1). There is also some evidence of a decrease in wages (column 5) but this result is not 
robust. There was no statistically significant impact associated with NIA on other financial 
outcomes.  
In Table 3.7, I compare California charities “just below” and “just above” the $2 million 
threshold before NIA. The results in column (1) are consistent with those in Table 3.6: declines 
in total revenue were due to lower levels of donations in 2005 and 2006 to charities in the 
treatment group, i.e., those just below the threshold. Next, in Table 3.8, where I include charities 
“just above” the threshold and compare organizations in California to those in other states, I 
find no impact of NIA on California charities. 
Finally, I also test for whether treated charities tend to stay below the $2 million 
threshold. If the explanation for the slower growth of charities (even if only temporary) observed 





then these organizations should not just grow slower on the average, but they should stay below 
the $2 million threshold. Specifically, I estimate equation (3.2) with a binary outcome variable 
such that 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =1 if 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 < $2 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 for charity i in year t, and zero otherwise. 
Then positive and statistically significant ?̂?2005 - ?̂?2007  and insignificant ?̂?2002  and ?̂?2003 
would support the hypothesis that below-the-threshold California charities responded to NIA by 
keeping their total revenue below the $2 million mark. The results are reported in Table 3.9, and 
replicate the various control-treatment group combinations of Table 3.4. Overall, there is not 
enough evidence to suggest that California charities most impacted by NIA tend to stay below 
the threshold, on average.  
 
3.8. Conclusion 
In this paper, I analyze the impact of mandatory audits and higher disclosure requirements on 
public charities in California. First, I analyze the effect using a small set of governance measures 
and find little change as a result of the Nonprofit Integrity Act. Most affected organizations were 
already using the accrual method of accounting prior to NIA, and so did not have to change this 
aspect of their financial management. The number of extensions to file Form 990 in 2005 was 
not statistically different from 2004, contrary to the expectation that more charities would have 
taken more time to prepare Form 990 and the required audit of statements. Likewise, there were 
few reported changes in bylaws, which might reflect the fact that most affected charities did not 
have enough time to establish audit committees in the 6-12 months following the enactment of 
NIA. It is also possible that charities might have been negligible in properly reporting changes in 
their governing documents on the old Form 990. Starting from 2008, the new Form 990 has a 
substantially higher number of questions on nonprofit governance, and charities might have 





appears to be more heterogeneity across charities in the quality of reporting on non-financial 
variables requested on Form 990 than on financial ones. 
One of the main limitations of this paper in analyzing nonprofit governance is the lack of 
other governance-related measured. More data on governance measures is available on From 990 
from year 2008. Additional information could also be obtained from the California Registry of 
Charitable Trusts. Weaknesses in the “governance sample” used here include a limited number 
of years and the absence of data on charities in other states. Improvements could be made in 
collecting data on more charities with the total revenue net of government grants closer to the $2 
million benchmark on both sides prior to NIA.  
 Second, using the dataset with financial measures of performance, I find that in the two 
years following the introduction of NIA, California charities with an average 2002-2004 
(pre-treatment) income “just below” the $2 million threshold grew by about 7.7-7.9% less than 
similar charities in other U.S. states, and by 15-18% less than California charities with the 
pre-treatment revenue “just above” $2 million. These differences in growth rates are not 
detectable by year 2007. Moreover, there is no difference in total revenue growth post-NIA 
between just-below-the-threshold California charities and smaller California charities (further 
away from the $2 million threshold), as well as no difference between above-the-threshold 
charities in California and the rest of the United States. I also find no evidence to suggest that 
California charities most impacted by NIA tend to stay below the threshold, on average. 
Overall, it is possible that the law exists only on paper, at least for the time period 
considered in this paper. The enforcement mechanism is probably weak as the Office of the 
Attorney General most likely does not have sufficient resources to monitor how the majority of 
charities comply with NIA. In addition, NIA seems to penalize only commercial fundraisers 





Table 3.0. Comparison of SOX, NIA and IRS requirements with respect to Audit Committees. 
Targeted Outcomes 
and Procedures 
SOX Provisions & 
Suggestions 
NIA Provisions IRS Form 990 
Requirements 
Audit Committee must 
be Appointed by: 
the Board the Board (if above the $2-million 
threshold) 
N/A 
Member of the Audit 
Committee must be a 
Board Member 
Yes No N/A 
Staff members, the 
president or CEO, the 
treasurer or CFO as 
members of the Audit 
Committee 
? No N/A 
Certification of Financial 
Statements by CEO/CFO 
(Sec. 302 of SOX) 
Yes No  Less restrictive 
Timely Disclosure (Sec. 
302) 
Yes  Yes. Audited statements must be 
available within 9 months of the fiscal 
year end. 
Yes. Form 990 must be 
filed within 4 and half 
months of the fiscal year 
end. 
Method of Information 
Dissemination 




Same as for Form 990. Financial 
statements must be made available to 
the Attorney General. 




Periodicity of Reporting Quarterly Annual (subject to certain thresholds) Annual (subject to certain 
thresholds, different from 
NIA) 
CEO/CFO compensation 
(Sec. 304 of SOX)  
Compensation is tied to 
financial restatements as 
way to motivate CEO/CFO 
to avoid potential 
problems with 
reporting/disclosure) 
Compensation of CEO and CFO must 
be “just and reasonable” (applies to all 
charities, except hospitals, educational 
institutions, and a few others). No 
definition is given. 
The IRS does not have 
any thresholds on the 
compensation levels of 
nonprofit staff. 
Internal Control Report 
(attested by a public 
accounting firm, Sec. 
40413) 
Involves an evaluation of 
internal controls 
The closest analog would be the 
Director’s letter that accompanies 
audited financial statements. It is not 
publicly available, except for 
important stakeholders such as board 
members and may be donors and 
bankers. 
Introduction of more 
governance-related 
inquiries on Form 990 in 
2008. 
Rotation of an auditor 
and/or an auditing firm 
every 3-5 years 
Yes No N/A 
Whistleblower protection 
and destruction of 
documents 
Yes. The only SOX 
provision that applies to 
nonprofits 
N/A N/A 
Disclosure of material 
changes in the operations 
or financial situation of a 
company on a timely and 
current basis 
Yes Implicit Yes 




                                                          





Table 3.1. Estimates of 𝛿 from Equation (3.1). Dependent variables are binary, related to accounting and 
governance practices of charities. The treatment (control) group includes California charities with the year 
2004 running variable at or above (below) $2 million. Data for 2004-2005 only. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
𝛿 0.00859 0.0233 0.00612 -0.00784 
 (0.0106) (0.0409) (0.0353) (0.0166) 
     
Charity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 6,172 6,172 6,172 6,172 
R-squared 0.976 0.706 0.639 0.538 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the charity level, are in parentheses.  
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3.2. Estimates of 𝛿 from Equation (3.1). Dependent variables are binary, related to accounting and 
governance practices of charities. The treatment (control) group includes California charities with the year 
2004 running variable between $2 and $2.5 million ($1.5 and $2 million). Data for 2004-2005 only.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
𝛿 0.0133 0.0311 -0.0889 0.0133 
 (0.0293) (0.113) (0.0969) (0.0431) 
     
Charity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 330 330 330 330 
R-squared 0.930 0.716 0.643 0.490 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the charity level, are in parentheses.  
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3.3. Estimates of 𝛿 from Equation (3.1). Dependent variables are binary, related to accounting and 
governance practices of charities. The treatment (control) group includes California charities with the year 
2004 running variable between $2 and $2.4 million ($1.6 and $2 million). Data for 2004-2005 only. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
𝛿 -0.000892 0.0843 -0.0308 -0.000892 
 (0.0299) (0.126) (0.108) (0.0532) 
     
Charity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 268 268 268 268 
R-squared 0.941 0.727 0.660 0.491 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the charity level, are in parentheses.  






Table 3.4. Estimated coefficients from Equation (3.2), using different treatment-control pairs (described 
in Section 3.7). Dependent variable is the log of total revenue. 2002-2007. Excluded year is 2004.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment-Control 
pairs 
CA vs. rest  
below $2m 
 CA vs. rest  
below $2m 
CA below vs. 
CA above 
CA below vs. 
CA smaller 
CA vs. rest  
above $2m 
      
𝜇2002 -0.00277 -0.00569 -0.197* 0.0377 0.166* 
 (0.0426) (0.0439) (0.103) (0.0518) (0.0964) 
𝜇2003 -0.00493 -0.00639 -0.129 0.0163 0.0956 
 (0.0344) (0.0348) (0.0840) (0.0411) (0.0786) 
𝜇2005 -0.0758** -0.0743** -0.152** -0.0711* 0.0789 
 (0.0313) (0.0317) (0.0707) (0.0371) (0.0647) 
𝜇2006 -0.0788** -0.0759** -0.184** -0.0466 0.110 
 (0.0354) (0.0368) (0.0847) (0.0420) (0.0788) 
𝜇2007 -0.0570 -0.0526 -0.184* -0.0491 0.125 
 (0.0437) (0.0461) (0.0974) (0.0498) (0.0892) 
      
State Time Trends No Yes No No No 
      
Observations 53,286 53,286 1,542 4,248 4,140 
R-squared 0.602 0.603 0.383 0.464 0.372 
Charity fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors, clustered at the charity level, are in parentheses.  
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3.5. Estimated coefficients from Equation (3.2), using different treatment-control pairs (described 
in Section 3.7). Dependent variable is the log of total revenue. Includes only charities with zero 
contributions. 2002-2007. Excluded year is 2004.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment-Control 
pairs 




CA below vs. 
CA above 
CA below vs. 
CA smaller 
CA vs. rest  
above $2m 
      
𝜇2002 0.00825  -0.164 -0.00169 -0.0861 
 (0.0581)  (0.194) (0.0970) (0.236) 
𝜇2003 -0.00385  -0.0608 -0.0254 0.000425 
 (0.0223)  (0.115) (0.0544) (0.0955) 
𝜇2005 -0.0686*  -0.209** -0.0691 -0.0705 
 (0.0409)  (0.0925) (0.0551) (0.0618) 
𝜇2006 -0.0687  -0.345* -0.0717 -0.111 
 (0.0504)  (0.172) (0.0892) (0.172) 
𝜇2007 -0.124  -0.469* -0.107 -0.0891 
 (0.123)  (0.253) (0.141) (0.137) 
      
Observations 2,742  90 228 114 
R-squared 0.667  0.620 0.614 0.336 
Charity fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors, clustered at the charity level, are in parentheses.  






Table 3.6. Estimated coefficients from Equation (3.2) for different financial variables. Treatment group 
includes California charities “just below” the NIA threshold using the 2002-2004 average revenue. 
Control group includes comparable charities in other states. 2002-2007. Excluded year is 2004. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Donations Fee-based 
Revenue 
Fundraising Expenses Wages Assets Liabilities 
        
𝜇2002 0.0482 -0.0875 0.0564 0.0785* 0.0302 0.00940 0.0622 
 (0.0790) (0.0874) (0.0892) (0.0445) (0.0341) (0.0396) (0.0825) 
𝜇2003 0.0642 -0.00475 0.0184 0.0368 0.0294 0.00731 0.0867 
 (0.0655) (0.0631) (0.0840) (0.0286) (0.0187) (0.0294) (0.0699) 
𝜇2005 -0.216** -0.0151 -0.0205 -0.0371 -0.0516** -0.0261 0.0528 
 (0.0863) (0.0556) (0.0777) (0.0240) (0.0204) (0.0248) (0.0707) 
𝜇2006 -0.170* 0.00880 -0.00816 -0.0372 -0.0564 -0.0222 0.0193 
 (0.0881) (0.0664) (0.0775) (0.0314) (0.0361) (0.0308) (0.0894) 
𝜇2007 -0.114 -0.0241 -0.0350 -0.0289 -0.0812* -0.0266 -0.0241 
 (0.102) (0.0822) (0.0854) (0.0430) (0.0446) (0.0404) (0.0953) 
        
Observations 53,286 53,286 53,286 28,995 53,286 53,286 53,286 
R-squared 0.970 0.988 0.989 0.816 0.989 0.937 0.939 
Charity fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors, clustered at the charity level, are in parentheses.  
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3.7. Estimated coefficients from Equation (3.2) for different financial variables. Treatment (control) 
group includes California charities “just below” (“just above”) the NIA threshold using the 2002-2004 
average revenue. 2002-2007. Excluded year is 2004. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Donations Fee-based 
Revenue 
Fundraising Expenses Wages Assets Liabilities 
        
𝜇2002 -0.231 -0.223 -0.0514 -0.108 0.0736 -0.0838 -0.126 
 (0.187) (0.136) (0.126) (0.0808) (0.0597) (0.0947) (0.175) 
𝜇2003 -0.217 -0.0520 -0.0522 -0.0642 0.0456 -0.0691 -0.0447 
 (0.169) (0.120) (0.117) (0.0541) (0.0417) (0.0604) (0.160) 
𝜇2005 -0.432*** 0.0394 -0.0113 -0.115** -0.000703 0.0147 -0.0447 
 (0.160) (0.137) (0.153) (0.0545) (0.0459) (0.0362) (0.142) 
𝜇2006 -0.349* -0.0640 -0.0189 -0.115** -0.0763 -0.00954 -0.0931 
 (0.198) (0.149) (0.149) (0.0474) (0.0600) (0.0603) (0.164) 
𝜇2007 -0.298 -0.156 -0.0206 -0.141** -0.0719 -0.0326 -0.192 
 (0.200) (0.206) (0.182) (0.0634) (0.0857) (0.0674) (0.196) 
        
Observations 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,542 
R-squared 0.973 0.983 0.986 0.470 0.987 0.940 0.933 
Charity fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors, clustered at the charity level, are in parentheses.  







Table 3.8. Estimated coefficients from Equation (3.2) for different financial variables. Treatment group 
includes California charities “just above” the NIA threshold using the 2002-2004 average revenue. 
Control group includes comparable charities in other states. 2002-2007. Excluded year is 2004. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Donations Fee-based 
Revenue 
Fundraising Expenses Wages Assets Liabilities 
        
𝜇2002 0.239 0.0657 0.119 0.152* -0.0310 0.0750 0.186 
 (0.175) (0.112) (0.0972) (0.0779) (0.0585) (0.0881) (0.155) 
𝜇2003 0.226 0.0398 0.0306 0.0796 0.00400 0.0684 0.124 
 (0.157) (0.106) (0.0859) (0.0515) (0.0430) (0.0542) (0.144) 
𝜇2005 0.164 -0.0477 0.0379 0.0516 -0.0671 -0.00229 0.109 
 (0.138) (0.123) (0.137) (0.0511) (0.0449) (0.0299) (0.132) 
𝜇2006 0.132 0.0532 0.0329 0.0672* 0.0139 -0.00249 0.170 
 (0.178) (0.141) (0.133) (0.0404) (0.0540) (0.0552) (0.143) 
𝜇2007 0.174 0.156 0.00504 0.102* 0.00328 0.0120 0.221 
 (0.180) (0.195) (0.165) (0.0550) (0.0780) (0.0585) (0.177) 
        
Observations 4,140 4,140 4,140 4,140 4,140 4,140 4,140 
R-squared 0.966 0.988 0.989 0.531 0.988 0.949 0.934 
Charity fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors, clustered at the charity level, are in parentheses.  
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3.9. Estimated coefficients from Equation (3.2), using different treatment-control pairs (described 
in Section 3.7). Dependent variable 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =1 if 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 < $2 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 for charity i, in year t, 
and zero otherwise. 2002-2007. Excluded year is 2004.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment-Control 
pairs 
CA vs. rest  
below $2m 
 CA vs. rest  
below $2m 
CA below vs. 
CA above 
CA below vs. 
CA smaller 
CA vs. rest  
above $2m 
      
𝜇2002 0.0304 0.0585 0.0119 0.0635 -0.122 
 (0.0544) (0.0548) (0.120) (0.0562) (0.111) 
𝜇2003 0.0693 0.0834* 0.156 0.0648 -0.0846 
 (0.0495) (0.0497) (0.0950) (0.0515) (0.0854) 
𝜇2005 0.0161 0.00201 -0.0107 0.0243 -0.0122 
 (0.0433) (0.0434) (0.0748) (0.0465) (0.0641) 
𝜇2006 -0.0364 -0.0645 -0.0583 -0.0210 -0.0551 
 (0.0453) (0.0459) (0.0811) (0.0490) (0.0705) 
𝜇2007 -0.0875* -0.130*** -0.137 -0.0643 -0.0689 
 (0.0475) (0.0487) (0.0871) (0.0514) (0.0762) 
      
State Time Trends No Yes No No No 
      
Observations 53,286 53,286 1,542 4,248 4,140 
R-squared 0.654 0.656 0.397 0.408 0.301 
Charity fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors, clustered at the charity level, are in parentheses.  
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Histories of some of these pioneer clinics, which have the FQHC designation today, 
suggest that their establishment was mainly driven by high demand for medical care by 
medically underserved populations. The intended beneficiaries of clinics’ services are 
usually low-income people, ethnic minorities, immigrants, and seasonal agricultural 
workers.   
 
• “Alliance Medical Center was founded in 1971 by a group of dedicated 
volunteers, community members who answered a need for a clinic that would 
serve farmworkers and their families. As the years have gone by, Alliance has 
grown and prospered as we continue to serve the community. We are no longer 
just a “farmworker clinic.” We now serve everyone from newborns to elders, 
offering medical and dental care, and a wide range of specialty services.” 
(http://www.alliancemed.org/index.php/administration/history) 
 
• “In 1994, Brookside Community Health Center was established by the West 
Contra Costa Health Care District in response to District studies which showed a 
lack of primary health care services for low income, medically underserved 
residents of the area.” (http://www.brooksideclinic.org/about-us.html) 
 
• [San Ysidro Health Center] was founded in 1969 by a local women's organization 
that recognized the need for accessible, affordable, quality health services in their 
community, especially prenatal and pediatric care services... . Since its inception, 
SYHC has grown to be the major "safety net" provider in San Diego's South 




• “The Vasek Polak Children’s Clinic Family Health Center (TCC/VP) opened on 
November 18, 2002 and is located in one of the most impacted zip codes in Long 
Beach, 90813. Many patients served at this clinic have significant stressors, 
including poverty, unemployment, inadequate housing, unsafe neighborhoods, 





• “In 1980, Clinica de Salud del Valle de Salinas (CSVS) was founded by a group 
of concerned local community members to ensure that basic health care was 
available to all residents of Monterey County, with a focus on families working in 
the agriculture industry.” (http://www.csvs.org/english/history.html) 
 
• “A coalition of Salvadoran civil war refugees sought to address the pressing 
mental and physical needs of their compatriots in the Los Angeles community and 
founded Clinica Romero in 1983 with the assistance of volunteer physicians. 
Inspiration for the mission of the clinic is rooted in the active compassion and 
defense of the poor exemplified by the life of martyred Archbishop Romero of El 
Salvador.” (http://www.clinicaromero.com/about) 
 
 
